Archive for the ‘Carbon price’ Category

Revisiting Kaya

Today we see a huge focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency as solutions for reducing CO2 emissions and therefore addressing the climate issue. Yet, as I have discussed in other posts, such a strategy may not deliver the outcome people expect and might even add to the problem, particularly in the case of efficiency. I am not the only one who has said this and clearly the aforementioned strategy has been operating for some 20 years now with emissions only going one way, up.

Kaya Yoichi

A question that perhaps should be asked is “why have many arrived at this solution set?”. Focusing on efficiency and renewable energy as a solution to climate change possibly stems from the wide dissemination of the Kaya Identity, developed in 1993 by Japanese energy economist Yoichi Kaya (pictured above). He noted that:

 Kaya formula

 Or in other words:

Kaya formula (words)

Therefore, by extension over many years (where k = climate sensitivity): 

Climate Kaya formula (words)

In most analysis using the Kaya approach, the first two terms are bypassed. Population management is not a useful way to open a climate discussion, nor is any proposal to limit individual wealth or development (GDP per person). The discussion therefore rests on the back of the argument that because rising emissions are directly linked to the carbon intensity of energy (CO2/Energy) and the energy use per unit of GDP (Energy/GDP or efficiency) within the global economy, lowering these by improving energy efficiency and deploying renewable energy must be the solutions to opt for.

But the Kaya Identity is just describing the distribution of emissions throughout the economy, rather than the real economics of fossil fuel extraction and its consequent emissions. Starting with a simple mineral such as coal, it can be picked up off the ground and exchanged for money based on its energy content. The coal miner will continue to do this until the accessible resource is depleted or the amount of money offered for the coal is less than it costs to pick it up and deliver it for payment. In the case of the latter, the miner could just wait until the price rises again and continue deliveries. Alternatively, the miner could aim to become more efficient, lowering the cost of pickup and delivery and therefore continuing to operate. The fossil fuel industry has been doing this very successfully since its beginnings.

The impact on the climate is a function (f) of the total amount delivered from the resource, not how efficiently it is used, when it is used, how many wind turbines are also in use or how many people use it. This implies the following;

Climate formula (words)

This may also mean that the energy price has to get very low for the miner to stop producing the coal. Of course that is where renewable energy can play an important role, but the trend to date has been for energy system costs to rise as renewable energy is installed. A further complication arises in that once the mine is operating and all the equipment for extraction is in place, the energy price has to fall below the marginal operating cost to stop the operation. The miner may go bankrupt in the process as capital debt is not being serviced, but that still doesn’t necessarily stop the mine operating. It may just get sold off to someone who can run it and the lost capital written off.

This doesn’t have to be the end of the story though. A price on the resultant carbon emissions can tilt the balance by changing the equation;

Climate formula with carbon price (words)

When the carbon price is high enough to offset the profit from the resource extraction, then the process will stop, but not before. The miner would then need to invest in carbon capture and storage to negate the carbon costs and restart the extraction operation.

What this shows is that the carbon price is critical to the problem. Just building a climate strategy on the back of efficiency and renewable energy use may never deliver a reduction in emissions. Efficiency in particular may offer the unexpected incentive of making resource extraction cheaper, which in turn makes it all the more competitive.

 

Emissions Trading via Direct Action in Australia

  • Comments Off

The Australian Government recently released a Green Paper describing in more detail its proposal for an Emission Reduction Fund (ERF), the principle component of its Direct Action climate policy. The ERF will sit alongside renewable energy and reforestation policies, but is designed to do the bulk of the heavy lifting as the Government looks for some 430 million tonnes of cumulative reductions (see below) over the period 2014 to 2020. The ERF will have initial funding of about AU$ 1.55 billion over the forward period, with the money being used to buy project reductions (as Australian Carbon Credit Units or ACCUs) from the agriculture and industrial sectors of the economy by reverse auction. These reductions will be similar to those that are created through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) available under the Kyoto Protocol.

 Australia Reduction Task to 2020

Although the fund and reverse auction process are discussed in some detail and appear as central to the policy framework, this may not be the case as the system is rolled out and the full framework developed. The issue that comes from such an approach to emissions reduction is that despite buying project reductions from the economy, the overall emissions pathway for the economy as a whole still does not follow the expected trajectory. The ERF may also encounter a number of issues seen with the CDM, all of which are some form of additionality;

  1. Determining if there would have been higher emissions had the project not happened. Perhaps the reduction is something that would have happened anyway or the counterfactual position of higher emissions would never have actually happened. For example, an energy efficiency gain is claimed in terms of a CO2 reduction but the efficiency gain is subject to some amount of rebound due to increased use of the more efficient service, therefore negating a real reduction in emissions. Further, the counterfactual of higher emissions might never have existed as the original less efficient process would not have operated at the higher level.
  2. Double counting – the project presumes a reduction that is already being counted by somebody else within the economy as a whole. For example, an energy efficiency gain in a certain part of the supply chain is claimed as an emissions reduction, but this is already intrinsic to the overall emissions outcome for another process.
  3. Rent seeking – project proponents seek government money for actions already underway or even construct an apparent reduction.

The Australian emissions inventory will be measured bottom up based on fuel consumption, changes in forest cover and land use and established estimates / protocols for agriculture, coal mine fugitive emissions, landfill etc. It will not be possible to simply subtract the ERF driven reductions from such a total unless they are separate sequestration based reductions, e.g. soil carbon. This is because the ERF reductions are themselves part of the overall emissions of the economy.

The Green Paper clearly recognizes theses issues and proposes that the overall emissions pathway through to 2020 must be safeguarded. In Section 4 it discusses the need for “An effectively designed framework to discourage emissions growth above historical levels . . . “, with associated terminology including phrases such as “covered entities”, “baseline emission levels”, “action required from businesses” and “compliance”.  The safeguarding mechanism, rather than being a supplementary element of Direct Action, could end up becoming the main policy measure for decarbonisation if significant CO2 reductions are not achieved under the ERF. While this may not be the objective that the Government seeks, it does mean that the implementation of the safeguard mechanism needs to incorporate the design thinking that would otherwise be applied to the development of intended emission trading systems, such as the Alberta Specified Gas Emitters Regulation.

As currently described, the safeguarding mechanism looks like a baseline-and-credit system, with the baseline established at facility level either on an intensity or absolute emissions basis (both are referred to in the Green Paper). Should a facility exceed the baseline it could still achieve compliance by purchasing ACCUs from the market, either from project developers or other facilities that have over performed against their own baselines. Although the Government have made it very clear that they will not be establishing a system such as cap-and-trade that collects revenue from the market, facilities will nevertheless face compliance obligations and may have to purchase reduction units at the prevailing market price.

The level of trade and the need for facilities to purchase ACCUs will of course depend on the stringency of the baselines and this remains to be seen, however in setting these the Government will need to be mindful of the overall national goal and its need to comply with that. The development of a full baseline and credit trading system also raises the prospect of the market out-bidding the Government for ACCUs, particularly if the Government sets its own benchmark price for purchase, as is indicated in the Green Paper.

As Australia moves from a cap-and trade system under the Carbon pricing Mechanism (CPM) to the ERF and its associated safeguarding mechanism, the main change for the economy will be distributional in nature, given that a 5% reduction must still be achieved and the same types of projects should eventually appear. However, the biggest challenge facing any system in Australia could be around speedy design and implementation, given that the time remaining before 2020 is now very limited and the emission reduction projects being encouraged will themselves take time to deliver.

The US Submission on Elements of the 2015 Agreement has recently appeared on the UNFCCC website and outlines, in some detail, the approach the US is now seeking with regards “contributions”. Adaptation and Finance are also covered, although not to the depth of the section on Mitigation.

The submission makes it very clear that the US expects robust contributions from Parties, with schedules, transparency, reporting and review. There is also a useful discussion on the legal nature of a contribution. None of this is surprising as the US delegation to the recent COPs and various inter-sessional meetings has made it very clear that real action must be seen from all parties, not just those in developed countries.

But the submission makes no reference to the role of carbon markets or carbon pricing. Only in two locations does it even refer to market mechanisms and this is only in the context of avoiding double counting. This is coming from the Party that gave the world the carbon market underpinning of the Kyoto Protocol, which in turn has given rise to the CDM, the EU ETS, the CPM (in Australia) and the NZ ETS to name but a few, so perhaps reflects the current difficulty Parties are having keeping carbon price thinking on the negotiating agenda. 

I would argue that without a price on carbon emissions, the CO2 emissions issue will be much more difficult to fully resolve. Further to this, while individual countries may pursue such an agenda locally, the emissions leakage from such systems could remain high until the carbon price permeates much of the global energy system. This then argues for an international agreement that encourages the implementation of carbon pricing at a national level. The Kyoto Protocol did this through the Assigned Amount Unit, which gave value to carbon emissions as a property right. While there is no such “Kyoto like” design under consideration for the post 2020 period, the agreement we are looking for should at least lay the foundations for such markets in the future. The question is, how??

In the post 2020 world, carbon pricing is going to have to start at the national level, rather than be cascaded from the top down. Many nations are pursuing such an agenda, including a number of emerging economies such as China, South Korea, South Africa and Kazakhstan. Linkage of these carbon price regimes is seen as the key to expansion, which in turn encourages others to follow similar policy pathways and join the linked club. The reason this is done is not simply to have carbon price homogeneity, but to allow the transfer of emission reduction obligations to other parties such that they can be delivered more cost effectively. This allows one of two things to happen; the same reductions but at lower cost or greater reductions for the expected cost. The latter should ideally be the goal and is apparently the aspiration the USA has, given it states that the agreement should be “designed to promote ambitious efforts by a broad range of Parties.” The carbon price is simply a proxy for this process to allow terms of trade to be agreed as a reduction obligation is transferred.

All of this implies that the post 2020 agreement at least needs a placeholder of some description; to allow the transfer of reductions to take place between parties yet still have them counted against the national contribution. As it stands today, it is looking unlikely that explicit reference to carbon pricing or carbon markets will make its way into the agreement, but perhaps it doesn’t need to at this stage. On the back of a transfer mechanism, ambition could increase and a pricing regime for transfers could potentially evolve. If that happens to look like a global carbon market in the end, then so be it.

What to make of 2013?

It’s difficult to sum up 2013 from a climate standpoint, other than to note that it was a year of contrast and just a little irony. Overall progress in actually dealing with the issue of global emissions made some minor gains, although there were a few setbacks of note along the way as well.

  • The IPCC released the climate science part of their 5th Assessment Report and that managed to keep the media interested for about a day, after which it was back to issues such as health care, economic growth, Euro-problems and assorted regional conflicts. Importantly, the report introduced into the mainstream the much more challenging model for global emissions, which recognizes that it is the long term accumulation that is important, rather than emissions in any particular year.
  • The global surface temperature trend remained stubbornly flat, despite every indication that the heat imbalance due to increasing amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere remains in place and therefore warming the atmosphere / ice / ocean system somewhere, although where exactly remained unclear. The lack of a clear short term trend became a key piece of evidence for those that argue there is no issue with changing the concentration of key components of the atmosphere, which further challenged the climate science community to provide some answers.
  • The UNFCCC continued to put a brave face on negotiations that are being seriously challenged for pace by most of the worlds declining glaciers while the world’s largest emitter, China, often thought of as blocking progress at the international level kicked off a number of carbon pricing trial systems in various parts of the country.
  • Australia elected a government that proudly announced on its first day in office that the carbon pricing system which was finally in place and operating after eight years of arguing would be dismantled, only to be confronted by the fact that the country sweltered under the hottest annual conditions ever recorded in that part of the world.
  • Several very unusual global weather extremes were reported, including what may be the most powerful ever storm to make landfall, yet there was a distinct lack of desire by scientists and commentators to attribute anything to the rising level of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere, except perhaps for the UNFCCC negotiator from the Philippines who went on a brief hunger strike in response to devastation that hit parts of his country.
  • The EU carbon price remained in the doldrums for the entire year, although did show a few signs of life as the Commission, Parliament and various Member States teased, tempted and taunted us with the prospect of action to correct the ETS and set it back on track. In the end, the “backloading” proposal was passed by the Parliament and will likely be adopted and implemented, but the test will be whether or not the Commission now has the backbone to propose and unconditionally support the necessary long term measures to see the ETS through to 2030 as the main driver of change.
  • For the first time that I had seen, a book was released that finally got to grips with the emissions issue, yet somewhat alarmingly failed to find any clear route out of the dilemma we collectively find ourselves in. “The Burning Question”, by Mike Berners-Lee and Duncan Clarke recognized how difficult the emissions challenge has become and questioned those who trivialize the issue by arguing that more renewable energy and better efficiency is all that is needed to solve the problem. Clearly a book for those who designed the hallway posters [Link] at COP19 in Warsaw to read. Closer to home, new Shell Scenarios released in March [Link] 2013 did chart a pathway out of the emissions corner that Mike and Duncan painted themselves into, but the much discussed 2°C wasn’t quite at the end of it.
  • The IEA put climate change back in the headlines of their World Energy Outlook, with a special supplement released in June outlining a number of critical steps that need to be taken to keep the 2°C door open. Unfortunately they hadn’t taken the time to read “The Burning Question” and consequently positioned enhanced energy efficiency as a key step to take over this decade.
  • In North America both the US and Canadian Federal governments continued to head towards a regulatory approach to managing emissions, while States and Provinces respectively continued to push for carbon pricing mechanisms. California and Quebec linked their cap and trade systems to create a first cross border link in the region.
  • The World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness continued its mission of preparing countries for carbon markets and carbon pricing, with numerous “works in progress” to show for the efforts put in to date. But the switch from early trials and learning by doing phases to robust carbon trading platforms underpinning vibrant markets remains elusive.

 These were all important steps, particularly those that tried to broaden or strengthen the role of carbon pricing. On that particular issue, 2013 saw both positive and negative developments, with progress best described as “baby steps” rather than anything substantial. With a change in the European Parliament, mid-term elections in the US and Australia in the process of unwinding, it is difficult to see where the big carbon pricing story in 2014 will come from. Perhaps the tinges of orange (see below) now beginning to appear in South America will flourish and green with COP20 being held in that region towards the end of the year.

 Slide4

Slide3

Slide2

 

Slide1

While there was plenty of talk at COP 19 about financing, national ambition, increasing pre-2020 ambition and adaptation, another core subject that struggled for high-level attention (the other one being CCS) was the idea of carbon pricing, specifically delivered through carbon markets. This is one of those subjects that an observer of the process would expect to see appearing in almost every discussion, yet it didn’t make it out of the SBSTA working group meetings. This meant that the high level discussions towards the end of the COP (when the national delegations are typically bolstered by the presence of a Minister) didn’t get to hear about carbon pricing at all (or CCS).

There is no doubt that carbon pricing appears on many national agendas, with of course the EU leading that trend through the 2005 start of the EU ETS. Parts of the US and Canada, New Zealand, Kazakhstan (pilot phase) and a few others have already incorporated carbon pricing within parts of their energy systems and China, South Africa and others are in various stages of preparing for it. These are positive developments, but carbon pricing really only works at its most efficient when coverage is both widespread and coordinated, otherwise leakage (in various forms), arbitrage and rent-seeking can undermine local implementation. Further to this and as I have discussed in previous postings, if carbon pricing isn’t a core element of the eventual climate policy framework, then emissions may not go down at the necessary rate or if they do decline it will likely be at a much higher cost than would otherwise have been necessary.

Carbon pricing is also the potential lever for large scale financing of mitigation projects, as has been seen to some extent with the CDM. By far the largest flow of finance to projects in developing countries has come through the application of the CDM and subsequent sale of CERs on international markets, not through public financing of projects through funds, development aid and the like. While these latter approaches are also important, they will never be sufficiently large or aggressive enough to underpin the scale of global mitigation required. Well over a billion CERs have been created since the start of the CDM, which equates to some $10 billion in carbon financing and possibly $30-$70 billion in underlying project financing.  But even discussions on the CDM in Warsaw were lacklustre, with some CDM negotiators continuing to think and operate as if the year was 2006 and demand for CERs was on an rise. At the beginning of the Warsaw talks, there was some discussion amongst negotiators about having the Green Climate Fund (GCF) utilise the CDM as a results-based financing tool, and allowing the CDM to become a ‘net mitigation tool’ for non-Annex 1 countries to utilise as they prepare for tabling contributions next year and in 2015. In the end, no such language emerged from Warsaw, which raises the prospect of even this mechanism struggling to survive in the post 2015 world.

One could argue that carbon pricing is simply part of national implementation and therefore shouldn’t feature at the UNFCCC level, but as noted above, that is not an efficient approach. There is a potential role for the UNFCCC to create a framework which both encourages the use of carbon pricing and coordinates its implementation through linkage, leading eventually to the much desired “global carbon market”. Within the current negotiations, the only place a UNFCCC role might be created is through the New Market Mechanism (NMM) within the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA). Some thoughts on this can be found here (Carbon Pricing, the FVA and the NMM), where the FVA/NMM is proposed to include a linking framework for all countries to use.

 NMM and FVA

There is also a second argument that linkage can be achieved bilaterally, such as California and Quebec have negotiated and Australia had proposed with the EU (presumably now defunct given the repeal of carbon legislation now underway in Australia). But bilateral linkage runs its course very quickly before multilateral discussions are required. For example, if Quebec now reached out to another party to link to, California would have to be involved given the existing link, so a trilateral discussion would be needed. This would quickly get very complex and large potential linking partners such as the EU would have to shift to a multilateral approach of some description.

So what happened to carbon markets in Warsaw? The short answer is not much.

The FVA and NMM discussions ground to a standstill in the first week. Concerns about basic form and function of the FVA dogged the discussion, compounded by other concerns relating to whether these were pre or post 2020 mechanisms. In the end, the FVA and NMM discussions were postponed until the regular SBSTA meetings in June. The UNFCCC posting on the FVA and NMM in Warsaw shows nothing more than the input documents that were available prior to the COP, with no conclusions whatsoever.

On a positive note this delay at least offers more time to develop FVA and NMM thinking along the “carbon market” lines outlined above, rather than have a weak agreement that precludes such a possibility and leaves them languishing as information sharing bodies – an entirely possibly outcome from this process. But the lack of attention to carbon pricing and carbon markets in the context of a global deal that is meant to rapidly drive down global emissions is worrying. There remains of course the sterling efforts of the World Bank and their Partnership for Market Readiness, but initiatives such as these won’t be sufficient without some overarching policy action to create the markets in the first place.

Selling CCS at a climate conference

As COP 19 rolls on in Warsaw, both delegates and observers that I have talked to are seeing little agreement, despite the sometimes upbeat assessment coming from the UNFCCC. It may well be late on Friday or even Saturday before something appears from this COP.

Meanwhile the side event and external (to the formal COP) conference programmes continue. It is through these processes that participants can meet and discuss various aspects related to climate change. This being a meeting about climate change, it might be expected that attendees would be interested in hearing about carbon capture and storage (CCS), but it turns out this is a hard sell here. The problem seems to start at the COP venue itself, where the meeting room banners feature various approaches to energy and environmental management. CCS doesn’t get a mention.

 COP Banners

All I could find were Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energy Sources, Air Protection and Water & Wastewater Management.

This theme continues in many presentations, speeches, dinner conversations and panel discussions. While CCS does of course feature when organizations such as GCCSI hold events, at more general climate solution events it struggles to hold its own. Rather the focus is solidly on energy efficiency and renewables. Neither of these are anything close to sufficient solutions to the climate problem as it stands today, yet you could sometimes come to the conclusion that this is what the COP is actually about.

Energy efficiency has transformed global industry since the first day of the industrial revolution. Everything we do is possible through a combination of technology innovation and energy efficiency, from power stations to vehicles to mobile phones. The result of this has been tremendous growth, but with it has come a continuous rise in greenhouse gas emissions, particularly CO2. We use more goods and services, buy more stuff and travel further than at any point in human history and there is no apparent let up in this trend as it continues to pervade the entire global economy. But now energy efficiency is being sold as a mechanism for reducing emissions, throwing into reverse a trend that has been with us for over 200 years and fundamentally challenging economic building blocks such as Jevons Paradox. A parade of people representing business organizations, environmental NGOs and multilateral institutions will wax lyrical about energy efficiency. In one presentation an airline industry spokesperson talked about the tremendous improvements in efficiency the industry was making, through engine design, light weighting, route optimization and arrival and departure planning. There is no doubt that this is happening, but it is also bringing cheaper air travel to millions of people and of course forcing up emissions for the industry as a whole. There is no sign of this trend reversing itself. Adding a carbon price to the energy mix is the way to change this trend and still make energy efficiency improvements. 

The renewable energy story is told in a similar way. While there is also no doubt that the application of renewable energy is bringing benefits to many countries, offering distributed energy, providing off-grid electricity and supplementing the global energy supply in a tangible way, the global average CO2 intensity of energy has remained stubbornly the same since the 1980s when it dropped on a relative scale (1990 = 100) from 107 in 1971 to 100 in 1987 (Source: IEA). It was still at 100 in 2011. This is not to say it will never change, but simply advocating for renewable energy is very unlikely to take us to net zero emissions before the end of this century. The fossil fuel base on which the economy rests is also growing as demand for energy grows. As recent IEA World Energy Outlooks have repeatedly shown, much of this new demand is being met with coal. The only way to manage emissions from coal is the application of CCS, yet this seemingly falls on deaf ears here in Warsaw.

When CCS does get a mention, it is increasingly phrased as CCUS, with the “U” standing for “use”. In her one upbeat mention of CCS that I have heard, UNFCCC Executive Secretary also referred to it as CCUS. In another forum, one participant even talked about “commoditizing” CO2 to find a range of new uses. The problem is that CO2 really can’t be used for much of anything, with one modest (compared to the scale of global emissions) but important exception. The largest use today is for enhanced oil recovery where the USA has a mature and growing industry. It was originally built on the back of natural CO2 extracted from the sub-surface, but the industry now pays enough for CO2 that it can provide support to carbon capture at power plants and other facilities (usually with some capital funding from the likes of DOE).  This has helped the US establish a CCS demonstration programme of sorts.

There are other minor industrial gas uses (soft drinks), some scope for vegetable greenhouses such as the Shell project in the Netherlands (which provides refinery CO2 to Rotterdam greenhouses for enhanced growing, rather than have them produce it by burnaing natural gas) and a technology that quickly absorbs CO2 in certain minerals to make a new material for building, but all of these are tiny. The problem is that CO2 is the result of combustion and energy release and therefore any chemistry that turns it into something useful again requires lots of energy – nature does this and uses sunlight. Even if such a step were possible, this wouldn’t change the CO2 balance in the atmosphere, just as any bio process doesn’t change the overall balance in the atmosphere. Only sequestration, either natural or anthropogenic, changes that balance.

“Show me the money” or CO2 mitigation at COP 19 ??

  • Comments Off

After the first week of the Warsaw COP, an observer could be excused for wondering what exactly the thousands of delegates meeting here were actually discussing. The closest the assembled negotiators, NGOs, business people and UN staff came to seriously talking about CO2 mitigation was when Japan announced its new 2020 target, an increase of 3% in emissions vs. 1990 (but positioned as a decrease of 3.8% vs. 2005 emissions). The change in target by Japan is a consequence of their decision to stop all use of nuclear power following the Fukushima disaster.

Curiously, the Japanese announcement was criticized by China, with their climate negotiator Su Wei saying: “I have no way of describing my dismay” about the revised target. The European Union also expressed disappointment and said it expected all nations to stick to promised cuts as part of efforts to halt global warming. Christiana Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC told Reuters that, “It is regrettable.” Somewhat predictably, she forecast that Japan’s planned investments in energy efficiency and renewable power would prove that the target could be toughened.

The Japanese decision sent one other major ripple through the football stadium holding the COP, that being the realization that national pledges are wide open to correction and change as circumstances dictate. Given that “pledge and review” is the likely foundation of the global deal that negotiators are aiming for in 2015, the Japanese move brings into question if such an approach has any legitimacy at all. Had the original Japanese target been underpinned by carbon market instruments with the robustness that we expect of financial markets, they might have felt compelled to buy the difference, which would have at least financed equivalent compensating mitigation actions in other parts of the world (although that being said, Canada took no such action when it failed to meet its goals under the Kyoto Protocol, it just rescinded its ratification instead).

But Japan and CO2 was a momentary distraction from the real discussion, money. This has appeared in a variety of forms and is endemic within the process. There is endless questioning about the $100 billion pledge made in Copenhagen;

In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.

. . . with the most often repeated phrase from many countries being akin to “Show me the money”. Of course, the intention of the Copenhagen Accord was never to have $100 billion per annum deposited in the Green Climate Fund by Annex 1 countries, but to develop approaches which would see at least $100 billion per annum in mitigation and adaptation investment flow to developing countries, leveraged by instruments such as the Green Climate Fund. Unfortunately this interpretation of the pledge is largely ignored.

show-me-the-money-38mm 

Money also rears its head in the Loss and Damage discussion where agreement was reached in the dying hours of the Doha COP to agree a mechanism for this in Warsaw. The horrors appearing across the media of the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines has of course focused minds on this discussion. In their various opportunities to speak in the plenary sessions, many nations called for the Loss and Damage issue to be rapidly progressed in Warsaw. 

Even within the discussions on technology transfer there is a renewed call from some nations for the opening up of patents (money) on a variety of “climate friendly” technologies.

The other half of any COP is the side event programme and here CO2 mitigation didn’t get much of an airing either. There were many side events on financing and adaptation and those on energy primarily focused on energy efficiency and renewables, neither of which offer a direct path to measurable and sustained CO2 mitigation. By contrast, the few side events on carbon capture and storage were rather sparsely attended.

The rather sparsely attended but content rich GCCSI event on CCS developments.

The rather sparsely attended but content rich GCCSI event on CCS developments.

 Even the “Green Climate” exhibition in the Palace of Culture was principally focused on energy efficiency in buildings, solar PV and waste management. However, Shell at least kept the CCS flag waving with its novel CCS lift / elevator (something of a virtual ride to 2 kms below the surface where CO2 could be safely stored).

The Shell CCS “lift” in the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw.

The Shell CCS “lift” in the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw.

So to week 2 of the Warsaw COP, which will likely end in the usual rush to a declaration of some description at the end, although in the very last hours of Week 1 on Saturday night the collected negotiators came away with nothing agreed on FVA and NMM.

Linking discussions continue

  • Comments Off

With the election of a new government in Australia and their promise to discontinue the “carbon tax”, the much discussed link between the Australian ETS and the EU ETS looks to be in doubt. As this is the highest profile example of bilateral linking, one might then think that the subject would die. Quite the contrary if you attended Carbon Forum North America last week, where linking continues to be a major preoccupation with carbon market aficionados.

The scene was set at CFNA when the Quebec Environment Minister used the conference to officially announce the link between cap-and-trade systems in California and Quebec. Although this has clearly been in the works for a while, the deal is now done. There were various other discussions about linking, but a particularly interesting panel session involved the World Bank where they tabled a completely new idea that could either be impossibly difficult to implement or could revolutionise the global carbon market – at this stage it is hard to assess which end of the spectrum we might be at. Nevertheless, it is an idea with real merit and worth thinking about or even piloting.

The World Bank takes the view that despite the best of intentions, market based emissions management systems (such as cap-and-trade or baseline-and-credit) will only rarely be close enough in design and underlying ambition to cleanly link and that as countries with existing bilateral links try to link with others (and therefore link the system that they are already linked with to another one by default), progress will grind to a standstill. Therefore, something else is needed. Their idea is to introduce a ratings system into the mix, with individual market based instruments being rated in a similar way to sovereign ratings by the likes of Standard and Poor’s.

For example, a tight cap-and-trade system with limited offset use and high ambition (i.e. a sharply declining cap) might have its allowances rated at 0.9 (like a national AAA  or AA+ rating), compared with a baseline-and-credit system with credits rated at 0.3 because such a system is not as environmentally tight due to its inherent intensity basis. Trade between the two would be possible, but three external credits would be needed for compliance instead of one internal allowance in the cap-and-trade system. Many different systems could then link without the need for perfect design alignment. Ratings applied in this way could solve the problem that the EU Commission has had with its on / off approach to CERs from the Clean Development Mechanism.

In the World Bank model the ratings would be handled by a private agency and the decision to use them would be a sovereign one, both by the country hosting a market based system that wishes to import other instruments for compliance and by any country that creates carbon instruments deciding that they can be exported for external use.

The World Bank proposed two other legs to a three part system, a settlement platform and an international carbon reserve. The latter would be a pool of carbon instruments that could be drawn on by any participating nation and would be created by a standardised contribution by all participants. This latter point is important in that if a nation’s carbon market compliance instrument is downgraded, they would need to contribute more of them to the pool to maintain the same standardised amount within it.

This idea was proposed as something that could commence today, outside the UNFCCC process. The alternative of waiting for some 190 countries to agree a common methodology when some don’t even recognise the idea of a market based approach has a high risk of failure (at least to the extent that it would deliver the infrastructure required for a global carbon market).

A lot of water will pass under the bridge before something like this gets going, but it was good to see new and original thinking in this area.

As expected and as had been widely leaked, the IPCC 5th Assessment WG1 Report released last week presented a range of evidence that further underpinned the case for anthropogenic induced warming of the climate system. By contrast with the 4th Assessment Report issued in 2007, the chance of a human link shifted from likely to extremely likely. Pages of supporting evidence were presented. 

But there was another important development since the 2007 report, the concept that cumulative total emissions of CO2 and global mean surface temperature response are approximately linearly related. There was only one reference to cumulative emissions in 2007 and that was simply a means of describing the mitigation challenge we face over this century. The 4th Assessment Report noted that;

Based on current understanding of climate-carbon cycle feedback, model studies suggest that to stabilise at 450 ppm carbon dioxide could require that cumulative emissions over the 21st century be reduced from an average of approximately 670 GtC to approximately 490 GtC.

The 5th Assessment Report takes this much further and devotes considerable attention to the subject. On page 20 of the Summary for Policy Makers, the report states;

  • Cumulative total emissions of CO2 and global mean surface temperature response are approximately linearly related (see Figure SPM.10). Any given level of warming is associated with a range of cumulative CO2 emissions, and therefore, e.g., higher emissions in earlier decades imply lower emissions later.
  • Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone with a probability of >33%, >50%, and >66% to less than 2°C since the period 1861–188022, will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources to stay between 0 and about 1560 GtC, 0 and about 1210 GtC, and 0 and about 1000 GtC since that period respectively. These upper amounts are reduced to about 880 GtC, 840 GtC, and 800 GtC respectively, when accounting for non-CO2 forcings as in RCP2.6. An amount of 531 [446 to 616] GtC, was already emitted by 2011.
  • A lower warming target, or a higher likelihood of remaining below a specific warming target, will require lower cumulative CO2 emissions. Accounting for warming effects of increases in non-CO2 greenhouse gases, reductions in aerosols, or the release of greenhouse gases from permafrost will also lower the cumulative CO2 emissions for a specific warming target.

The report also featured the chart below.

 IPCC Cumulative Carbon

 

This is important in that it clearly introduces into the mainstream the notion that the atmospheric CO2 issue is a stock problem, which brings with it a number of implications for both the energy system and the solution set.

For the energy system, the key issue this raises is that the amount of carbon already in the pipeline for consumption is considerably more than the remaining stock equating to a 2°C temperature anomaly goal. This has been picked up by a variety of organizations, both NGO and financial, and is at the core of the recent discussions on a “carbon bubble”.

But it also points to a critical aspect of finding a solution to the CO2 problem, the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS). I have written a great deal about this in previous postings. Sequestration (or removal of atmospheric carbon) is the only reliable mechanism for managing the stock, which means either increasing the permanent bio stock of carbon through forestry and land use or capturing and storing carbon dioxide geologically (CCS). Unfortunately this doesn’t get much of a mention from the carbon bubble proponents, which is a clear shortfall in their analysis. With the mitigation report coming out from the IPCC in the first half of next year, this WG1 finding may be an important placeholder for a more substantial discussion around sequestration.

One area that is left unaddressed, at least for me, is a better discussion on the role of short lived climate pollutants (SLCP) such as methane, particularly in the context of a stock framework for thinking about the climate issue. Although the IPCC say that the effective stock of CO2 must be reduced to account for the warming impact of SLCP, this isn’t the whole story. The difficulty is that while anthropogenic CO2 stays in the atmosphere for a very long time, gases such as methane do not – they break down to CO2. This means that methane isn’t a stock issue, but a flow issue, i.e. the impact of methane released today is to change the rate of current warming, but not really the peak warming that we will likely see at some point late this century or early next century. Methane emissions at that time will impact peak warming. It also means that the current efforts to reduce methane now could be undermined unless CO2 is also reduced.

So that is my take on this first release of the 5th Assessment Report. Of course there is a wealth of data to work through and understand, but this critical concept of cumulative carbon is one that needs to filter through policy circles. Once the penny drops on this story, we might actually see some real progress in policy making that will make a difference.

A rewind back to 2007 reveals an EU Parliament that was very keen on carbon capture and storage (CCS) and gave it tremendous support through the CCS Directive and the NER300 financing mechanism. Five years on and for all the reasons discussed in recent posts, only the UK looks likely to see any near term CCS development and this is entirely due to its own additional policy development.

In March 2007, the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council stated;

 Aware of the huge possible global benefits of a sustainable use of fossil fuels, the European Council:

    • underlines the importance of substantial improvements in generation efficiency and clean fossil fuel technologies;
    • urges Member States and the Commission to work towards strengthening R & D and developing the necessary technical, economic and regulatory framework to bring environmentally safe carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) to deployment with new fossil-fuel power plants, if possible by 2020;
    • welcomes the Commission’s intention to establish a mechanism to stimulate the construction and operation by 2015 of up to 12 demonstration plants of sustainable fossil fuel technologies in commercial power generation.

CCS couldn’t have had a much harder push out of the starting blocks, yet none of this project activity has happened and CCS is virtually at a standstill in the EU. This has led the EU Parliament to look more closely at the issue and in the very near future we should see the Environment Committee release a report on CCS. In the meantime the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) has posted a short draft opinion on CCS on the EU Parliament website. This may give some early insight into the likely direction of the more critical Environment Committee report. Key findings from ITRE are as follows;

    • Failing to include CCS within a long-term energy strategy will severely hamper national, Union and global efforts to address climate change;
    • Believes that the EU’s mandatory renewable target has undermined investment in CCS, and calls, therefore, for a technology-neutral approach to the Union’s 2030 energy goals, in line with Article 194(2) of the TFEU, in order to create a level playing field and ensure effective competition amongst varying low-carbon energy technologies;
    • Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the main barriers to the deployment of CCS, such as the granting of permits and funding, the establishment of a CCS skills base and the development and testing of technologies for effective capture, transport and storage;
    • Believes that incentives and policy measures should target both CCS demonstration as well as subsequent longer-term operational projects and must provide greater certainty for private sector investment; believes, furthermore, that incentives and measures should be split efficiently both within the power-generation sector and CCS within industrial production processes;
    • Considers that the low carbon price delivered through the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), and subsequent revenues generated from the sale of allowances under the New Entrants’ Reserve of the ETS (NER300), has failed to deliver an attractive business case for early long-term private sector investment in CCS;

This is all solid stuff and it would appear that ITRE have got to grips with both the important role that CCS must play and the challenges that CCS faces to deploy. Perhaps one surprise is the reference to Article 194(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is difficult to see how this particular part of the treaty actually supports the need for CCS. Rather, it tends to support the set of actions that have contributed to the problems that CCS is having, namely the focus on renewable energy.

ENERGY

Article 194

  • In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:
    •  ensure the functioning of the energy market;
    •  ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
    •  promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and
    • promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
  • Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Such measures shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c).  

Many will argue that support for renewable energy is the right approach to address climate change, but as I have discussed in numerous posts, it’s not quite that simple. There is little doubt that renewable energy is part of our future and in the next century it may well be the major component, if not all, of our energy system. But in the meantime we are using fossil fuels to power pretty much everything and that is going to take a century to change. If we don’t capture the majority of the CO2 associated with that ongoing use (even with it declining throughout the century) then 2°C isn’t achievable, but nor for that matter is 3°C.

The TFEU doesn’t really give much guidance to help solve this, although Article 191 states;

. . . promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.

This then comes down to interpretation of the phrase “combating climate change”. A hardnosed analysis of the global emissions  issue leads to the necessity for a CCS strategy, irrespective of any personal views on whether we should or shouldn’t power the world with fossil fuels. The fact is that we currently do and this existing reality won’t change anytime soon.