Archive for the ‘Carbon price’ Category

Who knew what and when?

A recent article in the Guardian, which was also carried through a number of other media outlets, implied some prior knowledge within the oil and gas industry of climate change and the impact of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use long before others had recognised its impact. The assertion was based on unearthed correspondence within Exxon where carbon dioxide emissions were discussed as early as 1981. The article goes on to say that “Climate change was largely confined to the realm of science until 1988, when the climate scientist James Hansen told Congress that global warming was caused by the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, due to the burning of fossil fuels.”

In fact, information about the role of carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas in the atmosphere has been widely available for over a century and has its foundation as far back as the early 19th Century, nearly 200 years ago. At that time, physicists were coming to terms with radiation physics and were attempting to understand why the Earth had a stable temperature. Knowing the energy falling on the planet from the Sun and after building an understanding of the radiation outwards from the Earth itself, the expected temperature of the planet could be derived. Unfortunately the calculation resulted in a number of somewhere around -15°C, which was clearly some 30°C lower than the observed temperature (about +15°C). Something else was in play, but at the time this was unclear. By 1862, an understanding of the role of certain gases in the atmosphere had been established, now more widely known as the “greenhouse effect”.

In 1896, Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius used this information for a paper on the role of carbon dioxide that remains the foundation of 120 years of analysis of the Earth’s temperature and resulting climate (On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground).

Arrhenius

In this paper Arrhenius established a methodology for linking the change in surface temperature with the change in the level of carbon dioxide (carbonic acid as he referred to it as) in the atmosphere. Table VII of the paper showed the results of his calculation for different levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere ranging from K=0.67 (where K=1 for the level at the time) to K=3.0. For the latitude of the equator he derived the following results;

Carbonic acid = 0.67 Carbonic acid = 1.5 Carbonic acid = 2.0 Carbonic acid = 2.5 Carbonic acid = 3.0
Temperature change at Latitude 0° -3.02°C 3.15°C 4.95°C 6.42°C 7.3°C

The Arrhenius paper discusses the work of a Professor Högblom, another Swedish scientist of the day, who had even calculated how much the burning of coal at that time (500 million tonnes per annum) might change the surface temperature of the planet. The number was very small, but today annual fossil carbon extraction is some twenty to thirty times greater than this and more importantly the cumulative extraction (which we now know is what actually matters) since the late 19th century is hundreds of time this level.

By the late 1950s, thanks to the work of Charles Keeling of Scipps Institution of Oceanography in California, accurate measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide were being made. In 1961, Keeling produced data showing that carbon dioxide levels were rising steadily in what became known as the “Keeling Curve”. In 1965, the first truly public warning as to the impact of rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere came from the President’s Science Advisory Committee (President Lyndon B. Johnson), with the words “Through his worldwide industrial civilization, Man is unwittingly conducting a vast geophysical experiment. . . . . This may be sufficient to produce measurable and perhaps marked changes in climate, and will almost certainly cause significant changes in the temperature and other properties of the stratosphere.

There have been many other such references and warnings, ranging from the 1988 testimony to Congress by NASA scientist James Hansen to Al Gore’s film Inconvenient Truth in 2006. Through all of these the story hasn’t really changed from the original calculations of Arrhenius in 1894, rather the understanding and methodology has been increasingly refined and improved.

The above timeline isn’t new and can be found in much more detail in many books, blogs and periodicals. Nor is it even close to comprehensive, with dozens of other scientists and institutions making important contributions to the early analysis, particularly in the 1950s. Nevertheless, it seems to need repeating. Although atmospheric warming may not have been a dinner table conversation in the 1980s, it wasn’t a secret either. A look at the use of the phrases “greenhouse effect”, “global warming” and “climate change” shows that they appeared in books in the 1970s.

Ngram

Nor was it largely confined to the realm of science. Hollywood had even picked up on the issue in the 1973 film Soylent Green, where the greenhouse effect is specifically mentioned and is to some extent a core issue in the dystopian future that is postulated.

Soylent Green

Rather, what is unusual about the climate issue is the present day questioning of the background science that has come some 100-200 years after the scientific basis was first formulated and largely established, rather than at the time. In my forthcoming book, “Carbon Pricing Matters”, I touch on this issue as follows;

The need to manage global emissions and put a halt to the relentless build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere requires the intervention of governments and cooperation between them to ensure their success; particularly when implemented through a cost on carbon dioxide emissions. There is an ongoing debate around the role of government and the degree to which it should be allowed to address the issue of global warming. There are many who believe that government should have only a modest role in society; others accept a much wider role, including one to solve broad-based issues that affect society at large, for example, the build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For the latter group, a carbon price may not go far enough; it is a tool designed to tease out the solution over a generation or more. In the case of those who seek to limit the role of government, the imposition of a pricing mechanism across the entire economy can be seen as a step too far and may even raise questions about the foundation upon which the mechanism is based; the science of climate change.

Four demands for Paris

The call was very clear, here were “four demands” for Paris COP21 being presented to a group in London. But the surprise was the presenter; not a climate focussed NGO or an activist campaigning for change, but Fatih Birol, Chief Economist for the International Energy Agency. He was in an optimistic mood, despite the previous two weeks of ADP negotiations in Bonn that saw almost nothing happen. He opened the presentation by saying “This time it will work” (i.e. Paris, vs. Copenhagen and all the other false starts).

On June 15th Mr Birol launched the World Energy Outlook Special Report: Energy and Climate Change. The IEA usually launch a special supplement to their annual World Energy Outlook (WEO) and this one was the second to focus on the climate challenge and the policy changes required for the world to be on a 2°C emissions pathway. It was also something of a shot over the bow for the Paris COP21 process which had just completed another two weeks of negotiations in Bonn, but with little to show for the effort. Mr Birol is a master of such presentations and this one was memorable. He focussed almost entirely on the short term, although the publication itself looks forward to 2030 for the most part. With regards to the energy system, short term usually means 5 years or so, but in this case short term really meant December but with the resulting actions being very relevant for the period 2016-2020.

Mr Birol outlined four key pillars (as they are referred to in the publication) for COP21, but restated them as “demands”. They are;

  1. Emissions must peak by 2020. The IEA believes that this can be achieved with a near term focus on five measures;
    1. Energy Efficiency.
    2. High efficiency coal, both in new building and removing some existing facilities. IEA proposed a ban on building sub-critical coal.
    3. An even bigger push on renewable energy, with an increase in investment from $270 billion in 2014 to $400 billion in 2030.
    4. Oil and gas industry to reduce upstream methane emissions.
    5. Phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies to end-users by 2030.
  2. Implement a five year review process for NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) so that they can be rapidly adjusted to changing circumstances. I discussed the risk of a slow review process when MIT released a report on the possible COP21 outcome.
  3. Turn the global 2°C goal into clear emission reduction targets, both longer term and consistent shorter term goals.
  4. Track the transition – i.e. track the delivery of NDCs and transparently show how the global emissions pathway is developing as a result.

Interestingly Mr. Birol didn’t mention carbon pricing once, at least not until a question came up asking why he hadn’t mentioned carbon pricing – “Is carbon pricing no longer an important goal, you didn’t mention it?” asked a curious member of those assembled at the Foreign Office. He said yes it was, but given his focus was on Paris and that he saw little chance of a global approach on carbon pricing being agreed in that time-span, he didn’t mention it! I think this represents a major oversight on the part of the IEA although there is at least some discussion on carbon pricing in the publication. While it is true that a globally harmonised approach to carbon pricing won’t be in place in the near term, I would argue that an essential 5th pillar (or 5th demand) for Paris is recognition of the importance of carbon pricing and creation of the necessary space for linking of heterogeneous systems to take place. This looks like the fastest route towards a globally relevant price.

Mr. Birol didn’t mention CCS either, which is perhaps more understandable given the 5 year focus of much of the publication. However, Chapter 4 within the publication deals extensively with CCS and the IEA highlights the importance of CCS in their 450 ppm scenario through the chart below.

IEA CCS

Finally, there was some discussion around the climate statement made by the G7 the week before and their commitment out to 2100. Looking at the statement released by the G7, they said;

“. . . . .we emphasize that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required with a decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of this century. Accordingly, as a common vision for a global goal of greenhouse gas emissions reductions we support sharing with all parties to the UNFCCC the upper end of the latest IPCC recommendation of 40 to 70 % reductions by 2050 compared to 2010 recognizing that this challenge can only be met by a global response.”

My reading of this is that the G7 are recognizing the need to be at or nearing global net zero emissions by 2100. However, this isn’t how the statement has been reported, with several commentators, media outlets and even one of the presenters alongside Fatih Birol interpreting this as an agreement to be fossil fuel free by 2100. These are two very different outcomes for the energy system; the first one potentially feasible and the second being rather unlikely. Both the Shell Oceans and Mountains New Lens Scenarios illustrate how a net zero emissions world can potentially evolve, with extensive use of CCS making room for continued use of fossil fuels in various applications. The core driver here will be the economics of the energy system and the competitiveness of fossil fuels and alternatives across the full spectrum of needs. It is already clear that alternative energy sources such as solar PV will be very competitive and could well account for a significant proportion of global electricity provision. Equally, there are areas where fossil fuels will be very difficult to displace; I gave one such example in a case study I posted recently on aviation. Energy demand in certain sectors may well be met by fossil fuels for all of this century, either with direct use of CCS to deal with the emissions or, as illustrated in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report, offset by bio-energy and CCS (BECCS) elsewhere. Unfortunately the nuances of this issue didn’t make it into the IEA presentation.

That’s it from me for a couple of weeks or so. I am heading north on the National Geographic Explorer to see the Arctic wilderness of Svalbard and Greenland.

The recent letter on carbon pricing from six oil and gas industry CEOs to Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and Laurent Fabius, Foreign Minister of France and President of COP 21 sent something of a tremor through the media world, to the extent that the New York Times picked up on it with an editorial on carbon taxation. The editorial transposed the CEO call for a carbon price into a call for a carbon tax (as is currently applied in British Columbia) and then set about building the case for a tax based approach and dismantling the case for mechanisms other than taxation; but their focus was on cap-and-trade (such as in California, Quebec and the EU ETS). The New York Times suggested that cap-and-trade doesn’t work, but apparently didn’t look at the evidence.

In January 2015 the EU ETS was ten years old. There were those who said it wouldn’t last and any number of people over the years who have claimed that it doesn’t work, is broken and hasn’t delivered; including the New York Times. Yet it continues to operate as the bedrock of the EU policy framework to manage carbon dioxide emissions. The simple concept of a finite and declining pool of allowances being allocated, traded and then surrendered as carbon dioxide is emitted has remained. Despite various other issues in its ten year history the ETS has done this consistently and almost faultlessly year in and year out; the mechanics of the system have never been a problem.

Effective carbon price
Comparing approaches and policies is difficult, but in general the various mechanisms can be rated as shown above. The most effective approach to mitigation is a widely applied carbon price across as much of the (global) economy as possible. Lost opportunities and inefficiencies creep in as the scope of approach is limited, such as in a project mechanism or with a baseline and credit approach; neither of which tackle fossil fuel use in its entirety.

The chart clearly shows carbon taxation and cap-and-trade competing for the top spot as the most effective mechanism for delivering a carbon price into the economy and driving lasting emission reductions. Both approaches work, so differentiating them almost comes down to personal preference, which can even be seen in the extensive academic literature on the subject where different camps lean one way or the other. My preference, perhaps influenced by my oil trading background, is to back the cap-and-trade approach. My reasons are as follows;

  • The cap-and-trade approach delivers a specific environmental outcome through the application of the cap across the economy.
  • Both instruments are subject to uncertainty, however the cap-and-trade is less subject to political change; conversely, taxation policy is regularly changed by governments. The New York Times made note of this with its reference to Australia, which has removed a fixed price carbon price that was effectively operating as a tax.
  • The carbon price delivered through a cap-and-trade system can adjust quickly to national circumstances. In the EU it fell in response to the recession and perversely has stayed down in response to other policies (renewable energy goals) currently doing the heavy lifting on mitigation. Why is this perverse; because the other policies shouldn’t be doing this job when a cap-and-trade is in place to do it more efficiently.
  • Acceptance is hard to win for any new cost to business, but particularly when not every competitor will be subject to that cost. The cap-and-trade system has a very simple mechanism, in the form of free allowance allocation, for addressing this problem for energy intensive (and therefore carbon intensive) trade exposed industries. Importantly, this mechanism doesn’t change the environmental outcome or reduce the incentive to manage emissions as the allowances held by a facility still have opportunity value associated with them.
  • Most carbon policies are being formulated at country or regional levels, rather than being driven by global approaches. Cap-and-trade systems are well-suited to international linking, leading to a more harmonized global price, while tax coordination is complex and politically difficult. Linking leads to a level playing field for industry around the world which fosters acceptance.

The economic effectiveness of both a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system for carbon pricing means that countries and regions of all shapes and sizes have an implementation choice. For large, multi-faceted economies, the cap-and-trade system is ideally suited for teasing out the necessary changes across the economy and delivering a lowest cost outcome. At the same time it offers the many emitters considerable flexibility in implementation. Equally, for some economies or sectors where options for change are limited, the offset provisions that often feature in the design of an emissions trading system can offer a useful lifeline for compliance. Still, in some economies, a direct tax may be the most appropriate approach. Perhaps this is for governance reasons related to trading, or a lack of sufficient market participants to create a liquid market or simply to encourage the uptake of a fuel such as natural gas rather than coal.

The choice between these instruments isn’t as important as the choice of an instrument in the first place, which is why the letter from the CEOs is so important at this time.

The past few weeks, highlighted by the Business & Climate Summit in Paris and Carbon Expo in Barcelona, has seen many CEOs, senior political figures and institutional leaders call for increased use of carbon pricing. This is certainly the right thing to be saying, but it begs the question, “What next?”. Many countries are already considering or in the process of implementing a carbon pricing system, but still the call rings out. While uptake of carbon pricing at national level certainly needs to accelerate, one critical piece that is missing is some form of global commonality of approach, at least to the extent that prices begin to converge along national lines.

On Monday June 1st six oil and gas companies come together and effectively called for such a step in a letter from their CEOs to Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and Laurent Fabius, Foreign Minister of France and President of COP 21. Rather than simply echo the call for carbon pricing, the CEOs went a step further and specifically asked;

Therefore, we call on governments, including at the UNFCCC negotiations in Paris and beyond – to:

  • introduce carbon pricing systems where they do not yet exist at the national or regional levels
  • create an international framework that could eventually connect national systems.

To support progress towards these outcomes, our companies would like to open direct dialogue with the UN and willing governments.

The request is very clear – this isn’t just a call for more, but a call to sit down and work on implementation. The CEOs noted that their companies were already members of, amongst other bodies, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). IETA has been working on connection of (linking) national systems for well over a year (although the history of this effort dates back to the days of the UNFCCC Long Term Cooperative Action – LCA – workstream under the Bali Roadmap) and I am co-chair, along with Jonathan Grant of PWC, of the team that is leading this effort.

Late last year IETA published a strawman proposal for the Paris COP, suggesting some text to set in place a longer term initiative to develop an international linking arrangement. I spoke about this at length to RTCC at Carbon Expo in Barcelona.

DCH Interview

The strawman is what it implies, an idea. It could be built on to develop a placemarker in the Paris agreement to ensure that the framework mentioned by the six CEOs actually gets implemented in the follow-up from Paris – as the CDM was implemented in the follow-up from Kyoto.

From my perspective, this week wasn’t just about carbon pricing, but also about climate science. On the same day that the FT published its story on the letter from the oil and gas industry CEOs, The Guardian chose to run a front page story implying that I had tried to detrimentally influence (apparently being a former oil trader!!) the content of the London Science Museum’s Atmosphere Gallery, a display on climate science that Shell agreed to sponsor some years ago. The reporter had based his story on exchanges between Shell and the Science Museum staff when the gallery was looking to do a recent refresh.

I did engage in such a discussion and I did make some suggestions as to content which I thought was new and interesting since the Atmosphere Gallery was first established. Unfortunately The Guardian wasn’t able to publish my proposals as they were put forward during a meeting between me and two staff members from The Science Museum, so to complete the story I will publish them here. Although this particular piece of science dates back to a 2009 Nature article by Oxford University’s Professor Myles Allen and his team, it didn’t feature in the Gallery when it was first put together (the Advisory Panel met during 2009 as part of the design phase of the Gallery). But today, it is the foundation work behind the concept of a global carbon budget which has become a mainstream topic of discussion. My angle on this was to illustrate the importance of carbon capture and storage in the context of this science, but with an emphasis on the science itself. My discussion with The Science Museum staff members took place on 23rd June 2014 and I asked them to consider the following for the refresh of the gallery:

1. As background, three papers that have come from Oxford University:

  • Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne

Myles R. Allen, David J. Frame, Chris Huntingford, Chris D. Jones, Jason A. Lowe, Malte Meinshausen & Nicolai Meinshausen

  • Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2°C

Malte Meinshausen, Nicolai Meinshausen, William Hare, Sarah C. B. Raper, Katja Frieler, Reto Knutti, David J. Frame & Myles R. Allen

  • The case for mandatory sequestration

Myles R. Allen, David J. Frame and Charles F. Mason

2. Consider using (or adapting) a trillion tonne video made by Shell where Myles Allen talks about CCS in the context of the cumulative emissions issue:

3. Consider putting the Oxford University fossil carbon emissions counter in the Atmosphere Gallery as this would help people understand the vast scale of the current energy system and the rate at which we are collectively approaching the 2°C threshold;

Trillionth Tonne

4. Reference the Trillion Tonne Communique from Cambridge:

5. Offer the use of the Shell “CCS Lift” (an audio-visual CCS experience) to help explain this technology to the gallery visitors.

My pitch to The Science Museum was that this approach offered a real opportunity to feature the Science Museum and the Atmosphere Gallery in the very public discussion on carbon budgets, get some good media attention in the run-up to Paris 2015 (e.g. through the very visible counter), tell the CCS story in context (the Myles Allen video and the CCS audio-visual display) and raise awareness of the cumulative nature of the problem (i.e. the science). In the end they decided not to use this material, but I stand by the proposal.

A new report from the IMF

Last week many representatives of the global business community gathered at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris for the Business and Climate Summit, a prequel of sorts to the main COP21 event in December, but with only the business community involved. The goal was to demonstrate the involvement of the business community in the climate change issue and to set the stage for the business response to whatever is agreed by the Parties to the UNFCCC in December.

The event had significant political backing, with President Hollande speaking at the opening session. His speech went straight to the heart of the issue, with very matter of fact references to the important role of carbon pricing and the need for carbon capture and storage. Even UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Christiana Figures, endorsed CCS, not something she is known to do very often. The remarks by the President were backed up by many speakers, but Angel Gurria, Secretary General, OECD was perhaps the most memorable with his call for “a price, a price, a big fat price on carbon.”

The opening on May 20th set the scene for a major session on carbon pricing the next morning, with the World Bank and various business leaders taking the podium. While these speakers were all in agreement on the importance of carbon pricing, the harmony of the day before wasn’t quite as strong, with something of an argument between Tony Hayward, Chairman of Glencore and Kerry Adler, CEO of Skypower (solar) over the respective role of solar and coal in the coming decades. Mr Hayward saw little possibility of solar filling the breadth of industrial needs currently fulfilled by coal (and other fossil fuels).

The economic purpose of a cost on carbon dioxide emissions (carbon price) is as a response to the externality presented by our collective use of fossil fuels. This externality (the impact related to rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere) was discussed on several occasions during the Summit with regular reference to a new IMF report which argues that fossil fuel subsidies now stand at $5.3 trillion per annum. The vast majority of this arises from unaccounted externalities, such as the emissions of carbon dioxide and the impact of black carbon. Given that global fossil fuel production is some 10+ billion tonnes of oil equivalent per annum, then $5 trillion of externality equates to a charge for each tonne of production of some $500. The IMF report says that about a quarter of this relates to carbon dioxide emissions.

The publication of this number caused some excitement at the Summit and of course it got picked up in the media very quickly, in many cases with very little explanation as to its meaning. The IMF paper dwells at length on the need to cost in the externality and argues that despite a huge rise in energy costs that would result from such a charge, there would be a net welfare benefit to society at large. The report discusses the work of 19th Century Economist Arthur Pigou, who introduced the concept of externalities and proposed that negative externalities could be corrected by the imposition of a tax, now known as Pigouvian taxation. In the case of the climate issue, a carbon tax or the need to purchase emission allowances from the government are examples of Pigouvian taxes. The IMF report notes;

When the consumption of a good by a firm or household generates an external cost to society, then efficient pricing requires that consumers face a price that reflects this cost. In the absence of a well-functioning market for internalizing this cost in the consumer price, efficiency requires the imposition of a Pigouvian tax equal to the external cost generated by additional consumption.

. . . . . . 

. . . . . .

Eliminating post-tax subsidies in 2015 could raise government revenue by $2.9 trillion (3.6 percent of global GDP), cut global CO2 emissions by more than 20 percent, and cut pre-mature air pollution deaths by more than half. After allowing for the higher energy costs faced by consumers, this action would raise global economic welfare by $1.8 trillion (2.2 percent of global GDP).

But it is also important to consider the current value that is delivered by the availability of energy, a point also made by Tony Hayward on the carbon pricing panel. From an economic standpoint, it is worth taking this a step further. After all, why would the world be producing and using a fuel that brings such apparent economic hardship to society (i.e $5 trillion per annum worth of hardship)? The answer to this question implies that a positive externality must be outweighing this factor.

Although the IMF report doesn’t mention it, Pigou didn’t just talk about externalities in the negative sense, but also in the positive sense. Someone creating a positive externality—say, by educating himself and making himself more interesting or useful to other people—might not invest enough in education because he would not perceive the value to himself as being as great as the value to society. Pigou even advocated for subsidies for activities that created such positive externalities.

Despite the issues associated with using them, fossil fuels have brought tremendous value to society and continue to do so. Almost everything we take for granted in modern society from the food we eat to the iPhone we constantly use are here because of fossil fuels. This wealth creation that is tied to their use but not reflected in the price is a positive externality. Such a positive externality should be apparent in the price of fossil fuels, but because of their relative abundance around the world and the dislocation that often exists between extraction and use, this may not be the case. The positive externality is potentially so large that it is likely the root cause of some governments offering real incentives and (Pigouvian) subsidies to promote additional fossil fuel production. The IMF report calls these Producer Subsidies, but notes that they are relatively small.

None of the above is meant as an argument for not dealing with the environmental externalities associated with fossil fuels use. As noted many times during the Summit and as I have discussed often in the past, a carbon price is essential. But as other forms of energy scale up to the level at which we use fossil fuels, new externalities will present themselves. There will of course be the ongoing positive externality associated with energy provision, but negative externalities will almost certainly make themselves known as new industries emerge and new materials are introduced into society for everyday use (e.g. very large scale use of lithium). Perhaps the lesson from the IMF report is to start dealing with externalities much earlier in the cycle of production, before they reach a level which challenges our economic system to correct.

More steps towards Paris

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At the end of last week (May 15th) Canada submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the UNFCCC, becoming the 37th state to do so (including 28 countries within the EU). The three key points of the Canadian INDC submission are:

  • An emissions reduction pledge of 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 (the US has pledged a target of 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025);
  • The reduction will be economy-wide and will cover all GHGs recognized under the UNFCCC;
  • Canada “may also use international mechanisms to achieve its target, subject to robust systems that deliver real and verified emissions reductions.”

This means that substantial progress is being made towards a good coverage of INDC submissions by the time of the Paris COP, although many eyes will now be turning to the emerging economies (e.g. China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Chile, Saudi Arabia etc.) for the real signal with regards tackling global emissions. Mexico has made a good start in that regard.

In just two weeks the national negotiators will meet again, this time in Bonn, to continue their deliberations in the lead up to COP21. But is the process in good shape?

Compared to this time in 2009 with the Copenhagen COP looming, I think it is in better shape. Although there are many details to be agreed, the negotiators at least know what it is they are trying to agree on; a relatively lean framework within which can sit the collection of INDCs from all countries for scrutiny and review. It has taken many years to get to this point and the process is far from complete, but the task at hand is now clear even though many will argue that it won’t be sufficient to deliver the goal to limit warming of the climate system to less than 2°C. At least there is thematic consensus which I don’t think existed in May 2009; was it to be top down or bottom up, what would happen to the Kyoto Protocol, should there be a global goal on temperature rise? These and many other questions were still in play.

Looking back on some of my first year of blog posts which were written in 2009, it was all very different.

  • Many eyes were on the deliberations of the US House of Representatives and the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade Bill, with every expectation that the USA would take the lead on establishing a carbon price. Today, those eyes are on the world’s largest emitter, China, as it proceeds with its carbon pricing provincial trials and expansion to a nationwide system.
  • It wasn’t until the June 2009 UNFCCC meeting that the team from the Oxford University Department of Physics first presented their new thinking on a global carbon emissions limit of 1 trillion tonnes over the industrial era; now negotiators are actually considering the concept of net-zero emissions and therefore an end date to the ongoing accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
  • The British government produced a first of its kind report on the idea of global carbon trading. In some respects not much has changed, but the discussion has matured and the likes of the World Bank are now taking this concept forward. A linked market even exists between California and Quebec.
  • In July 2009 I came across the first electric vehicle charging stations in London and met a person who was taking delivery of the seventh Tesla in the UK. In 2014 there were 15,000 EV and PHEV newly registered and right now on AutoTrader there are 10 used Tesla cars for sale!!
  • The UNFCCC negotiations were operating on two tracks, the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and Long term Cooperative Action (LCA), with no real sign of them coming together.
  • There was little consensus on climate finance; today the Green Climate Fund has been established and there is an active process underway to start disseminating the initial developed country funding.
  • There was little sign of targets and goal setting from the major developing countries; today China has indicated a plateau in emissions by around 2030 and other countries are following their lead.

In hindsight it isn’t surprising that all of these issues were not resolved by the following December. The goals for Paris may not be as lofty as those for Copenhagen, but at least from the perspective of a mid-year review they appear more achievable. It’s been a few months since I have added a piece to my “Paris Puzzle”, but it is perhaps timely to do this now.

Jigsaw May 2015

Accounting isn’t enough

As the World Bank and others ramp up the discussion on carbon pricing, heads are turning towards Paris with thoughts on how the issue will be incorporated into the expected COP21 global climate deal. I have said many times in the past that unless a carbon price makes its way into the whole global energy system, then its success in bringing down emissions is far from assured. While local carbon pricing wins will appear, the global effort could be undermined by a lack of global coverage.   This is true of other policy approaches as well, but in the case of carbon pricing there is the significant benefit of economic efficiency.  For me, the signs so far aren’t great, with the text that came out of the Geneva ADP meeting showing few signs of tackling this important issue.

In recent weeks I have heard some commentators and national climate negotiators argue that the Framework Convention itself is sufficient to underpin cooperative carbon market development and that all the COP21 deal needs is a framework to ensure that accounting of carbon based trades is robust and avoids issues such as double counting (two parties each counting a particular reduction under their own emissions inventory). The underpinning language within the Convention can be found in several places (examples below), but the references are oblique and without direct recognition of carbon pricing or carbon markets;

  • Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties;
  • These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention;
  • Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of the Convention;

While this language could be interpreted as a mandate to develop a global carbon market and the ensuing exchange of carbon pricing instruments between Parties, or companies within the jurisdiction of those Parties, it hardly encourages this process to take place, let alone become a key activity in implementing a global deal. Similarly, if a Paris deal just addresses accounting issues, I don’t believe that this will act as the necessary catalyst for carbon market development either. It’s a bit like agreeing how to calculate the GDP and then not opening the national mint to print and issue the currency!!

Looking back at the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism provides some valuable learning. While it isn’t a comprehensive carbon pricing instrument the Protocol nevertheless catalysed its development with a few paragraphs of text, to the extent that it eventually pushed some $100 billion (some have estimated much higher levels) in project investment into various developing country economies. This far eclipses the $10 billion that has so far been pledged to the Green Climate Fund, clearly demonstrating that market based approaches will almost always outstrip direct public financing or funding.    To meet the developed countries’ commitment to mobilize $100bn per annum by 2020, it is clear that carbon market approaches including linking will be required.  It is difficult to see how it will be met without incentivizing the private sector in this way.

This is the sort of step that I think the negotiators in Paris need to take. Rather than just elaborating on core accounting principles, I believe that they need to incorporate a means of actively encouraging carbon market expansion. Given the nationally determined contribution based architecture that is emerging, such a development will probably be a bottom up process, perhaps with heterogeneous linking between various market based systems. The Harvard Kennedy School are offering valuable insight into how this might transpire.

One organisation, IETA, has put forward a proposal for Paris along these lines. It is a light touch approach, given the opposition that a real carbon market proposal seems to foster, but hopefully it will be enough to get things started. The IETA proposal calls for the development of a “unified international transfer system”, in effect a “plug-and-play” linkage approach for national trading systems. With wording along these lines in the Paris agreement, later COP decisions could establish the modalities for such a system, thus opening up and accelerating the process that the likes of California and Quebec went through to link their respective trading systems. Such modalities would include the common accounting framework that is needed irrespective of the approach taken to encourage the development of a global market. In all cases, accounting still remains central to progress.

I won’t claim that this is the quickest and most effective way forward, but it is where we are and probably the best that can be achieved, assuming the push from above is there to encourage it. Without such a push, we are all left to hope that something may transpire on carbon markets, but wishful thinking isn’t a solution to 2°C.

Business and carbon pricing

At the UN Climate Summit last September, the World Bank and others put the carbon pricing – or perhaps more correctly carbon valuation – discussion squarely back on the agenda, first with a Statement on Carbon Pricing signed by over 1000 companies and 70 governments and then with a series of side events and meetings which also carried through to COP20 in Lima. The World Bank is now building on their initiative throughout 2015 as we head towards COP21 in Paris.

One important aspect of the initiative is the role of business and the way in which companies handle the carbon pricing (carbon valuation) agenda internally. This stems from another part of the World Bank initiative which was initially launched by the UN Global Compact, the Business Leadership Criteria on Carbon Pricing. The criteria are designed to encourage companies to incorporate an internal carbon price (value) within the business, advocate for  carbon value generally and communicate on progress. The first of these has led to some interesting discussions in various forums, with a range of views emerging as to what an internal carbon price (value) does and how it is applied.

Some observers have concluded that an internal approach operates as a true proxy cost of carbon emissions within the business that is applying it, such that the business behaves as if it were subjected to an external carbon tax operating at the same price. This would be done in the absence of such an external price driver, therefore acting as a stand-in for the lack of government action. To some extent, wishful thinking is operating here, with some believing that internal carbon pricing can lead to widespread emission reductions as a major business led initiative. But this is not what is happening or what is meant by an internal carbon price.

Rather, the internal “carbon price”, also referred to as a “shadow carbon price”, “carbon price premise” or “carbon screening value” is normally a mechanism used to manage the future regulatory risk that parts of the company or a future project may be exposed to. For example, if a certain investment is to be made, that investment is then tested against a variety of future conditions, which could include an eventual cost incurred by the expected emissions of carbon dioxide. Although the project may not immediately be exposed to such a price, the development of climate legislation over the life of the project may create such an exposure, which in turn could threaten the future viability of the asset. The application of a screening value applied when the investment proposal is being assessed allows the investor to reconsider the project, change the scope, modify the design or simply accept the level of risk and proceed.

The practice of applying an internal carbon price (value) in this manner is one of many steps that a company may take as it prepares for a world in which a real cost on carbon emissions becomes an external reality. The World Bank has developed a series of case studies on these preparatory measures and these have been published very recently in a report titled “Preparing for Carbon Pricing, Case Studies from Company Experience: Royal Dutch Shell, Rio Tinto, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company”. The report was prepared by the Washington based Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) under the auspices of the Partnership for Market Readiness, a World Bank initiative.

Preparing for carbon pricing

These case studies illustrate the benefits of incorporating climate change policies into corporate strategies; analyzing risks and opportunities in an environment of new public policies; and engaging effectively with relevant stakeholders—including governments. The case studies also show how carbon assets are traded and what systems are being constructed to monitor, report, and verify company level GHG emissions.

Fifty shades of grey?

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The tension was building throughout the week, but finally just before Valentine’s Day weekend the negotiators in Geneva completed the first draft of a Paris negotiating text and released it at the end of the eighth part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). Contained within this 86 page document, replete with perhaps 400 or so carefully worded options to select from and 1,234 square brackets, is supposedly the necessary political recipe for addressing the climate issue over the coming decades. Or were we presented with the greyness of diplomacy and compromise, which may be the best that can be managed for now, but doesn’t incorporate the necessary toolkit to drive down emissions in the decades to come?

The text certainly contains sufficient versions of one important overarching requirement; that being the need to reach net zero emissions at some point in the future. In the context of the level of greenhouse gas emissions, the word zero appears in the text seven times, from a non-specific reference of “net zero greenhouse gas emissions in line with the ultimate objective of the Convention“, to the highly ambitious proposal for “zero emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases in the period 2060–2080“. I discussed this at some length in my previous post, with the conclusion that an end of the century net zero emissions objective is perhaps achievable, but much earlier than this looks unlikely. Even a timeframe of 85 years will require enormous effort, including extensive use of carbon pricing and the widespread deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS). This view received quite a number of comments on The Energy Collective. My post wasn’t to argue that nothing would happen or that no progress could be made, but to point out the difficulty of rapidly slowing down and turning a system that has such enormous momentum. All of the suggested technologies that filled the comments section will almost certainly play a role, but the challenge is the time it takes to do all this. My own experience in the energy industry tells me the timeframe is decades, not years. In my view, the text now taking us forward to Paris doesn’t present the necessary conditions for a strong response, but it is only part of the story and much more will be revealed over the coming weeks and months as the INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) are also published. This text seems to be more about achieving some diplomatic harmony around the climate issue and at least trying to get everyone marching to the same tune.

But returning to the text itself, the other area that needs considerable support and diplomatic effort is seeing a carbon price emerge within the global energy system. The phrase “carbon pricing” gets two mentions in the 86 pages of text, but there are many options presented on the “use of markets”. To some extent, “markets” is UNFCCC code for a carbon price, but not in all cases. It can also mean the further development of market mechanisms (such as the CDM) and the ability for developing countries to sell credits from these mechanisms to developed countries as a means of securing clean energy investment. While many variations around this theme are presented, there is no proposed language in the current text that really sets out to establish a full global carbon pricing regime – although Option 4 on page 17 perhaps comes closest by trying to resurrect something that operates along the lines of the Kyoto Protocol. A global carbon market seems to be a step too far for most countries at the moment, even though it is an essential part of the solution set. Rather, a proxy based approach is being proposed through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, which hopes to see a global market develop over time through the linkage of various national and sub-national emissions management approaches and the interchange of the domestic units, quotas and allowances on which they are based. In the World Bank model, this would be governed by an exchange rate mechanism. This week also saw the UK House of Commons Energy & Climate Change Committee launch a report on the linking of emissions trading systems. The report concluded that;

Any agreement reached at the UNFCCC COP 21 in Paris at the end of 2015 should promote the use of carbon markets and facilitate the future linking of emissions trading systems.

One final reality check on the paris text is that nowhere in the 86 pages is CCS mentioned. While the UNFCCC is always very careful about featuring a specific technology and understandably so, the clear advice from the IPCC 5th Assessment Report was that 2°C cannot be reached without it, at least not within reasonable cost bounds. The IPCC does get mentioned 23 times.

In contrast with the events in Geneva, BP published their Energy Outlook 2035 which showed both overall energy demand and demand for fossil fuels rising in the outlook period (see chart; source: BP). The corresponding rise in energy system emissions is also given, reaching some 40 billion tonnes per annum by 2035. This is in contrast to the IEA 450 Scenario which argues for a fall in emissions to nearly 20 billion tonnes by 2035. However, the outlook does include a rising carbon price through to 2035, when it reaches some $40 per tonne CO2. Judging from the data presented, the main impact of this seems to be to bring coal growth to a near halt, but that’s all. The BP analysis presents a very different outlook to the one we need to stay within the 2°C threshold agreed by governments at the Cancun COP back in 2010. It also argues for a clear and robust outcome from Paris, although the current text doesn’t point in that direction.

BP Demand to 2035

BP Emissions to 2035

What can really be done by 2050?

The calls for action are becoming louder and bolder as the weeks continue to countdown towards COP21 in Paris. Perhaps none have been as bold as the recent call by The B Team for governments to commit to a global goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and to embed this in the agreement to be signed at COP21 in Paris.

The B Team is a high profile group of business and civil society leaders, counting amongst its number Richard Branson (Virgin Group of Companies), Paul Polman (CEO of Unilever) and Arianna Huffington (Huffington Post). The team is not just looking at climate change, but the even larger challenge of doing business in the 21st Century; shifting from Plan A which requires business to focus on profit alone, to Plan B which encompasses a more holistic set of objectives around financial performance, sustainability and business as a force for good to help solve challenging social and environmental goals. It is perhaps the next big step forward in what was originally termed “sustainable development”.

Without wanting to question the broader motives of The B Team, I do challenge their view that the climate issue can be resolved in just 35 years. For some this may sound like a long time, but it is the span of just one career. In fact it is the span of my career in the oil and gas industry from when I started work in Geelong Refinery in Australia in 1980. At least in one industry today, IT, everything has changed in that time, but that is not true elsewhere. In 1980 there were no personal computers in Geelong Refinery; today it probably can’t run without them, although the distillers, crackers and oil movement facilities being run by them have hardly changed and in many instances are precisely the same pieces of equipment that were running in 1980. In almost every other industry, the shift has been gradual, perhaps because of the installed base which of course wasn’t an issue for personal computing and mobile telephony. I suspect that this is true in Mr Polman’s own industry (household products) and it is certainly true in Mr Branson’s. In 1980 I flew on my first trip to London on a 747 and today I am in San Francisco, having arrived here on a 747, albeit a slightly longer, more sophisticated, efficient and larger capacity one than the 1980 model, but still a 747 burning many tons of jet fuel to get here. During his time in office which started with the election in 1980, Ronald Reagan replaced the existing Air Force One 707 with a 747 which still flies today but which Mr Obama has just announced will be replaced with a 747-8. Those planes will likely fly for some 30 years, as will all the other planes being built today, with many just entering the beginning of their production runs (787, A350, A380), rather than heading towards the end as we might be with the 747 series. There are also no serious plans for the jet engine to run on anything other than hydrocarbons for the foreseeable future (i.e. 50+ years) and even the attempts to manufacture bio-hydrocarbon jet fuels are still in their commercial infancy.

So why would we think that everything can be different in just 35 years? There is no doubt that to quickly and decisively solve the climate issue and have a better than even chance of keeping the surface temperature rise below 2°C that we need to do this, but that doesn’t mean we can. To start with, there has to be tremendous political will to do so and to be fair, this is clearly what The B Team is trying to foster by making the call. But political will isn’t enough to turn over the installed industrial capacity that we rely on today, let alone replace it with a set of technologies that in some instances don’t exist. The development and deployment of radical new technologies takes decades, with the energy industry able to make that change at about half the rate of the IT industry. Even the latter has needed nearly 50 years to invent (ARPANET in 1969) and extensively deploy the internet.

We are now seeing real progress in the sale of electric cars, but even there the numbers don’t stack up. To completely outpace conventional vehicle manufacture and replace the entire legacy stock of on-road vehicles will take about 50 years, assuming a ramp up of global electric car production of at least 20% p.a. every year until all internal combustion engine manufacturing is phased out. While this might be conceivable for personal transport, the progress on finding an alternative for heavy transport, including ships, is slow.

For medium to heavy industry that relies almost completely on hydrocarbon fuels for high temperature operations in particular, there are no easy alternatives. Electricity could be an option in some instances, but almost all operations today choose coal or natural gas. For smelting, coal is essential as it provides the carbon to act as a reducing agent for the chemical conversion of the ore into a pure metal.

Perhaps the area in which rapid progress will be seen is electricity generation, where a whole range of zero emission technologies exist. These include wind, solar, geothermal, tidal, nuclear and carbon capture and storage. But even with complete success in this one area, we shouldn’t forget that electricity is less than 20% of the current global final energy mix. This will surely rise, but it is unlikely to reach 100% in 35 years given that it has only moved from 11% to 18% the last 35 years.

Shell’s own New Lens Scenarios show that significant progress can be made between now and 2050, but not in terms of a massive reduction in emissions, although that process is clearly underway in the Mountains Scenario by then (see below). Rather, the time to 2050 is largely filled with the early deployment of a range of new energy technologies, which sets the scene for rapid reductions to net-zero emissions over the period 2050-2100. Another critical development for the near-term is a complete global policy framework for carbon pricing. Even assuming big steps are made between now and Paris in even getting this into the agreement, the time for implementation is a factor that must be recognised. With a fast start in Paris, the earliest possible date is 2020 in that this is when the global agreement kicks in, but even the EU ETS took 8 years between initial design and full operation, similarly the CDM alone took over 10 years to fully institutionalize. Expanding full carbon pricing globally in the same period is challenging to say the least.

NLS Emissions to 2100

The aspiration of the B Team is laudable, but not really practical. The Paris agreement should certainly be geared around an end-goal of net-zero emissions but the realistic, albeit still aggressive, time span for this is 80+ years, not 35 years.