Archive for the ‘CDM’ Category

A new reality to come to terms with

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The first UNFCCC talks since the adoption of the Paris Agreement are now underway and the various delegations are getting down to the tough task of implementation. I was in Bonn on the opening day of the two week meeting, representing the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) in a side event hosted by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board (EB). The aim of the event was to draw on the learning from a decade of CDM operation and apply this experience to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. This is the Article that provides a potential new foundation for carbon market development. I was there to present the IETA Article 6 Vision paper which I posted a story on recently.

The side event was packed out and many were standing in the corridor leading to the room; there is clearly considerable interest in this topic. Over the years the CDM has been a successful mechanism, resulting in nearly 8000 projects and some 1.7 billion Certified Emission Reduction (CER) units issued. Even at a €5-10 per CER (as it was in the earlier days of the EU ETS), this still represents a carbon price based financial injection of up to €10 billion into developing economies. The CDM spawned a small industry of project developers, assessors, MRV professionals and climate finance experts and clearly demonstrated that even a gentle application of the market can have a significant impact. Little wonder that there is such interest in the mitigation mechanism embedded in Article 6 and its potential to drive change.

However, the CDM (or a version of it) is unlikely to be repeated or replicated under Article 6, at least not under the terms that existed within the Kyoto Protocol. It was clear from the discussion during the side event that this new reality is going to take a while to hit home and settle in. The CDM became an important source of climate finance for developing countries, where the only real obligation on the part of the host country for a given project was to provide the necessary governance structure to ensure eventual issuance of the CERs. But that is no longer the case given the provisions of the Paris Agreement and Article 6 are now effectively the same for all countries.

Over time, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) will expand to cover all greenhouse gas in all economies. Every NDC, either specifically or notionally (for assessment and stocktake purposes) is linked to a quantitative carbon budget and there is an expectation from the Paris Agreement that these budgets will be delivered. While the Paris Agreement doesn’t say this in such stark terms, it is nevertheless implied. The whole approach that the UNFCCC used to assess the NDCs in their latest synthesis report, released on May 2nd, underpins this. Their aggregate analysis is summarized in carbon budget terms as follows;

The implementation of the communicated INDCs is estimated to result in aggregate global emission levels of 55.0 (51.4 to 57.3) Gt CO2 eq in 2025 and 56.2 (52.0 to 59.3) Gt CO2 eq in 2030. The global levels of emissions in 2025 and 2030 were calculated by adding the estimated aggregate emission levels resulting from the implementation of the communicated INDCs, that is 46.5 (44.3 to 48.9) Gt CO2 eq in 2025 and 48.0 (45.1 to 51.4) Gt CO2 eq in 2030, to the levels of emissions not covered by the INDCs. Global cumulative CO2 emissions after 2011 are expected to reach 533.1 (509.6 to 557.2) Gt CO2 in 2025 and 738.8 (703.6 to 770.9) Gt CO2 in 2030.

As I noted in my last post and drawing on Article 6.5 in the Paris Agreement, this means that the transfer of credits from a project across a national border (in the style of the CDM) will impact the national inventory reports of both parties. These transfers will then have to be executed in the style of Joint Implementation (JI) of the Kyoto Protocol, which effectively required an adjustment to the project host country’s national goal if the crediting unit was to be used by another Party to meet their goal.

I raised this issue as part of my presentation and the message was then amplified by a couple of people in the audience during the Q&A. But the response from some in the room was close to one of denial of this new reality, even though the Paris Agreement makes the need for such adjustment clear. The discussion almost drifted back into the old reality of developing countries not having goals and targets, but fortunately we didn’t land there. We didn’t resolve the issue either, which means that there are probably some tough discussions ahead as the negotiators get down to business.

A week later in Bonn and after many hours of discussions on Article 6 by the Parties, there has been some progress. At a side event on the second Monday also on Article 6 and also standing room only, I heard one central African delegate note that we had certainly left the world of the CDM and that perhaps we were somewhere between the constructions offered by CDM and JI of the Kyoto Protocol, albeit this would have to be interpreted to match the new bottom up global architecture of the Paris Agreement. I also heard another national delegate argue strongly that the new mechanism was not a sustainable development mechanism and should not be referenced as such, even if sustainable development was an important outcome of the implementation of the mechanism. Several panellists talked about quantification of NDCs as an important precursor to the avoidance of double counting.

The various concerns and issues that have been raised in these early discussion are very valid and the answers aren’t immediately obvious. Many developing countries have placed the need for finance as a condition on at least some portion of their mitigation contribution and in the past the CDM offered such finance. But if the reality of a new mechanism is a tighter national goal as a consequence of using it, there may be some push back. In the IETA paper one possible solution to this was proposed, namely the direct purchase of project units from the host country of the mitigation activity by multi-lateral funds. But this is unlikely to reach the necessary scale of mitigation envisaged by the NDCs, so other approaches will have to be developed. Interesting times ahead!

Update: The co-chairs in the UNFCCC discussions on Article 6 have released informal notes on ITMOs (here) and the proposed mechanism (here). These are a summary of points made in the initial discussions in Bonn.

Developing Article 6

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Article 6 of the Paris Agreement contains a number of bolt holes for the development of market and non-market mechanisms to drive future mitigation.

Within these, paragraph 6.2 pertains to any linkage that might exist between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), such as could occur between cap and trade systems residing in different countries. For example, Canada and the United States have such a linkage between the California and Quebec systems, with other states and provinces likely to join. Presumably when Canada presents the result of its NDC efforts to the UNFCCC at various stock takes, the transfer that has occurred between these two systems will need to be accounted for, with this paragraph leading to a clear set of modalities for the necessary accounting of the transfer. The longer term hope is that this paragraph provides additional impetus to such activities, catalysing both the use of such trading systems and the creation of links between them. This is an important step towards the formation of a globally traded carbon market.

Paragraph 6.4 is also a formative proposition, potentially containing within it the means to drive new investment and markets. It states;

A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, and shall aim:

  1. To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development;
  2. To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party;
  3. To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and
  4. To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.

Almost from the moment the gavel came down in Paris, commentators have been referring to this as the Sustainable Development Mechanism. This has become so embedded that when I returned to this part of the Agreement to write this post I was surprised that it isn’t actually called that. Rather, the mechanism is an EMM (Emissions Mitigation Mechanism) which supports sustainable development, not a sustainable development mechanism that happens to result in emissions reduction.

It is very early days, although Paragraph 6.7 gives the negotiators just this year to sort out the modalities and procedures of the mechanism. At a conference in London this month, a first discussion around Article 6 and particularly the mechanism within it took place. Although the meeting was more of a post-Paris stocktake, it offered an opportunity to get some thoughts and ideas onto the table.

One of the first of these was a presumption that the mechanism is simply the Clean Development Mechanism of the Paris Agreement, i.e. CDM 2.0. While it may eventually offer such a service, to limit it to this and no more may turn out to be very short sighted. In the first instance, the text above does not mention project activity or identify developing countries as the beneficiaries of the activities undertaken. This is in contrast to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol which clearly identified such a role for the CDM.

Rather, paragraph 6.4 is defined more broadly as a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gases while fostering sustainable development. This means that it could have very wide scope and operate on many fronts or alternatively be specified quite narrowly but operate universally as a carbon trading unit. Other definitions or uses may also be considered.

Within a broad scope the mechanism could operate down to a single project, as was the case under the CDM, or become a crediting unit within a baseline system that operates across an entire NDC or within a sector covered by an NDC. Such a unit might be traded between systems, acting as the agent to link baseline-and-credit designs or even cap-and-trade designs. It could become a carbon reduction bought through a financing mechanism such as the Green Climate Fund, establishing that fund as a buyer of reductions as a means of driving mitigation activity. Other possibilities include linking it to technology demonstration or climate finance requirements.

The ambition embedded within the Paris Agreement is going to require change on a very large scale and at a very rapid pace; certainly much faster than could be envisaged through a project by project approach, as was the case with the CDM. While the CDM was very successful in what it did, the scale was hardly measurable against the size of the global energy system. This also argues against an early narrow use of Paragraph 6.4.

At this stage the possibilities are wide open and we need to keep them that way. In the months leading up to the Bonn intercessional meeting in late May, the opportunity exists to explore these options and think through the possible applications of a broadly defined mitigation mechanism. A rush to create CDM 2.0 would be a mistake, even if there is early recognition that the mechanism will need to fulfil this task as part of its overall definition.

COP21: A success within the success

From the moment Laurent Fabius nervously banged his gavel on Saturday 12th December, the newswires, bloggers and analysts have been writing about the success of COP21 and the ambitious nature of the Paris Agreement. Without doubt, more will be written in the weeks and months ahead. But the deal was done and many parts made it possible.

Deal done

In the end it is the detail and implementation that will count. One critical aspect of implementation received a major boost from a short but very specific piece of text within the Paris Agreement; Article 6 might just be the additional catalyst that is needed for the eventual emergence of a global carbon emissions market and therefore the all-important price on carbon.

The Paris Agreement was never going to be the policy instrument that would directly usher in a global price on carbon; carbon pricing is a national or regional policy concern. But the Agreement could offer the platform on which various national carbon pricing policies could interact through linkage, bringing some homogeneity and price alignment between otherwise disparate and independently designed systems. The case for this was initially put forward through collaboration between the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and the Harvard Kennedy School in Massachusetts. A number of papers coming from the school underpinned a Straw-Man Proposal for the Paris Agreement, authored by IETA in mid-2014 and eventually published at the end of that year. The straw-man didn’t mention carbon pricing or emissions trading, it simply proposed a provision for transfer of obligation between respective INDCs, in combination with rigorous accounting to support said transfer.

. . . . . may transfer portions of its defined national contribution to one or more other Parties . . . . .

In addition, the straw-man proposed a broader mechanism for project activity and REDD+. The IETA team worked hard during 2015 building the case for such inclusions in the Paris Agreement. A number of governments, business groups and environmental NGOs came to similar conclusions; Paris needed to underpin carbon market development. After all, fossil fuel use and carbon emissions are so integrated into the global economy that only the power of the global market could possibly address the problem that has been created.

Roll on twelve months and the Paris Agreement now includes Article 6, which provides the opportunity for INDC transfer between Parties and a sustainable development mechanism to operate more widely and hopefully at greater scale than the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. In the case of the transfer, Article 6 says;

. . . . . approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions . . . . .

While not exactly the same as the original IETA idea, it does the same job. Of course, like every other part of the Paris Agreement, this is just the beginning of the task ahead. The CDM within the Kyoto Protocol was similarly defined back in 1997, but it was not until COP7 in Marrakech in 2001 that a fully operational system came into being. Even then, the CDM still required further revisions over the ensuing years.

Exactly how the transfer between INDCs materializes in a UNFCCC context is not clear today, although such a transfer is a prerequisite for cross border linking, such as between California and Quebec or what might eventually become multiple US States and multiple Canadian Provinces. The good news for now is that the provision is there and its use can be explored and developed over the coming year before the COP convenes again in Marrakech in 2016. The eventual goal remains the globally linked market.

Global market

COP21: How are carbon markets doing?

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The opening of COP21 has come and gone with some 150 statements from the pulpit by the largest collection of global leaders ever to assemble in one place. It wasn’t possible to listen to all of them as the group was split and parallel programmes ran in separate rooms. But with the benefit of the excellent webcast facilities provided by the UNFCCC it was possible to jump back and forth between the two groups and listen to a few key addresses. I was hoping for some solid mention of carbon pricing, but references were few and far between, despite the push by the World Bank to raise the profile and importance of government policy measures to introduce a price on carbon. However, the French Preident did make a particular reference.

Two other references that I heard are particularly important;

  1. The President of China, Xi Jinping, reiterated the plan to introduce an economy wide cap-and-trade system in that country.
  2. The new Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, announced that Australia would ratify the 2nd Phase of the Kyoto Protocol, covering the period from 2013-2020.

In one sense the Australian announcement might be seen as a symbolic gesture, in that the Kyoto Protocol is clearly winding down with the expected arrival of the Paris Agreement. However, the move could also  represent an important stake in the ground for the future. Australia has a growing resource sector, even during the current period of lower commodity prices. As such, reducing emissions almost certainly means attaching the economy to an international carbon market, such that even if domestic emissions do not immediately fall, the country can nevertheless pay its way in terms of reductions elsewhere. Australia will need a market architecture to do this and at least for the period up to 2020, the Kyoto Protocol is the only game in town. It will also allow Australia to hold on to offshore reductions made in the pre-2020 timeframe and carry them forward into the Paris Agreement period; assuming that period sees the development of some sort of carbon market framework and accounting.

Therein lays a problem. At least early on in the Paris deliberations, negotiators were already stuck, trying to find agreement between very basic accounting provisions and a more overarching carbon market framework for the Paris Agreement. Simple accounting is perhaps closer to the entirely bottom up nature of the Paris process, but a real market needs some form of framework to build on, particularly when the traded commodity within that market requires precise definition from government.

This is not to say that nobody is talking about carbon pricing in Paris. It was gratifying to see the new Prime Minister of Canada appear on the podium at the launch of the World Bank Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, which Shell has joined. Mr Trudeau had come from his leadership statement in the Plenary where he proudly announced, “Canada is back”. At the CPLC launch he spoke of the efforts of the Canadian Provinces in developing carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems.

But my early take is that the governments now represented in Paris have a way to go before fully recognising one important truth about climate policy. Implementing public policy to deliver a cost for emitting carbon dioxide as part of the energy economy is arguably the single most important step that can be taken to achieve the global goal of limiting warming of the climate system to as close to 2°C as possible.

On Wednesday evening (December 2nd) the business community made it very clear what they think on this issue. At an event in the IETA/WBCSD pavilion, a dozen or more major business association read out their statements on the importance of a carbon price and the inclusion of carbon market provisions within the expected Paris Agreement.

Global market

Final steps towards Paris?

The last ten days have seen a rush by nations to publish their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), with the much anticipated INDC from India amongst those submitted. On Monday October 5th, the Co-Chairs of the ADP also released a proposal for a first draft of a new climate change agreement for Paris. So it has been a very busy few days, but are we any closer to a deal and could that deal have sufficient ambition to bend the emissions curve?

The India INDC is telling as an indicator of where the developing world really is, versus where the rapidly emerging economies such as China now find themselves. In the case of the latter group, there is thinking towards an emissions peak with China indicating that this will be around 2030 and continuing signals from the academic and research community in that country indicating that it may well be earlier. One such article appeared recently in the Guardian. But for the much poorer developing countries the story remains very different.

The submissions from India is 38 pages long, but of this some 28 pages is supporting evidence and context, explaining the reality of Indian emissions, the need to grow the economy to take hundreds of millions out of poverty and the expected use of fossil fuels to power industry, including areas such as metal smelting, petrochemicals and refining. With a focus on efficiency in particular, India expects to achieve a 33 to 35 percent reduction in CO2 intensity of the economy, but in reality that means a rise in energy related emissions to around 4 billion tonnes or more by 2030, up from some 2+ billion tonnes per annum at present (1.954 Gt in 2012, IEA). This could be tempered by a further element of their contribution which aims to increase forest sinks by some 3 billion tonnes of CO2 in total through to 2030.

There has been considerable speculation as to the renewable energy component of India’s INDC, with a hope that this would show enormous progress in solar deployment in particular. The INDC took the somewhat unusual route of talking in capacity additions, rather than generation (and therefore emissions). India aims to achieve 40% cumulative electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel based resources by 2030. This is significant, but less than it might appear. In a very simple example where 100 GW of generating capacity is comprised of 40 GW solar PV and 60 GW coal, the generation mix might be around 14% renewables and 86% coal. This is assuming a 20% capacity factor for the solar PV (maximum is 50% with day-night) and 80% capacity factor for the coal.

India has also put a considerable price tag on their INDC, with a mitigation effort of some US$ 834 billion through to 2030. In a previous post I looked at the costs assumed in the Kenyan INDC, which came to some $25 billion, but for a population of ~60 million (average through to 2030). With a projected population of some 1.5 billion by 2030, the finance side is in the same ballpark as the Kenyan INDC, albeit on the higher side.

Finally, the last few days have seen new draft text appear – shortened dramatically from some 80 pages to a manageable 20. But references to government led carbon markets, carbon pricing systems or even the use of transfer mechanisms between parties are largely missing. Article 34 of the Draft Decision does hint at the need to rescue the CDM from the Kyoto Protocol by referring to the need to build on Article 12 of the Protocol, but it will be of little use if there isn’t substantial demand for credits in developing and rapidly emerging economies. Simply creating a new crediting mechanism or even bringing the CDM into the Paris agreement won’t on its own direct the finance to the likes of Kenya and India. That demand and related finance flow will only come if the developed and emerging economies are building emissions trading systems (such as in China) and have the ability and confidence to transfer units related to it across their borders. So a great deal of work remains to be done.

 

 

Accounting isn’t enough

As the World Bank and others ramp up the discussion on carbon pricing, heads are turning towards Paris with thoughts on how the issue will be incorporated into the expected COP21 global climate deal. I have said many times in the past that unless a carbon price makes its way into the whole global energy system, then its success in bringing down emissions is far from assured. While local carbon pricing wins will appear, the global effort could be undermined by a lack of global coverage.   This is true of other policy approaches as well, but in the case of carbon pricing there is the significant benefit of economic efficiency.  For me, the signs so far aren’t great, with the text that came out of the Geneva ADP meeting showing few signs of tackling this important issue.

In recent weeks I have heard some commentators and national climate negotiators argue that the Framework Convention itself is sufficient to underpin cooperative carbon market development and that all the COP21 deal needs is a framework to ensure that accounting of carbon based trades is robust and avoids issues such as double counting (two parties each counting a particular reduction under their own emissions inventory). The underpinning language within the Convention can be found in several places (examples below), but the references are oblique and without direct recognition of carbon pricing or carbon markets;

  • Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties;
  • These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention;
  • Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of the Convention;

While this language could be interpreted as a mandate to develop a global carbon market and the ensuing exchange of carbon pricing instruments between Parties, or companies within the jurisdiction of those Parties, it hardly encourages this process to take place, let alone become a key activity in implementing a global deal. Similarly, if a Paris deal just addresses accounting issues, I don’t believe that this will act as the necessary catalyst for carbon market development either. It’s a bit like agreeing how to calculate the GDP and then not opening the national mint to print and issue the currency!!

Looking back at the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism provides some valuable learning. While it isn’t a comprehensive carbon pricing instrument the Protocol nevertheless catalysed its development with a few paragraphs of text, to the extent that it eventually pushed some $100 billion (some have estimated much higher levels) in project investment into various developing country economies. This far eclipses the $10 billion that has so far been pledged to the Green Climate Fund, clearly demonstrating that market based approaches will almost always outstrip direct public financing or funding.    To meet the developed countries’ commitment to mobilize $100bn per annum by 2020, it is clear that carbon market approaches including linking will be required.  It is difficult to see how it will be met without incentivizing the private sector in this way.

This is the sort of step that I think the negotiators in Paris need to take. Rather than just elaborating on core accounting principles, I believe that they need to incorporate a means of actively encouraging carbon market expansion. Given the nationally determined contribution based architecture that is emerging, such a development will probably be a bottom up process, perhaps with heterogeneous linking between various market based systems. The Harvard Kennedy School are offering valuable insight into how this might transpire.

One organisation, IETA, has put forward a proposal for Paris along these lines. It is a light touch approach, given the opposition that a real carbon market proposal seems to foster, but hopefully it will be enough to get things started. The IETA proposal calls for the development of a “unified international transfer system”, in effect a “plug-and-play” linkage approach for national trading systems. With wording along these lines in the Paris agreement, later COP decisions could establish the modalities for such a system, thus opening up and accelerating the process that the likes of California and Quebec went through to link their respective trading systems. Such modalities would include the common accounting framework that is needed irrespective of the approach taken to encourage the development of a global market. In all cases, accounting still remains central to progress.

I won’t claim that this is the quickest and most effective way forward, but it is where we are and probably the best that can be achieved, assuming the push from above is there to encourage it. Without such a push, we are all left to hope that something may transpire on carbon markets, but wishful thinking isn’t a solution to 2°C.

Brazil is back; but are they a decade late?

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COP20 in Lima ended its first full week on a mixed note, but with some positive signs for the ongoing process. The detailed discussions on the role of carbon markets under the SBSTA ended in disagreement and postponement which was disheartening, but there remains hope that this key subject will still see the light of day under the ADP during the coming days. Curiously, China (and others) opposed deepening the market discussion at SBSTA because of a lack of guidance from the ADP itself, but according to the Earth Negotiation Bulletin they stated in the ADP when reflecting on the Paris Agreement non-paper (ADP.2014.11.NonPaper) that “sections on market and non-market approaches, and new market-based mechanisms could prejudge discussions under the Subsidiary Bodies”. They seem to be setting themselves up for their own private Catch-22 there. It was also unfortunate that those who will pick up the ongoing challenge posed by carbon emissions and climate change were reported on as follows; “YOUNGOs noted that markets have not delivered what they promised and called for a moratorium on markets.” Perhaps they have been reading Naomi Klein’s book “This Changes Everything”.

One document in particular that drew attention was a paper circulated by Brazil, detailing an idea they had proposed at the October ADP meeting. Brazil have a long history of creative intervention in the process, being the country that “invented” the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which over the decade of its operational life has delivered tens, if not hundreds of billions of dollars (depends on your measurement definitions) of carbon finance to developing countries. It appears that Brazil is back to its creative best with a paper on “concentric differentiation”, which draws together both the concept of CBDR-RC* and the need for universal acceptance and eventual implementation of absolute targets as the route to atmospheric stabilisation of carbon dioxide.

The paper is best described by referencing a diagram included by Brazil (see below). Initially the INDCs** of various parties are scattered throughout the circles depending on their capabilities, with all developed countries starting in the middle. The crucial change to previous attempts at agreement is the inclusion of the proposal;

“developing country parties are expected to include in their respective NDC a type of economy-wide mitigation targets, leading to absolute targets over time”

This means that everyone migrates inwards as their capabilities allow, but that developing country parties at least start with an emissions goal, albeit intensity based, per capita based or based on a business-as-usual (BAU) deviation. Least developed economies start in the outer ring and are encouraged, but not required to present an INDC. Eventually all parties end up with absolute targets in the middle.

Brazil concept

This is a very encouraging proposal by Brazil and it also includes an extensive reference to markets, cap-and-trade, a reformed CDM and so on. But without wanting to take away from the importance of their thinking, it does raise the question of whether it is a decade or more too late. This is the proposal that should have come when parties were negotiating onward commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), thereby giving that agreement new life and making it fit for purpose in the 21st Century. Almost all the necessary pieces were already in place, it simply (!! – nothing is ever that simple) required the addition of the middle ring and the provisions for promotion.

In KP language, the centre ring is the AAU (Assigned Amount Unit) world, now only home to the EU, Norway, Australia and Ukraine. Even Japan has left. The outer ring is the CDM world, which relies on financial flows from the inner ring. A renegotiation and addition to KP could have inserted the middle ring and promotion requirements and even developed a new carbon accounting unit for intensity based targets. With all three rings based on carbon units, the much needed “global carbon market” could have taken off relatively quickly. Such a design might have even brought back countries such as the USA given that its objections regarding developing country actions would have been addressed.

One aspect of the Brazil proposal that has some traction in the ADP is the idea that “backsliding” on INDCs won’t be permitted. In other words, once you have declared an INDC with an absolute target, that is where you stay.

The Brazil proposal is for the ADP and not for the KP; which means that parties will have to reinvent everything from scratch. But at least Brazil is there with its creative input leading the way. On to Week 2 in Lima where the Parties are at least into the process of negotiating text, rather than negotiating the procedures under which they would even consider text.

 

* Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities

**Intended nationally determined contributions

 

A recent story in The Guardian expressed some optimism that “humans will rise to the challenge of climate change”. Ten reasons were given to be hopeful, but not one of them mentioned the climate basics such as a carbon price or carbon capture and storage. Rather, the offerings were largely tangential to the reality of rising CO2 emissions, with the hope that because European homes are using less energy and solar prices are dropping, then ipso facto, atmospheric CO2 levels would somehow stabilize (i.e. annual CO2 emissions falling to zero).  Without wanting to be pessimistic, but rather realistic, it may not be the case that emissions just fall and here are ten reasons why not. For those who visit this blog more regularly, sorry for the repetition, but hopefully this is a useful summary anyway.

1. There is still no carbon price

Although discussions about carbon pricing are widespread and there are large systems in place in the EU and California, pervasive robust pricing will take decades to implement if the current pace is maintained. Yet carbon pricing is pivotal to resolving the issue, as discussed here. The recent Carbon Pricing Statement from the World Bank also makes this point and calls on governments, amongst others, to work towards the goal of a global approach.

2. Legacy infrastructure almost gets us there

The legacy energy system that currently powers the world is built and will more than likely continue to run, with some parts for decades. This includes everything from domestic appliances to cars to huge chemical plants, coal mines and power stations. I have added up what I think is the minimum realistic impact of this legacy and it takes us to something over 800 billion tonnes carbon emitted to the atmosphere, from the current level of about 580 billion tonnes since 1750. Remember that 2°C is roughly equivalent to one trillion tonnes of carbon.

3. Efficiency drives growth and energy use, not the reverse

The proposition that energy efficiency reduces emissions seems to ignore the cumulative nature of carbon emissions and is apparently based on the notion that energy efficiency is somehow separate to growth and economic activity. What is wrong with this is that the counterfactual, i.e. that the economy would have used more energy but grown by the same amount, probably doesn’t exist. Rather, had efficiency measures not been taken then growth would have been lower and energy consumption would have been less as a result. Because efficiency drives economic growth, you have to account for Jevons Paradox (rebound). After all, economies have been getting more efficient since the start of the industrial revolution and emissions have only risen. Why would we now think that being even more efficient would somehow throw this engine into reverse?

4. We still need a global industrial system

In a modern city such as London, surrounded by towns and idyllic countryside with hardly a factory in sight, it’s easy to forget that an industrial behemoth lurks around the corner producing everything we buy, eat, use and trade. This behemoth runs on fossil fuels, both for the energy it needs and the feedstock it requires.

5. Solar optimism

There’s little doubt that solar PV is here to stay, will be very big and will probably be cheap, even with the necessary storage or backup priced in. But it’s going to take a while, perhaps most of this century for that to happen. During that time a great deal of energy will be needed for the global economy and it will come from fossil fuels. We will need to deal with the emissions from this.

6. Developing countries need coal to industrialize

I talked about this in a very recent post – developing countries are likely to employ coal to industrialize, which then locks the economy into this fuel. One way to avoid this is to see much wider use of instruments such as the Clean Development Mechanism, but at prices that make some sense. This then comes back to point 1 above.

7. We focus on what we can do, but that doesn’t mean it’s the best thing to do

Methane emissions are currently attracting a great deal of attention. But cutting methane today and not making similar reductions in CO2 as well means we could still end up at the same level of peak warming later this century. It’s important to cut methane emissions, but not as a proxy for acting on CO2.

8. It’s about cumulative carbon, not emissions in 2050

Much of the misconception about how to solve the climate issue stems from a lack of knowledge about the issue itself. CO2 emissions are talked about on a local basis as we might talk about city air pollution or sulphur emissions from a power plant. These are flow problems in that the issue is solved by reducing the local flow of the pollutant. By contrast, the release of carbon to the atmosphere is a stock problem and the eventual stock in the atmosphere is linked more to the economics of resource extraction rather than it is to local actions in cities and homes. Thinking about the problem from the stock perspective changes the nature of the solution and the approach. One technology in particular becomes pivotal to the issue, carbon capture and storage (CCS).

9. Don’t mention CCS, we’re talking about climate change

Following on from the point above, it’s proving difficult for CCS to gain traction and acceptance. This is not helped by the UN process itself, where CCS doesn’t get much air time. One example was the Abu Dhabi Ascent, a pre-meeting for the upcoming UN Climate Summit. CCS wasn’t even on the agenda.

10. We just aren’t trying hard enough

A new report out from the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change argues that the expected global agreement on climate change coming from the Paris COP21 in 2015 is unlikely to deliver anything close to a 2°C solution. At best, they see the “contributions” process that is now underway as usefully bending the global trajectory.

The analysis shows that an agreement likely achievable at COP-21 will succeed in a useful bending the curve of global emissions. The likely agreement will not, however, produce global emissions within the window of paths to 2050 that are consistent with frequently proposed climate goals, raising questions about follow-up steps in the development of a climate regime.

Perhaps of even greater concern is the potential that the UNFCCC process has for creating lock-in to a less than adequate policy regime. They note:

Nevertheless, if an agreement is reached in 2015, going into effect by 2020, the earliest review of performance along the way might not be before 2025. In this case, an effort to formulate the next agreement under the Climate Convention, or a tightening of COP-21 agreements, would not start until 2025 or after, with new targets set for a decade or more after that. If this expectation is correct, then global emissions as far out as 2045 or 2050 will be heavily influenced by achievements in the negotiations over the next 18 months.

 

 

While all fossil fuels are contributing to the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, coal stands apart as really problematic, not just because of its CO2 emissions today (see chart, global emissions in millions of tonnes CO2 vs. time), but because of the vast reserves waiting to be used and the tendency for an emerging economy to lock its energy system into it.

Global energy emissions

Global emissions, million tonnes CO2 from 1971 to 2010

I recently came across data relating to the potential coal resource base in just one country, Botswana, which is estimated at some 200 billion tonnes. Current recoverable reserves are of course a fraction of this amount, but just for some perspective, 200 billion tonnes of coal once used would add well over 100 billion tonnes of carbon to the atmosphere and therefore shift the cumulative total from the current 580 billion tonnes carbon to nearly 700 billion tonnes carbon; and that is just from Botswana. Fortunately Botswana has quite a small population and a relatively high GDP per capita so it is unlikely to use vast amounts of this coal for itself, but its emerging neighbours, countries like Zimbabwe, may certainly benefit. This much coal would also take a very long time to extract – even on a global basis it represents over 25 years of use at current levels of production.

This raises the question of whether a country can develop without an accessible resource base of some description, but particularly an energy resource base. A few have done so, notably Japan and perhaps the Netherlands, but many economies have developed by themselves on the back of coal or developed when others arrived and extracted more difficult resources for them, notably oil, gas and minerals. The coal examples are numerous, but start with the likes of Germany, Great Britain, the United States and Australia and include more recent examples such as China, South Africa and India. Of course strong governance and institutional capacity are also required to ensure widespread societal benefit as the resource is extracted.

Coal is a relatively easy resource to tap into and make use of. It requires little technology to get going but offers a great deal, such as electricity, railways (in the early days), heating, industry and very importantly, smelting (e.g. steel making). In the case of Great Britain and the United States coal provided the impetus for the Industrial Revolution. In the case of the latter, very easy to access oil soon followed and mobility flourished, which added enormously to the development of the continent.

But the legacy that this leaves, apart from a wealthy society, is a lock-in of the resource on which the society was built. So much infrastructure is constructed on the back of the resource that it becomes almost impossible to replace or do without, particularly if the resource is still providing value.

As developing economies emerge they too look at resources such as coal. Although natural gas is cleaner and may offer many environmental benefits over coal (including lower CO2 emissions), it requires a much higher level of infrastructure and technology to access and use, so it may not be a natural starting point. It often comes later, but in many instances it has been as well as the coal rather than instead of it. Even in the USA, the recent natural gas boom has not displaced its energy equivalent in coal extraction, rather some of the coal has shifted to the export market.

Enter the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The idea here was to jump the coal era and move directly to cleaner fuels or renewable energy by providing the value that the coal would have delivered as a subsidy for more advanced infrastructure. But it hasn’t quite worked that way. With limited buyers of CERs (Certified Emission Reduction units) and therefore limited provision of the necessary subsidy, the focus shifted to smaller scale projects such as rural electricity provision. These are laudable projects, but this doesn’t represent the necessary investment in large scale industrial infrastructure that the country actually needs to develop. Rooftop solar PV won’t build roads, bridges and hospitals or run steel mills and cement plants. So the economy turns to coal anyway.

This is one of the puzzles that will need to be solved for a Paris 2015 agreement to actually start to make a difference. If we can rescue a mechanism such as the CDM and have it feature in a future international agreement, it’s focus, or at least a major part of it, has to shift from small scale development projects to large scale industrial and power generation projects, but still with an emphasis on least developed economies where coal lock-in has yet to occur or is just starting.

Emissions Trading via Direct Action in Australia

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The Australian Government recently released a Green Paper describing in more detail its proposal for an Emission Reduction Fund (ERF), the principle component of its Direct Action climate policy. The ERF will sit alongside renewable energy and reforestation policies, but is designed to do the bulk of the heavy lifting as the Government looks for some 430 million tonnes of cumulative reductions (see below) over the period 2014 to 2020. The ERF will have initial funding of about AU$ 1.55 billion over the forward period, with the money being used to buy project reductions (as Australian Carbon Credit Units or ACCUs) from the agriculture and industrial sectors of the economy by reverse auction. These reductions will be similar to those that are created through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) available under the Kyoto Protocol.

 Australia Reduction Task to 2020

Although the fund and reverse auction process are discussed in some detail and appear as central to the policy framework, this may not be the case as the system is rolled out and the full framework developed. The issue that comes from such an approach to emissions reduction is that despite buying project reductions from the economy, the overall emissions pathway for the economy as a whole still does not follow the expected trajectory. The ERF may also encounter a number of issues seen with the CDM, all of which are some form of additionality;

  1. Determining if there would have been higher emissions had the project not happened. Perhaps the reduction is something that would have happened anyway or the counterfactual position of higher emissions would never have actually happened. For example, an energy efficiency gain is claimed in terms of a CO2 reduction but the efficiency gain is subject to some amount of rebound due to increased use of the more efficient service, therefore negating a real reduction in emissions. Further, the counterfactual of higher emissions might never have existed as the original less efficient process would not have operated at the higher level.
  2. Double counting – the project presumes a reduction that is already being counted by somebody else within the economy as a whole. For example, an energy efficiency gain in a certain part of the supply chain is claimed as an emissions reduction, but this is already intrinsic to the overall emissions outcome for another process.
  3. Rent seeking – project proponents seek government money for actions already underway or even construct an apparent reduction.

The Australian emissions inventory will be measured bottom up based on fuel consumption, changes in forest cover and land use and established estimates / protocols for agriculture, coal mine fugitive emissions, landfill etc. It will not be possible to simply subtract the ERF driven reductions from such a total unless they are separate sequestration based reductions, e.g. soil carbon. This is because the ERF reductions are themselves part of the overall emissions of the economy.

The Green Paper clearly recognizes theses issues and proposes that the overall emissions pathway through to 2020 must be safeguarded. In Section 4 it discusses the need for “An effectively designed framework to discourage emissions growth above historical levels . . . “, with associated terminology including phrases such as “covered entities”, “baseline emission levels”, “action required from businesses” and “compliance”.  The safeguarding mechanism, rather than being a supplementary element of Direct Action, could end up becoming the main policy measure for decarbonisation if significant CO2 reductions are not achieved under the ERF. While this may not be the objective that the Government seeks, it does mean that the implementation of the safeguard mechanism needs to incorporate the design thinking that would otherwise be applied to the development of intended emission trading systems, such as the Alberta Specified Gas Emitters Regulation.

As currently described, the safeguarding mechanism looks like a baseline-and-credit system, with the baseline established at facility level either on an intensity or absolute emissions basis (both are referred to in the Green Paper). Should a facility exceed the baseline it could still achieve compliance by purchasing ACCUs from the market, either from project developers or other facilities that have over performed against their own baselines. Although the Government have made it very clear that they will not be establishing a system such as cap-and-trade that collects revenue from the market, facilities will nevertheless face compliance obligations and may have to purchase reduction units at the prevailing market price.

The level of trade and the need for facilities to purchase ACCUs will of course depend on the stringency of the baselines and this remains to be seen, however in setting these the Government will need to be mindful of the overall national goal and its need to comply with that. The development of a full baseline and credit trading system also raises the prospect of the market out-bidding the Government for ACCUs, particularly if the Government sets its own benchmark price for purchase, as is indicated in the Green Paper.

As Australia moves from a cap-and trade system under the Carbon pricing Mechanism (CPM) to the ERF and its associated safeguarding mechanism, the main change for the economy will be distributional in nature, given that a 5% reduction must still be achieved and the same types of projects should eventually appear. However, the biggest challenge facing any system in Australia could be around speedy design and implementation, given that the time remaining before 2020 is now very limited and the emission reduction projects being encouraged will themselves take time to deliver.