Archive for the ‘Kyoto Protocol’ Category

The first UNFCCC talks since the adoption of the Paris Agreement are now underway and the various delegations are getting down to the tough task of implementation. I was in Bonn on the opening day of the two week meeting, representing the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) in a side event hosted by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board (EB). The aim of the event was to draw on the learning from a decade of CDM operation and apply this experience to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. This is the Article that provides a potential new foundation for carbon market development. I was there to present the IETA Article 6 Vision paper which I posted a story on recently.

The side event was packed out and many were standing in the corridor leading to the room; there is clearly considerable interest in this topic. Over the years the CDM has been a successful mechanism, resulting in nearly 8000 projects and some 1.7 billion Certified Emission Reduction (CER) units issued. Even at a €5-10 per CER (as it was in the earlier days of the EU ETS), this still represents a carbon price based financial injection of up to €10 billion into developing economies. The CDM spawned a small industry of project developers, assessors, MRV professionals and climate finance experts and clearly demonstrated that even a gentle application of the market can have a significant impact. Little wonder that there is such interest in the mitigation mechanism embedded in Article 6 and its potential to drive change.

However, the CDM (or a version of it) is unlikely to be repeated or replicated under Article 6, at least not under the terms that existed within the Kyoto Protocol. It was clear from the discussion during the side event that this new reality is going to take a while to hit home and settle in. The CDM became an important source of climate finance for developing countries, where the only real obligation on the part of the host country for a given project was to provide the necessary governance structure to ensure eventual issuance of the CERs. But that is no longer the case given the provisions of the Paris Agreement and Article 6 are now effectively the same for all countries.

Over time, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) will expand to cover all greenhouse gas in all economies. Every NDC, either specifically or notionally (for assessment and stocktake purposes) is linked to a quantitative carbon budget and there is an expectation from the Paris Agreement that these budgets will be delivered. While the Paris Agreement doesn’t say this in such stark terms, it is nevertheless implied. The whole approach that the UNFCCC used to assess the NDCs in their latest synthesis report, released on May 2nd, underpins this. Their aggregate analysis is summarized in carbon budget terms as follows;

The implementation of the communicated INDCs is estimated to result in aggregate global emission levels of 55.0 (51.4 to 57.3) Gt CO2 eq in 2025 and 56.2 (52.0 to 59.3) Gt CO2 eq in 2030. The global levels of emissions in 2025 and 2030 were calculated by adding the estimated aggregate emission levels resulting from the implementation of the communicated INDCs, that is 46.5 (44.3 to 48.9) Gt CO2 eq in 2025 and 48.0 (45.1 to 51.4) Gt CO2 eq in 2030, to the levels of emissions not covered by the INDCs. Global cumulative CO2 emissions after 2011 are expected to reach 533.1 (509.6 to 557.2) Gt CO2 in 2025 and 738.8 (703.6 to 770.9) Gt CO2 in 2030.

As I noted in my last post and drawing on Article 6.5 in the Paris Agreement, this means that the transfer of credits from a project across a national border (in the style of the CDM) will impact the national inventory reports of both parties. These transfers will then have to be executed in the style of Joint Implementation (JI) of the Kyoto Protocol, which effectively required an adjustment to the project host country’s national goal if the crediting unit was to be used by another Party to meet their goal.

I raised this issue as part of my presentation and the message was then amplified by a couple of people in the audience during the Q&A. But the response from some in the room was close to one of denial of this new reality, even though the Paris Agreement makes the need for such adjustment clear. The discussion almost drifted back into the old reality of developing countries not having goals and targets, but fortunately we didn’t land there. We didn’t resolve the issue either, which means that there are probably some tough discussions ahead as the negotiators get down to business.

A week later in Bonn and after many hours of discussions on Article 6 by the Parties, there has been some progress. At a side event on the second Monday also on Article 6 and also standing room only, I heard one central African delegate note that we had certainly left the world of the CDM and that perhaps we were somewhere between the constructions offered by CDM and JI of the Kyoto Protocol, albeit this would have to be interpreted to match the new bottom up global architecture of the Paris Agreement. I also heard another national delegate argue strongly that the new mechanism was not a sustainable development mechanism and should not be referenced as such, even if sustainable development was an important outcome of the implementation of the mechanism. Several panellists talked about quantification of NDCs as an important precursor to the avoidance of double counting.

The various concerns and issues that have been raised in these early discussion are very valid and the answers aren’t immediately obvious. Many developing countries have placed the need for finance as a condition on at least some portion of their mitigation contribution and in the past the CDM offered such finance. But if the reality of a new mechanism is a tighter national goal as a consequence of using it, there may be some push back. In the IETA paper one possible solution to this was proposed, namely the direct purchase of project units from the host country of the mitigation activity by multi-lateral funds. But this is unlikely to reach the necessary scale of mitigation envisaged by the NDCs, so other approaches will have to be developed. Interesting times ahead!

Update: The co-chairs in the UNFCCC discussions on Article 6 have released informal notes on ITMOs (here) and the proposed mechanism (here). These are a summary of points made in the initial discussions in Bonn.

Within the Paris Agreement sits Article 6, a carefully crafted set of provisions to foster, in the parlance of the UNFCCC and the Parties to the Agreement, cooperative approaches. This includes a provision for cross border transfer of mitigation outcomes and a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development. But for those outside the negotiating process (and hopefully those inside as well), this Article is seen as the foundation for carbon market development. There was a great deal of advocacy effort behind the Article, particularly from the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) who argued strongly that such a construction within the Paris Agreement was essential to see accelerated adoption of government implemented carbon pricing; widely recognised as a critical policy instrument for managing carbon dioxide emissions.

The wording of Article 6 needs some deciphering and for those now assembling in Bonn to begin the process of implementation of the Paris Agreement, some steer from the private sector will hopefully be helpful. After all, if the provisions do enable the development and expansion of carbon markets then it will almost certainly be the private sector that is most deeply involved. To that end, IETA have now published a first thought piece on Article 6, setting out a vision for its implementation.

IETA Article 6 Brochure

The IETA vision for Article 6 is built on the need for governments to implement carbon pricing, ideally through market based approaches such as cap-and-trade or baseline-and-credit. This starts with the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMO), described in 6.2 and 6.3. These transfers are effectively carbon market trades between governments or private entities operating through emission trading systems. One example is the link between California and Quebec, which effectively ties parts of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of Canada and the United States together. Similarly the link between Norway and the EU ETS is doing the same for their respective NDCs. IETA argues that for clean and simple accounting and the avoidance of double counting, that the concept of exchange of carbon units, either notional or real, should be an underpinning feature of any ITMO. That means the basis for cooperative approaches is, for the most part, a market based one. For governments to access the economic benefits and cost effectiveness of a cooperative approach, they will need to implement carbon unit based emissions management systems within their economies.

IETA also recognises that not all governments may be ready or able to implement trading based systems, so its vision draws on another aspect of Article 6 to enable this. Paragraphs 6.4 (a) – (d) describe an emissions mitigation mechanism (which IETA have given the designation EMM). While some commentators are already arguing that this is a future version of the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. CDM 2.0), IETA makes the case for a much broader interpretation and use of this mechanism. Such implementation could see the EMM offering both universal carbon allowance and crediting units for those countries that choose to use them, facilitating trade between NDCs (i.e. ITMO), providing registry accounting and offering the prospect of carbon pricing in many economies.

The EMM could also be designed to establish sector baselines and issue sovereign credits for performance in excess of those baselines, which might then be purchased by external climate funds to channel investment. In this way it would function more like the CDM. But as IETA notes in its thought piece, the world in which crediting from one country acting as a direct offset in another is coming to an end. Under the CDM this was possible because the project host country had no quantified emissions management goal. As such, national accounting effectively took place on one side only, although the project itself had to have a credible baseline against which it operated. But as NDCs progressively expand to cover all national emissions (if they don’t then the Paris Agreement can’t claim to manage global emissions), paragraph 6.5 prevents such one sided accounting;

Emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement of the host Party’s nationally determined contribution if used by another Party to demonstrate achievement of its nationally determined contribution.

This means that the transfer of credits from a project across a national border (in the style of the CDM) will impact the national inventory reports of both parties. IETA argues that these transfers will then have to be executed in the style of Joint Implementation (JI) of the Kyoto Protocol, which effectively required an adjustment to the project host country’s national goal if the crediting unit was to be used by another Party to meet their goal.

The Paris Agreement introduces a very different world of international emissions trading to the one that exists today and has operated in recent years. The IETA paper concludes with a visualisation of how this might end up.

Article 6 Evolution

Developing Article 6

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Article 6 of the Paris Agreement contains a number of bolt holes for the development of market and non-market mechanisms to drive future mitigation.

Within these, paragraph 6.2 pertains to any linkage that might exist between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), such as could occur between cap and trade systems residing in different countries. For example, Canada and the United States have such a linkage between the California and Quebec systems, with other states and provinces likely to join. Presumably when Canada presents the result of its NDC efforts to the UNFCCC at various stock takes, the transfer that has occurred between these two systems will need to be accounted for, with this paragraph leading to a clear set of modalities for the necessary accounting of the transfer. The longer term hope is that this paragraph provides additional impetus to such activities, catalysing both the use of such trading systems and the creation of links between them. This is an important step towards the formation of a globally traded carbon market.

Paragraph 6.4 is also a formative proposition, potentially containing within it the means to drive new investment and markets. It states;

A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, and shall aim:

  1. To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development;
  2. To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party;
  3. To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and
  4. To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.

Almost from the moment the gavel came down in Paris, commentators have been referring to this as the Sustainable Development Mechanism. This has become so embedded that when I returned to this part of the Agreement to write this post I was surprised that it isn’t actually called that. Rather, the mechanism is an EMM (Emissions Mitigation Mechanism) which supports sustainable development, not a sustainable development mechanism that happens to result in emissions reduction.

It is very early days, although Paragraph 6.7 gives the negotiators just this year to sort out the modalities and procedures of the mechanism. At a conference in London this month, a first discussion around Article 6 and particularly the mechanism within it took place. Although the meeting was more of a post-Paris stocktake, it offered an opportunity to get some thoughts and ideas onto the table.

One of the first of these was a presumption that the mechanism is simply the Clean Development Mechanism of the Paris Agreement, i.e. CDM 2.0. While it may eventually offer such a service, to limit it to this and no more may turn out to be very short sighted. In the first instance, the text above does not mention project activity or identify developing countries as the beneficiaries of the activities undertaken. This is in contrast to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol which clearly identified such a role for the CDM.

Rather, paragraph 6.4 is defined more broadly as a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gases while fostering sustainable development. This means that it could have very wide scope and operate on many fronts or alternatively be specified quite narrowly but operate universally as a carbon trading unit. Other definitions or uses may also be considered.

Within a broad scope the mechanism could operate down to a single project, as was the case under the CDM, or become a crediting unit within a baseline system that operates across an entire NDC or within a sector covered by an NDC. Such a unit might be traded between systems, acting as the agent to link baseline-and-credit designs or even cap-and-trade designs. It could become a carbon reduction bought through a financing mechanism such as the Green Climate Fund, establishing that fund as a buyer of reductions as a means of driving mitigation activity. Other possibilities include linking it to technology demonstration or climate finance requirements.

The ambition embedded within the Paris Agreement is going to require change on a very large scale and at a very rapid pace; certainly much faster than could be envisaged through a project by project approach, as was the case with the CDM. While the CDM was very successful in what it did, the scale was hardly measurable against the size of the global energy system. This also argues against an early narrow use of Paragraph 6.4.

At this stage the possibilities are wide open and we need to keep them that way. In the months leading up to the Bonn intercessional meeting in late May, the opportunity exists to explore these options and think through the possible applications of a broadly defined mitigation mechanism. A rush to create CDM 2.0 would be a mistake, even if there is early recognition that the mechanism will need to fulfil this task as part of its overall definition.

What can really be done by 2050?

The calls for action are becoming louder and bolder as the weeks continue to countdown towards COP21 in Paris. Perhaps none have been as bold as the recent call by The B Team for governments to commit to a global goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and to embed this in the agreement to be signed at COP21 in Paris.

The B Team is a high profile group of business and civil society leaders, counting amongst its number Richard Branson (Virgin Group of Companies), Paul Polman (CEO of Unilever) and Arianna Huffington (Huffington Post). The team is not just looking at climate change, but the even larger challenge of doing business in the 21st Century; shifting from Plan A which requires business to focus on profit alone, to Plan B which encompasses a more holistic set of objectives around financial performance, sustainability and business as a force for good to help solve challenging social and environmental goals. It is perhaps the next big step forward in what was originally termed “sustainable development”.

Without wanting to question the broader motives of The B Team, I do challenge their view that the climate issue can be resolved in just 35 years. For some this may sound like a long time, but it is the span of just one career. In fact it is the span of my career in the oil and gas industry from when I started work in Geelong Refinery in Australia in 1980. At least in one industry today, IT, everything has changed in that time, but that is not true elsewhere. In 1980 there were no personal computers in Geelong Refinery; today it probably can’t run without them, although the distillers, crackers and oil movement facilities being run by them have hardly changed and in many instances are precisely the same pieces of equipment that were running in 1980. In almost every other industry, the shift has been gradual, perhaps because of the installed base which of course wasn’t an issue for personal computing and mobile telephony. I suspect that this is true in Mr Polman’s own industry (household products) and it is certainly true in Mr Branson’s. In 1980 I flew on my first trip to London on a 747 and today I am in San Francisco, having arrived here on a 747, albeit a slightly longer, more sophisticated, efficient and larger capacity one than the 1980 model, but still a 747 burning many tons of jet fuel to get here. During his time in office which started with the election in 1980, Ronald Reagan replaced the existing Air Force One 707 with a 747 which still flies today but which Mr Obama has just announced will be replaced with a 747-8. Those planes will likely fly for some 30 years, as will all the other planes being built today, with many just entering the beginning of their production runs (787, A350, A380), rather than heading towards the end as we might be with the 747 series. There are also no serious plans for the jet engine to run on anything other than hydrocarbons for the foreseeable future (i.e. 50+ years) and even the attempts to manufacture bio-hydrocarbon jet fuels are still in their commercial infancy.

So why would we think that everything can be different in just 35 years? There is no doubt that to quickly and decisively solve the climate issue and have a better than even chance of keeping the surface temperature rise below 2°C that we need to do this, but that doesn’t mean we can. To start with, there has to be tremendous political will to do so and to be fair, this is clearly what The B Team is trying to foster by making the call. But political will isn’t enough to turn over the installed industrial capacity that we rely on today, let alone replace it with a set of technologies that in some instances don’t exist. The development and deployment of radical new technologies takes decades, with the energy industry able to make that change at about half the rate of the IT industry. Even the latter has needed nearly 50 years to invent (ARPANET in 1969) and extensively deploy the internet.

We are now seeing real progress in the sale of electric cars, but even there the numbers don’t stack up. To completely outpace conventional vehicle manufacture and replace the entire legacy stock of on-road vehicles will take about 50 years, assuming a ramp up of global electric car production of at least 20% p.a. every year until all internal combustion engine manufacturing is phased out. While this might be conceivable for personal transport, the progress on finding an alternative for heavy transport, including ships, is slow.

For medium to heavy industry that relies almost completely on hydrocarbon fuels for high temperature operations in particular, there are no easy alternatives. Electricity could be an option in some instances, but almost all operations today choose coal or natural gas. For smelting, coal is essential as it provides the carbon to act as a reducing agent for the chemical conversion of the ore into a pure metal.

Perhaps the area in which rapid progress will be seen is electricity generation, where a whole range of zero emission technologies exist. These include wind, solar, geothermal, tidal, nuclear and carbon capture and storage. But even with complete success in this one area, we shouldn’t forget that electricity is less than 20% of the current global final energy mix. This will surely rise, but it is unlikely to reach 100% in 35 years given that it has only moved from 11% to 18% the last 35 years.

Shell’s own New Lens Scenarios show that significant progress can be made between now and 2050, but not in terms of a massive reduction in emissions, although that process is clearly underway in the Mountains Scenario by then (see below). Rather, the time to 2050 is largely filled with the early deployment of a range of new energy technologies, which sets the scene for rapid reductions to net-zero emissions over the period 2050-2100. Another critical development for the near-term is a complete global policy framework for carbon pricing. Even assuming big steps are made between now and Paris in even getting this into the agreement, the time for implementation is a factor that must be recognised. With a fast start in Paris, the earliest possible date is 2020 in that this is when the global agreement kicks in, but even the EU ETS took 8 years between initial design and full operation, similarly the CDM alone took over 10 years to fully institutionalize. Expanding full carbon pricing globally in the same period is challenging to say the least.

NLS Emissions to 2100

The aspiration of the B Team is laudable, but not really practical. The Paris agreement should certainly be geared around an end-goal of net-zero emissions but the realistic, albeit still aggressive, time span for this is 80+ years, not 35 years.

 

Brazil is back; but are they a decade late?

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COP20 in Lima ended its first full week on a mixed note, but with some positive signs for the ongoing process. The detailed discussions on the role of carbon markets under the SBSTA ended in disagreement and postponement which was disheartening, but there remains hope that this key subject will still see the light of day under the ADP during the coming days. Curiously, China (and others) opposed deepening the market discussion at SBSTA because of a lack of guidance from the ADP itself, but according to the Earth Negotiation Bulletin they stated in the ADP when reflecting on the Paris Agreement non-paper (ADP.2014.11.NonPaper) that “sections on market and non-market approaches, and new market-based mechanisms could prejudge discussions under the Subsidiary Bodies”. They seem to be setting themselves up for their own private Catch-22 there. It was also unfortunate that those who will pick up the ongoing challenge posed by carbon emissions and climate change were reported on as follows; “YOUNGOs noted that markets have not delivered what they promised and called for a moratorium on markets.” Perhaps they have been reading Naomi Klein’s book “This Changes Everything”.

One document in particular that drew attention was a paper circulated by Brazil, detailing an idea they had proposed at the October ADP meeting. Brazil have a long history of creative intervention in the process, being the country that “invented” the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which over the decade of its operational life has delivered tens, if not hundreds of billions of dollars (depends on your measurement definitions) of carbon finance to developing countries. It appears that Brazil is back to its creative best with a paper on “concentric differentiation”, which draws together both the concept of CBDR-RC* and the need for universal acceptance and eventual implementation of absolute targets as the route to atmospheric stabilisation of carbon dioxide.

The paper is best described by referencing a diagram included by Brazil (see below). Initially the INDCs** of various parties are scattered throughout the circles depending on their capabilities, with all developed countries starting in the middle. The crucial change to previous attempts at agreement is the inclusion of the proposal;

“developing country parties are expected to include in their respective NDC a type of economy-wide mitigation targets, leading to absolute targets over time”

This means that everyone migrates inwards as their capabilities allow, but that developing country parties at least start with an emissions goal, albeit intensity based, per capita based or based on a business-as-usual (BAU) deviation. Least developed economies start in the outer ring and are encouraged, but not required to present an INDC. Eventually all parties end up with absolute targets in the middle.

Brazil concept

This is a very encouraging proposal by Brazil and it also includes an extensive reference to markets, cap-and-trade, a reformed CDM and so on. But without wanting to take away from the importance of their thinking, it does raise the question of whether it is a decade or more too late. This is the proposal that should have come when parties were negotiating onward commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), thereby giving that agreement new life and making it fit for purpose in the 21st Century. Almost all the necessary pieces were already in place, it simply (!! – nothing is ever that simple) required the addition of the middle ring and the provisions for promotion.

In KP language, the centre ring is the AAU (Assigned Amount Unit) world, now only home to the EU, Norway, Australia and Ukraine. Even Japan has left. The outer ring is the CDM world, which relies on financial flows from the inner ring. A renegotiation and addition to KP could have inserted the middle ring and promotion requirements and even developed a new carbon accounting unit for intensity based targets. With all three rings based on carbon units, the much needed “global carbon market” could have taken off relatively quickly. Such a design might have even brought back countries such as the USA given that its objections regarding developing country actions would have been addressed.

One aspect of the Brazil proposal that has some traction in the ADP is the idea that “backsliding” on INDCs won’t be permitted. In other words, once you have declared an INDC with an absolute target, that is where you stay.

The Brazil proposal is for the ADP and not for the KP; which means that parties will have to reinvent everything from scratch. But at least Brazil is there with its creative input leading the way. On to Week 2 in Lima where the Parties are at least into the process of negotiating text, rather than negotiating the procedures under which they would even consider text.

 

* Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities

**Intended nationally determined contributions

 

Getting going in Lima??

COP20 is now underway in Lima and I have been on the newly created site for two days. Less than three months ago this was apparently an empty piece of land in a large Peruvian government complex, but now it is a bustling and well fitted out set of temporary buildings for housing negotiators and observers from some 190 countries; plus of course their entourage, a large security contingent, caterers, support staff and voluntary guides. The facilities are good and the meetings have started, but solid progress is hard to identify. There’s a lot resting on Lima as Carbon Visuals have clearly shown!!

Lots resting on Lima

Although the ADP (The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action) is charged with the unenviable task of producing an agreement text for Paris in just one year and has been running for three years with this in mind, the opening days here are once again like watching the opening rounds of a chess match, with the Parties positioning themselves for later confrontation rather than attempting to clear the way and open up the game. This isn’t to say that nothing has happened since Durban; there is at least a non-paper on elements of a draft negotiating text and this is where the discussions for this COP have started.

While the ADP continues its discussions, the various strands of other dead or dying negotiations continue on, although to what end it is sometimes hard to see. Sitting within the technical bodies are the remnants of the LCA (the failed Copenhagen agreement), which includes the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) and New Market Mechanism (NMM). This is where the main discussion around the use and expansion of carbon markets and mechanisms sits, but progress here has been close to zero since the discussions fell apart in Warsaw as I reported last year. No progress is being made in Lima, with a standoff between parties preventing any further discussion based on objections from Brazil, China, Bolivia, South Africa and Saudi Arabia to this work continuing in the absence of a mandate from the ADP. They have argued that until the ADP takes shape and sets the scene for the development of a carbon market framework, then there is no point having discussions on this subject on the sides. The problem is that unless these side negotiations make some progress in defining what a carbon market framework might look like, the ADP can’t really incorporate the necessary hooks within its structure to give the mandate to the FVA and NMM workstreams to continue their deliberations. Catch 22 comes to mind!

Perhaps on a brighter note, an active side event schedule is well underway. Attendance at these events, often lacklustre in the first few days, appears to be good, with an IPCC event that I spoke at on Wednesday afternoon playing to a nearly full house in quite a large room. This was an event about how people use and interpret the findings of the IPCC, rather than what the IPCC itself had to say in its 5th Assessment Report. But even here the differences in how people view the world show up. I spoke about the key role that CCS plays in scenarios that are targeting aggressive reductions (i.e. 430-480 ppm CO2e) and how a particular table in the IPCC report showed the sharp increase in costs if CCS was unavailable.

IPCC WGIII Table SPM2

My point was not just to highlight this table, but to use it to illustrate a problem the IPCC has in taking complex information and bringing it to the surface. The table was my case study. While it represents the actual findings of the IPCC, it seems to have little bearing on what people think (see below for my key slide from the presentation I gave) they said and I argued that the IPCC and UNFCCC are part of the problem in the way they summarise, shorten, tweet and disseminate the data. Deep down in the 5th Assessment Report it is very clear that a 2°C outcome is very (perhaps totally) dependent on the deployment of CCS, but this wasn’t even discussed in the high level summaries and press releases that were put out at the time. As I mentioned back in September, when the UN Climate Summit took place in New York, CCS wasn’t even on the agenda but a whole session was devoted to renewable energy. While renewable energy (solar / wind) is important in the context of energy access, the table clearly highlights that it isn’t really key to 2°C.

Declining facts

As if to underscore the point, the panellist from Climate Action Network took the stand and said that the IPCC work helped him realise that the world should and could be running on 100% renewable energy by 2050. It wasn’t at all clear to me where this realisation came from in the actual IPCC work, but you can probably guess who had the longest line of audience members wanting to be met with after the event – it wasn’t me.

Let’s hope for some greater enlightenment in the days to come.

While all fossil fuels are contributing to the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, coal stands apart as really problematic, not just because of its CO2 emissions today (see chart, global emissions in millions of tonnes CO2 vs. time), but because of the vast reserves waiting to be used and the tendency for an emerging economy to lock its energy system into it.

Global energy emissions

Global emissions, million tonnes CO2 from 1971 to 2010

I recently came across data relating to the potential coal resource base in just one country, Botswana, which is estimated at some 200 billion tonnes. Current recoverable reserves are of course a fraction of this amount, but just for some perspective, 200 billion tonnes of coal once used would add well over 100 billion tonnes of carbon to the atmosphere and therefore shift the cumulative total from the current 580 billion tonnes carbon to nearly 700 billion tonnes carbon; and that is just from Botswana. Fortunately Botswana has quite a small population and a relatively high GDP per capita so it is unlikely to use vast amounts of this coal for itself, but its emerging neighbours, countries like Zimbabwe, may certainly benefit. This much coal would also take a very long time to extract – even on a global basis it represents over 25 years of use at current levels of production.

This raises the question of whether a country can develop without an accessible resource base of some description, but particularly an energy resource base. A few have done so, notably Japan and perhaps the Netherlands, but many economies have developed by themselves on the back of coal or developed when others arrived and extracted more difficult resources for them, notably oil, gas and minerals. The coal examples are numerous, but start with the likes of Germany, Great Britain, the United States and Australia and include more recent examples such as China, South Africa and India. Of course strong governance and institutional capacity are also required to ensure widespread societal benefit as the resource is extracted.

Coal is a relatively easy resource to tap into and make use of. It requires little technology to get going but offers a great deal, such as electricity, railways (in the early days), heating, industry and very importantly, smelting (e.g. steel making). In the case of Great Britain and the United States coal provided the impetus for the Industrial Revolution. In the case of the latter, very easy to access oil soon followed and mobility flourished, which added enormously to the development of the continent.

But the legacy that this leaves, apart from a wealthy society, is a lock-in of the resource on which the society was built. So much infrastructure is constructed on the back of the resource that it becomes almost impossible to replace or do without, particularly if the resource is still providing value.

As developing economies emerge they too look at resources such as coal. Although natural gas is cleaner and may offer many environmental benefits over coal (including lower CO2 emissions), it requires a much higher level of infrastructure and technology to access and use, so it may not be a natural starting point. It often comes later, but in many instances it has been as well as the coal rather than instead of it. Even in the USA, the recent natural gas boom has not displaced its energy equivalent in coal extraction, rather some of the coal has shifted to the export market.

Enter the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The idea here was to jump the coal era and move directly to cleaner fuels or renewable energy by providing the value that the coal would have delivered as a subsidy for more advanced infrastructure. But it hasn’t quite worked that way. With limited buyers of CERs (Certified Emission Reduction units) and therefore limited provision of the necessary subsidy, the focus shifted to smaller scale projects such as rural electricity provision. These are laudable projects, but this doesn’t represent the necessary investment in large scale industrial infrastructure that the country actually needs to develop. Rooftop solar PV won’t build roads, bridges and hospitals or run steel mills and cement plants. So the economy turns to coal anyway.

This is one of the puzzles that will need to be solved for a Paris 2015 agreement to actually start to make a difference. If we can rescue a mechanism such as the CDM and have it feature in a future international agreement, it’s focus, or at least a major part of it, has to shift from small scale development projects to large scale industrial and power generation projects, but still with an emphasis on least developed economies where coal lock-in has yet to occur or is just starting.

The US Submission on Elements of the 2015 Agreement has recently appeared on the UNFCCC website and outlines, in some detail, the approach the US is now seeking with regards “contributions”. Adaptation and Finance are also covered, although not to the depth of the section on Mitigation.

The submission makes it very clear that the US expects robust contributions from Parties, with schedules, transparency, reporting and review. There is also a useful discussion on the legal nature of a contribution. None of this is surprising as the US delegation to the recent COPs and various inter-sessional meetings has made it very clear that real action must be seen from all parties, not just those in developed countries.

But the submission makes no reference to the role of carbon markets or carbon pricing. Only in two locations does it even refer to market mechanisms and this is only in the context of avoiding double counting. This is coming from the Party that gave the world the carbon market underpinning of the Kyoto Protocol, which in turn has given rise to the CDM, the EU ETS, the CPM (in Australia) and the NZ ETS to name but a few, so perhaps reflects the current difficulty Parties are having keeping carbon price thinking on the negotiating agenda. 

I would argue that without a price on carbon emissions, the CO2 emissions issue will be much more difficult to fully resolve. Further to this, while individual countries may pursue such an agenda locally, the emissions leakage from such systems could remain high until the carbon price permeates much of the global energy system. This then argues for an international agreement that encourages the implementation of carbon pricing at a national level. The Kyoto Protocol did this through the Assigned Amount Unit, which gave value to carbon emissions as a property right. While there is no such “Kyoto like” design under consideration for the post 2020 period, the agreement we are looking for should at least lay the foundations for such markets in the future. The question is, how??

In the post 2020 world, carbon pricing is going to have to start at the national level, rather than be cascaded from the top down. Many nations are pursuing such an agenda, including a number of emerging economies such as China, South Korea, South Africa and Kazakhstan. Linkage of these carbon price regimes is seen as the key to expansion, which in turn encourages others to follow similar policy pathways and join the linked club. The reason this is done is not simply to have carbon price homogeneity, but to allow the transfer of emission reduction obligations to other parties such that they can be delivered more cost effectively. This allows one of two things to happen; the same reductions but at lower cost or greater reductions for the expected cost. The latter should ideally be the goal and is apparently the aspiration the USA has, given it states that the agreement should be “designed to promote ambitious efforts by a broad range of Parties.” The carbon price is simply a proxy for this process to allow terms of trade to be agreed as a reduction obligation is transferred.

All of this implies that the post 2020 agreement at least needs a placeholder of some description; to allow the transfer of reductions to take place between parties yet still have them counted against the national contribution. As it stands today, it is looking unlikely that explicit reference to carbon pricing or carbon markets will make its way into the agreement, but perhaps it doesn’t need to at this stage. On the back of a transfer mechanism, ambition could increase and a pricing regime for transfers could potentially evolve. If that happens to look like a global carbon market in the end, then so be it.

As the EU Commission gears up to release its 2030 Energy and Climate White Paper in Davos week, there is considerable discussion regarding the emissions reduction target that will be recommended. Historically the EU has been keen on multiple targets, but in recent years this has backfired, with conflicting goals and multiple policy instruments leading to a weak carbon market and a lack of investment in one critical climate technology in particular, carbon capture and storage (CCS).

For the period 2020-2030, it is hoped that the EU will retreat on the number of targets and focus instead on a single greenhouse gas target that then becomes the main driver of change in the energy system. Such an approach could help restore the EU ETS and ultimately deliver the key carbon emissions goal at a lower overall cost, therefore also helping restore some EU positioning in terms of international competitiveness.

Most commentators are expecting the GHG target to be in the range of 35 to 40% from a 1990 baseline (vs. 20% for 2020), but there is very little discussion on how that target might be structured. There are two basic approaches;

  1.  Emissions must meet a particular goal in a given year.
  2. Cumulative emissions over a period of time must be below the baseline year on an average basis.

While a single statement such as “Emissions in 2020 must be 20% below 1990” is often used to cover both these cases, the goals are very different. This is a critical consideration as the EU sets out its position for 2030, but perhaps more importantly as future goals are tabled for the UNFCCC in Q1 2015.

The UNFCCC has, to date, monitored and reported on national objectives through the Kyoto Protocol, which is based on the second approach given above, i.e., cumulative emissions. In the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU commitment for the period 2013-2020 is a reduction of 20% below 1990. This is because the Kyoto Protocol is based on allowances (Assigned Amount Units or AAUs) and that these must be surrendered for each tonne emitted over the period. This is also how the atmosphere sees CO2 emissions – cumulatively. Every tonne matters as CO2 accumulates in the atmosphere over time. It doesn’t matter at all what the emissions are in a given year, only that the cumulative amount over time is kept below a certain amount. The EU ETS works in the same way – every tonne counts.

However, as if to confuse, the Doha Amendment also gives the EU Copenhagen pledge of a 20% (or 30% under certain conditions) reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 as a percentage of the reference year, 1990. In the particular case of the EU, due to the expectation of relatively flat emissions over the period 2013 to 2020, these two goals are very similar, such that the difference issue hasn’t really seen the light of day. Further to this, the Kyoto Protocol allows for carryover of AAUs from 2008-2012 into the 2013-2020 period, so the difference is further dampened. But when it comes to 2030, big differences could show up (see chart below).

 Eu Emissions Goal 2030

 In the case of a 35% target (for example), the brown line shows a pathway to this as a fixed goal in 2030, but equally any pathway would be okay as long as the emissions are 35% below 1990 levels in 2030. But on a cumulative emissions basis, assuming a linear reduction, this is only a 28% reduction for the period 2021 to 2030.

The green line equates to a 35% cumulative emissions reduction for the same period, but in the year 2030 a reduction of about 47% is actually needed to achieve this, a much more ambitious requirement then a simple 2030 goal.

Exactly what the EU says on January 22nd remains to be seen, with considerations such as the high level number itself and domestic vs. international action being the main discussion points. But the big difference might just lie in the eventual wording (“by 2030” or “through to 2030”) and the need to table commitments with the UNFCCC at some point, particularly if the latter still works on a cumulative basis after a global agreement is reached.

Can a (second) global carbon market emerge?

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At the very end of May Carbon Expo was held in Barcelona. It was an excellent event, overall attendance was good and there were still quite a few exhibitors at the Expo hoping for life in the project mechanism market of the current “global carbon market”. But this is an area of trade that is clearly struggling. 

Carbon Expo

The conference also offered an opportunity for the World Bank to release a new review of carbon market activity, which showed that there is at least quite a lot, even if price development is far from the levels required to ever make any discernible difference to global emissions.

 Carbon Markets (world Bank)

 

Carbon Expo consists of many events, plenary panels and side meetings and through these one of the subjects that attracted plenty of attention is the ongoing desire to see a global carbon market take shape. This seems like a rather odd desire since we have had something along these lines for the past decade under the Kyoto Protocol, but nobody really wanted to discuss that, even though it is clearly the approach that makes the most sense, is most robust in terms of compliance and has all the necessary bits and pieces actually up and running. Equally, it is withering on the vine. 

The desired alternative to a Kyoto style global market has yet to be specified, but it builds on the reality of the World Bank report which shows that there are lots of carbon market systems in various stages of development, implementation or operation and that if they could somehow be linked together a global market would coalesce. This follows from the excitement around the proposed link between the EU and Australian Emission Trading Systems.

Both the EU and Australia have called their proposed linkup a bilateral arrangement. That may well be the case, but it would have been an order of magnitude more difficult were it not for the fact that both systems were designed under the Kyoto Protocol framework, recognized the same types of offsets, counted carbon the same way etc. I discussed this back in September last year after the linkup was first announced.

So here we are in a world that has started once down the pathway towards a global carbon market, built all the required institutions and instruments necessary to run it, balked at using them but perversely still wants the market to develop. As such, discussions continue on how a global market might catalyze, with four models now in the picture. They are:

  1. The creation of an international compliance unit and a standard set of offset mechanisms. This is effectively a spinoff of the Kyoto Protocol, using the CDM, but creating a new international unit to replace the AAU (the KP “glue”). Such a unit would underpin national ETSs that voluntarily opt-in to the global market. An international registry would exist to keep track of the market and manage national compliance.
  2. A set of “exchange rates” evolve between national compliance units and project mechanisms, akin to currency exchange rates. This then supposedly solves the problem of different levels of national ambition, quality of offset projects and so on. The problem here is that CO2 is more like a fixed commodity type instrument, whereas currency (where exchange rates exist) is not a commodity but effectively a security (like a company share). The value of a security is set by the value of the whole that it represents (e.g. a company, a country). By contrast, a tonne of CO2 will always be a tonne of CO2.
  3. Bilateral arrangements continue and linkages simply evolve over time. The challenge comes when A links with B then B talks to C but A doesn’t want to link with C. Also, some very different designs may never be suitable for linking.
  4. International Measurement / Reporting / and Verification rules are expanded to cover the necessary requirements for linking. This is effectively like (1) above, but without the international unit or internationally regulated compliance.

The most robust approach exists in (1), but this is currently looking like the least likely outcome – many nations seem to be opposed to such an approach, at least for now. The opposition appears to extend from the idea of the UN managing national sovereignty in any form, such as evaluating national programmes and allocating international units against them, even though this is positioned as a voluntary opt-in process.

The exchange rate approach has instant appeal, simply because it allows the market to decide. But so far, I have not seen an explanation as to how it might actually work.

Evolution through bilateral agreement appears to be the most likely path forward, so the question remains if there is any role for the UNFCCC in such an approach. Perhaps it’s role is limited to maintaining offset mechanisms such as the CDM.

This remains a nascent discussion, with much thinking to be done.