As COP21 starts and the negotiators face the task of reaching an agreement, one of the most important points of discussion will be the review and recalibration of INDCs. Many organisations, including some business based ones (i.e. We Mean Business), are arguing for a five yearly review of the national contributions. If strictly adopted, this might mean that the first round of INDCs are already under review before they formally commence (i.e. 2020), such that the global emissions outcome by 2025 is already lower than current INDC projections would project. An alternative is a 10 year review, such that the first deviation from current INDC projections becomes apparent in the early 2030s.

There are practical considerations associated with this. Many who view the energy industry from the outside have consistently had expectations for rapid change. For example, the UNFCCC itself has continued with its pre-2020 workstream even as the time for meaningful change has diminished. This isn’t to argue that nothing can happen between now and 2020, but it is unlikely that much extra can now happen in that time frame. The energy industry is built on long lead times, project cycles that can stretch out to a decade and capital cycles that are often laid out years in advance of actual spending. Sometimes this can be disrupted, particularly when there is a sudden shift in market price structure, but that is not the normal pattern of change.

There is also the reality of policy development timelines needed to trigger change. For example, the EU is in the midst of a three year (at least) examination of the climate and energy needs for the period 2020 to 2030, which requires green papers, white papers, various stakeholder consultations, draft legislation, parliamentary committee discussion, a parliamentary vote, Member State agreement and transfer to national legislation. It is unlikely that this would be revised as soon as 2018-2021 having just reached agreement on the entire package in 2016 and finalised EU wide adoption in 2017. The institutional capacity may not exist for constant revision.

But there is an overriding thought which should take priority – the emissions and therefore eventual temperature impact of moving to a more aggressive review timetable. It is very clear that the current round of INDCs do not deliver a 2°C pathway – many analysts and the UNFCCC have concluded that. The INDCs also say little to nothing about the past 2030 period, so future INDCs or review of current INDCs will be needed.

A relatively basic analysis can give some insight as to the climate value of review and the benefit of conducting that on a five year basis or a ten year timetable. I put this together as outlined below;

  • There isn’t really a clear emissions trajectory for the current round of INDCs, at least not after 2030. For the purposes of this analysis I have assumed that they result in peaking of global emissions in the 2030s, followed by the beginnings of a decline to 2040 and beyond. Some would argue that even this is optimistic.
  • The 2°C pathway reaches net-zero emissions in about 2080, then enters a period of negative emissions through the use of a technology such as BECCS (biomass energy with carbon capture and storage).
  • In the case of a five year correction process, I assumed that every five years the UNFCCC looks at progress against a 2°C pathway (which of course will change over time, but I haven’t got into that detail) and after each new round of submissions the INDC pathway, as it would be at that point in time, shifts a quarter of the way further towards the 2°C pathway. The result is an emissions trajectory that starts to deviate from the current INDC pathway by 2025.
  • In the case of the ten year correction process, the same happens but on a ten year cycle, with the intervening five year period declining at the same rate as the previous five year period. Because of the slower turnaround in the process, I also assumed that after a more protracted INDC discussion, the shift in the pathway is relative to the 2°C line as it was five years earlier, rather than at the time. As such, there is a bit more lag built into the process and emissions remain the same as the current INDC pathway until after 2030.

INDC Review Pathways

  • The chart above shows the four potential pathways; 2°C, the current INDCs extended out for several decades and the corrected pathways, based on five year and ten year correction cycles.

As shown, the uncorrected INDC pathway is a 3+°C scenario, whereas both the five year and ten year correction pathways are about 2.5°C and both arrive at a net zero emissions outcome around the turn of the century. As such, it is clear that a review cycle can change everything and has the potential to deliver a clear outcome rather than an open ended emissions tail stretching well into the 22nd century.

But the difference between them is 0.15°C, or a cumulative 280 million tonnes of CO2 over the balance of the century. While this is not insignificant, the more important goal for the negotiators should be to agree a clear review and recalibration process, rather than be too focussed on the precise timeliness of it.


As we get closer to COP21 there will be plenty of articles and opinion pieces put forward describing the process, speculating on the outcome and generally trying to help readers understand what exactly is going on. One such piece appeared in the Financial Times recently, written by Pilita Clark. It’s a good summary and has some thoughtful insights but requires some clarification around what the six oil and gas industry CEOs actually argued for in their letter to the UNFCCC.

Pilita Clark rightly points out that a Paris accord, if reached, will be based on many widely differing national contributions, rather than a single agreed policy such as a global carbon price. But the article further qualifies this conclusion with reference back to the letter that the CEOs of Shell, BP, ENI, BG, Statoil and Total wrote to the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and the French Presidency, with the following remark;

“. . . the European oil and gas companies that have called for a global carbon pricing framework ahead of the Paris meeting have done so safe in the knowledge this would never emerge from the talks.”

In fact the letter didn’t call for a global carbon price or pricing framework for the very same reason that Pilita Clark gave; this isn’t on the agenda and would never be agreed by the negotiators assembled in Paris.

Rather, the main agenda item for Paris is the negotiation of a framework within which the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) will sit. This will probably include provisions for measurement, reporting, verification, peer review and financial assistance for implementation.   An important tool for nations to meet their mitigation goals will be through  carbon pricing mechanisms, which are referenced in a few Parties’ INDCs but not often enough.   The framework agreed in Paris could also include another important provision; the notion of cooperative implementation through the transfer of the obligation under the INDC to another party. This would allow emission reductions to be made at lowest cost globally, which in turn could assist the process of review and agreement on greater ambition.

The International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) have been advocating for such a provision for over a year, with a proposal that would require such transfers to be reconciled in terms of carbon units of some description. The transfer of units would lead to price discovery and therefore the emergence of a carbon market at international level. IETA proposed the following short text insertion within the expected Paris agreement:

Cooperation between Parties in realizing their Contributions

Parties may voluntarily cooperate in achieving their mitigation contributions.

  • A unified international transfer system is hereby established.
  • A Party though private and/or public entities may transfer portions of its nationally determined contribution to one or more other Parties through carbon units of its choice.
  • Transfers and receipts of units shall be recorded in equivalent carbon reduction terms.

IETA have also proposed alternative formulations of the same idea as various Parties (national governments) have put forward their own versions of the concept. Like almost every piece of language proposed so far, this has been incorporated to some extent in the 55 pages of text about to be negotiated, along with its multitude of bracketed options and alternative language possibilities. What survives remains to be seen?

In their letter, the CEOs alluded to this idea, when they called for the following;

Therefore, we call on governments, including at the UNFCCC negotiations in Paris and beyond – to: 

  • introduce carbon pricing systems where they do not yet exist at the national or regional levels
  • create an international framework that could eventually connect national systems. 

National carbon pricing systems make complete sense, such as the ETS in Europe and the proposed carbon tax in South Africa. The framework that could connect them would allow for the speedy and transparent transfer of a national obligation across a border through emissions trading, which is exactly what happens today between Norway and the EU, between countries within the EU and arguably even between the USA and Canada through the California – Quebec ETS linkage. But this needs to be a much more widespread activity in order to quickly leverage the full potential for emission reduction that exists at any point in time.

This isn’t an empty call for a global carbon price, but a reinforcement of the call that IETA has been making for some time and a plea to the UNFCCC, the French Presidency of the COP and the respective Parties to see such a measure included in the Paris agreement. It’s a simple practical step that is needed to catalyse the development of a global carbon market.

The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) held its 6th Ministerial Meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia recently. The conference offered considerable opportunity for governments and companies to showcase their achievements in carbon capture and storage (CCS) and to highlight areas in which research and development was proceeding.

Given the location, Saudi Aramco was there in force and they also offered the opportunity for a number of participants to visit their headquarters in Dhahran and get an even deeper look at how the company was looking at the CO2 issue and the use of CCS. As there isn’t a carbon pricing system operating in Saudi Arabia, the company is heavily focussed on using CO2 for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), but this is at least driving research and development on CO2 separation, purification and transport with a view to further lowering the cost and improving the efficiency of these key steps in the CCS value chain.

To this end, Saudi Aramco is doing some intriguing work on small scale carbon capture, which was demonstrated in both Riyadh and Dhahran by their display featuring a saloon car with on-board carbon capture. The vehicle captures about thirty percent of the carbon dioxide in the exhaust, using a solvent process. The CO2 is then recovered from the solvent, compressed and stored as a supercritical liquid in a small cylinder, all within the vehicle itself. The carbon dioxide can then be discharged when the car is filled with fuel as part of the normal service offered at a (future) gasoline station. The fuel supplier would then handle long term geological storage of the carbon dioxide or may have outlets where it can be profitably used (e.g. as a feedstock for manufacture of more fuel, but with the caveat that a considerable amount of energy will be required for such a step).

CCS Car (small)

The vehicle is a 2nd generation prototype, with the carbon capture equipment occupying about half the boot space. But this is a huge step forward compared to their first generation attempt where the equipment sat on a trailer pulled by the car. Further enhancements are planned. The current system is an active one, in that it draws energy from the vehicle to operate the equipment, resulting in an efficiency penalty of about 5-10% for the vehicle as a whole. Future thinking includes a more passive system, which could see carbon dioxide absorbed into a chemical matrix such as in a regular catalytic convertor. However, some energy input would presumably be required at some point to release this for subsequent use or storage.

Whether this ends up as a viable domestic vehicle solution is not entirely the point at this stage. One aspiration that the demonstration alluded to was its use in Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) which travel long distances with large loads and where battery technology may not be feasible. Other applications could be imagined, such as on board ships. More importantly, the underlying development of smaller and cheaper carbon capture technology offers real hope for long term management of emissions. It was also clear that this work and the other efforts being made by Saudi Aramco on CCS and EOR have very high level support in the country; the Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Ali Al-Naimi, spent two full days both at the conference and escorting the smaller group to Dhahran.


The first week of November sees Shell officially open its first major carbon capture and storage (CCS) facility, the Quest project. It is in Alberta, Canada and will capture and store about one million tonnes of carbon dioxide per annum. Construction commenced back in September 2012 when the Final Investment Decision (FID) was taken and the plant started up and began operating for the first time in September of this year, just three years later. It is one of only a handful of fully integrated carbon capture and storage facilities operating globally. There are now many facilities that capture CO2 but mainly linked to Enhanced Oil Recovery which provides an income source for these projects.  Quest has dedicated CO2 storage, developed in an area some 65 kms from the capture site at a depth of about 2 kms.

Quest Construction

The Quest income source is not based on EOR; it has been able to take advantage of the government implemented carbon price that prevails within Alberta. Although the current carbon pricing mechanism has an effective ceiling of $15 per tonne CO2 which isn’t sufficient for CCS, let alone a first of its kind, it nevertheless provides a valuable incentive income to operate the facility which has been built on the back of two substantial capital grants from the Provincial and Federal governments respectively. A supplementary mechanism also in place in Alberta provide credits related to the carbon price mechanism for the early years of a CCS project, providing additional operating revenue for any new facility.

Canada, as it turns out, has become a global leader in CCS. The Quest facility is the second major project to be started up in Canada is as many years, with the Saskpower Boundary Dam project commencing operations this time last year.

As noted, Quest will capture and store approximately one million tonnes of carbon dioxide per annum. It demonstrates how quickly and efficiently large scale CO2 management can be implemented once the fiscal conditions are in place. Quest, which is relatively small in scale for an industry that is used to managing gas processing and transport in the hundreds of millions to billions of tonnes globally, demonstrates both the need for continued expansion of the CCS industry and the importance of carbon pricing policy to drive it forward. This single facility far surpasses the largest solar PV facilities operating around the world in terms of CO2 management. Take for example the Desert Sunlight Solar Farm in California, currently the fourth largest solar PV power station in the world. According to First Solar, it displaces 300,000 tonnes of CO2 annually, less than a third of that captured and permanently stored by Quest.

A key difference though is the use of the word displace. Alternative energy projects don’t directly manage CO2, they generate energy without CO2 emissions. But, as I have noted in previous postings and in my first book, the release of fossil carbon to the atmosphere is more a function of energy prices and resource availability. This means that even when a project like Desert Sunlight operates, the CO2 it notionally displaces may still be released at some other location or at some other time, depending on long term energy prices and extraction economics. There is no doubt that the CO2 is not being emitted right now in California, but that doesn’t necessarily resolve the problem. Quest, by contrast, directly manages the CO2 from fossil fuel extraction.

The requirement to provide alternative energy (i.e. without CO2 emissions) needs to grow, but we shouldn’t imagine that such action, by itself, will fully resolve the climate issue. That will come through the application of carbon pricing mechanisms by governments, driving the further expansion of both the alternative energy and CCS industries as a result.

A video about the Quest project, made by the constructors, Fluor, is available here.

The last few weeks have seen a flood of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) arrive at the UNFCCC offices in Bonn, presumably to be included in the assessment of progress promised by the UNFCCC Secretariat for release well before the Paris COP21.

There are now some 150 submissions and assessing them in aggregate requires some thinking about methodology. For starters, the temperature rise we will eventually see is driven by cumulative emissions over time (with a climate sensitivity of about 2°C per trillion tonnes of carbon – or 3.7 trillion tonnes CO2), not emissions in the period from 2020 to 2025 or 2030 which is the point at which most of the INDCs end. In fact, 2025 or 2030 represent more of a starting point than an end point for many countries. Nevertheless, in reading the INDCs, the proposals put forward by many countries give some clues as to where they might be going.

For Europe, the USA and many developed economies, the decline in emissions is already underway or at least getting started, with most having already said that by mid-century reductions of 70-80% vs. the early part of the century should be possible. But many emerging economies are also giving signs as to their long term intentions. For example, the South Africa INDC proposes a Peak-Plateau-Decline strategy, which sees a peak around 2020-2025, plateau for a decade and then a decline. Similarly, China has clearly signalled a peak in emissions around 2030, although with development at a very different stage in India, such a peak date has yet to be transmitted by that government.

Nevertheless, with some bold and perhaps optimistic assumptions, it is possible to assess the cumulative efforts and see where we might be by the end of the century or into the early part of next century. In doing this I used the following methodology;

  1. Use an 80/20 approach, i.e. assess the INDCs of the top 15-20 emitters and make an assumption about the rest of the world. My list includes USA, China, India, Europe, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Canada, Mexico, Russia, Japan, Australia, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. In current terms, this represents 85% of global energy system CO2 emissions.
  2. For the rest of the world (ROW), assume that emissions double by 2040 and plateau, before declining slowly throughout the second half of the century.
  3. For most countries, assume that emissions are near zero by 2100, with global energy emissions nearing 5 billion tonnes. The majority of this is in ROW, but with India and China still at about 1 billion tonnes per annum each, effectively residual coal use.
  4. Cement use rises to about 5 billion tonnes per annum by mid-century, with abatement via CCS not happening until the second half of the century. One tonne of cement produces about half a tonne of process CO2 from the calcination of fossil limestone.
  5. Land use CO2 emissions have been assessed by many organisations, but I have used numbers from Oxford University’s spreadsheet, which currently puts it at some 1.4 billion tonnes per annum of carbon (i.e. ~5 billion tonnes CO2). Given the INDC of Brazil and its optimism in managing deforestation, I have assumed that this declines throughout the century, but still remains marginally net positive in 2100.
  6. I have not included short lived climate forcers such as methane. These contribute more to the rate of temperature rise than the eventual outcome, provided of course that by the time we get to the end of the century they have been successfully managed.
  7. Cumulative emissions currently stand at 600 billion tonnes carbon according to

The end result of all of this are the charts below, the first being global CO2 emissions on an annual basis and the one below that being cumulative emissions over time. The all important cumulative emissions top out just below 1.4 trillion tonnes carbon.

Global CO2 Emissions Post INDC

Global Cumulative Emissions post INDCs

The trillionth tonne point, or the equivalent of 2°C, is passed around 2050, some 11 years later than the current end-2038 date indicated on the Oxford University website. My end point is the equivalent of about 2.8°C, well below 4+°C, but not where it needs to be. The curve has to flatten much faster than current INDCs will deliver, yet as emissions accumulate, the time to do so is ticking away.

Even with a five year review period built into the Paris agreement, can the outcome in 2030 or 2035 really be significantly different to this outlook? Will countries that have set out their stall through to 2030 actually change this part way through or even before they have started along said pathway? One indication that they might comes from China, where a number of institutions believe that national emissions could peak well before 2030. However, the problem with accumulation is that history is your enemy as much as the future might be. Even as emissions are sharply reduced, the legacy remains.

Nevertheless, we shouldn’t feel hopeless about such an outcome. Last week I was at the 38th Forum of the MIT Joint Program on the Policy and Science of Global Change and I was reminded again during one of the presentations of their Level 1 to Level 4 mitigation outcomes which I wrote about in my first book, 2°C Will Be Harder than we Think. These are shown below.

Shifting the Risk Profile

Taking no mitigation action at all results in a potential temperature distribution with a tail that stretches out past 7°C, albeit with a low probability. However, we can’t entertain even a low probability of such an outcome, so some level of mitigation must take place. While Level 1 remains the goal (note however that the MIT 2°C is not above pre-industrial, but relative to 1981-2000), MIT have shown that lesser outcomes remove the long tail and contain the climate issue to some extent. The INDC analysis I have presented is similar to Level 2 mitigation, which means the Paris process could deliver a very substantial reduction in global risk even if it doesn’t equate to 2°C. More appreciation of and discussion around this risk management approach is required, rather than the obsession with 2°C or global catastrophe that many currently present.

Of course, extraordinary follow through will be required. Each and every country needs to deliver on their INDC, many of which are dependent on very significant financial assistance. I looked at this recently for Kenya and India. Further, the UNFCCC process needs its own follow through to ensure that global emissions do trend towards zero throughout the century, which remains a very tall order.

The last ten days have seen a rush by nations to publish their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), with the much anticipated INDC from India amongst those submitted. On Monday October 5th, the Co-Chairs of the ADP also released a proposal for a first draft of a new climate change agreement for Paris. So it has been a very busy few days, but are we any closer to a deal and could that deal have sufficient ambition to bend the emissions curve?

The India INDC is telling as an indicator of where the developing world really is, versus where the rapidly emerging economies such as China now find themselves. In the case of the latter group, there is thinking towards an emissions peak with China indicating that this will be around 2030 and continuing signals from the academic and research community in that country indicating that it may well be earlier. One such article appeared recently in the Guardian. But for the much poorer developing countries the story remains very different.

The submissions from India is 38 pages long, but of this some 28 pages is supporting evidence and context, explaining the reality of Indian emissions, the need to grow the economy to take hundreds of millions out of poverty and the expected use of fossil fuels to power industry, including areas such as metal smelting, petrochemicals and refining. With a focus on efficiency in particular, India expects to achieve a 33 to 35 percent reduction in CO2 intensity of the economy, but in reality that means a rise in energy related emissions to around 4 billion tonnes or more by 2030, up from some 2+ billion tonnes per annum at present (1.954 Gt in 2012, IEA). This could be tempered by a further element of their contribution which aims to increase forest sinks by some 3 billion tonnes of CO2 in total through to 2030.

There has been considerable speculation as to the renewable energy component of India’s INDC, with a hope that this would show enormous progress in solar deployment in particular. The INDC took the somewhat unusual route of talking in capacity additions, rather than generation (and therefore emissions). India aims to achieve 40% cumulative electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel based resources by 2030. This is significant, but less than it might appear. In a very simple example where 100 GW of generating capacity is comprised of 40 GW solar PV and 60 GW coal, the generation mix might be around 14% renewables and 86% coal. This is assuming a 20% capacity factor for the solar PV (maximum is 50% with day-night) and 80% capacity factor for the coal.

India has also put a considerable price tag on their INDC, with a mitigation effort of some US$ 834 billion through to 2030. In a previous post I looked at the costs assumed in the Kenyan INDC, which came to some $25 billion, but for a population of ~60 million (average through to 2030). With a projected population of some 1.5 billion by 2030, the finance side is in the same ballpark as the Kenyan INDC, albeit on the higher side.

Finally, the last few days have seen new draft text appear – shortened dramatically from some 80 pages to a manageable 20. But references to government led carbon markets, carbon pricing systems or even the use of transfer mechanisms between parties are largely missing. Article 34 of the Draft Decision does hint at the need to rescue the CDM from the Kyoto Protocol by referring to the need to build on Article 12 of the Protocol, but it will be of little use if there isn’t substantial demand for credits in developing and rapidly emerging economies. Simply creating a new crediting mechanism or even bringing the CDM into the Paris agreement won’t on its own direct the finance to the likes of Kenya and India. That demand and related finance flow will only come if the developed and emerging economies are building emissions trading systems (such as in China) and have the ability and confidence to transfer units related to it across their borders. So a great deal of work remains to be done.



FASTER carbon pricing mechanisms

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Last week New York hosted amongst other events, the Papal visit, the UN General Assembly where some 150 world leaders gathered and Climate Week. Arguably this had the makings of a bigger coming together than COP21 itself, although many other issues were also on the agenda, such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Nevertheless, the climate issue progressed and the subject of carbon pricing was widely discussed, both how it might be implemented by governments and how companies could use carbon valuation internally in relation to project implementation and risk management.

A highpoint of the Climate Week events was the release by the World Bank of its FASTER principles on implementation of carbon pricing mechanisms . This is work to support the overall push by that organisation for greater uptake of explicit carbon pricing mechanisms at national level as governments consider how they might implement their INDCs.

FASTER is an acronym, with each of the terms further elaborated in a fairly readable 50 page accompanying document. The short version is as follows;

  • F – Fairness
  • A – Alignment of Policies
  • S – Stability and Predictability
  • T – Transparency
  • E – Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness
  • R – Reliability and Environmental Integrity

I have a slight feeling that the acronym was thought up before the words, but each of the subject areas covered is relevant to the design of a carbon pricing mechanism by governments, such as a cap-and-trade system.

Importantly, the principles recognise many of the key issues that early cap-and-trade and taxation systems have confronted, such as dealing with competitiveness concerns, managing competing policies and complementing the mechanism with sufficient technology push in key areas such as carbon capture and storage and renewables. The latter requires something of a Goldilocks approach in that too little can result in wasted resource allocation, but too much while also being wasteful can end up becoming a competing deployment policy.

In the various workshops held during Climate Week, one aspect of the FASTER principles that did draw comment was the call for a “predictable and rising carbon price”. Predictability should be more about the willingness of government to maintain the mechanism over the long term, rather than a clear sign as to what exactly that price might be. For the most part, commodity markets exist, trade and attract investment on the basis that they are there and that the commodity itself will continue to attract demand for decades to come. We are still some way from a reasonable level of certainty that carbon pricing policies will be in place over many decades, given that they do not enjoy cross-party support in all jurisdictions.

Particularly for the case of a cap-and-trade system, a rising carbon price cannot be guaranteed. Rather, the system requires long term certainty in the level of the cap, after which the market will determine the appropriate price at any given point in time. This might rise as the EU ETS saw in its early days, but equally the widespread deployment of alternative energy sources or carbon capture and storage could see such a system plateau at some price for a very long time. Even within this, capital cycles could lead to the same price volatility as is seen in most commodity markets.

The guarantee of a rising price may not be the case for a tax based system either. Should emissions fall faster than the government anticipates, there could be popular pressure for an easing of the tax. As carbon tax becomes mainstream, we shouldn’t imagine it would be treated any differently to regular income based or sales tax levels, both of which can fluctuate.

The release of the FASTER Principles coincides with my own book on carbon pricing mechanisms, which was launched just prior to Climate Week. I cover many of the same topics, but drawing more on the events that have transpired over the last decade. Both these publications will hopefully be of interest to individuals and businesses in China, the government of which formally announced the implementation of a cap-and-trade system from 2017. This will be an interesting implementation to watch, in that it may well be the first such system that operates on a rising cap, at least for the first few years. Irrespective, the announcement ensured that Climate Week ended on a high note.

An underpinning theme of my blog postings over the years has been discussion around government policy frameworks that seek to attach a cost to CO2 emissions – or so called carbon pricing. I have argued for them, commented on their inner workings and highlighted successes and failures along the way. At the start of each year I have published an overview of global progress, which of course has always featured the EU ETS, but now incorporates systems and approaches from countries such Kazakhstan and South Africa.

The importance of placing a cost on anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide cannot be understated, yet it took a fairly heroic effort from the World Bank this time last year to even get the subject of carbon pricing onto the agenda of the UN Climate Summit in New York. Despite the efforts in many countries, this important policy instrument still doesn’t get the recognition or attention it deserves. Yet, as I have argued on many occasions, including my e-book published to coincide with the Summit last year, the climate issue probably doesn’t get resolved without it.

So on the anniversary of that Summit, with Climate Week in New York coming around again, I have a second book being launched, devoted entirely to the all-important subject of carbon pricing as a national and global policy instrument.

Why Carbon Pricing MattersWhy Carbon Pricing Matters” looks at how various national pricing mechanisms work, why some of them may not work at all, what is wrong with others and of course seeks to answer the very question it poses in its title; why this policy instrument matters so much. With COP21 in Paris approaching, I have also argued the case for recognition of this instrument at the global level as well; this isn’t just about national policy implementation.

Not surprisingly the EU ETS gets a chapter to itself; there is a great deal of history here and many lessons learned, but some still to be recognized. As an Australian I have also ventured into the murky waters of carbon pricing policy in that country, which changes constantly and always throws up surprises. With a new Prime Minister, another round of debate may well be on the cards; we shall see.

Finally, I have again challenged the business community to think long and hard about this policy instrument – there are so many reasons why it is the best course to follow. Policy to manage carbon dioxide emissions is inevitable, so the choices we make now may impact the economy and environment for generations to come.

The book is available exclusively on Amazon, either for Kindle or iPads, iPhones and other devices with the Kindle App. This year, the book is also available in hard copy, given the number of requests I had for such treatment over the last twelve months. For those that haven’t caught up with my first attempt, it is now also available in hardcopy.

Where are the carbon market provisions?

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With just 100 days to run until COP21 in Paris and a tenth of that available for formal negotiations, the various national delegations met in Bonn last week to try and push forward the 80+ pages of text, replete with hundreds of bracketed options, into something that looks like a climate treaty. By all media outlet accounts progress was slow. Although the process hasn’t reached the point where alarm bells are ringing, the political pressure is mounting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon set to confront world leaders at the end of September in New York.

A key issue that remains under discussion yet with little to show for months of effort is that of the role of carbon pricing in the Paris agreement. While the decision to implement a carbon price within a national economy will always remain a sovereign one, encouragement from the top is nevertheless important. After all, if a carbon price doesn’t make its way into the global energy system, it’s difficult to see significant curtailment of fossil carbon extraction taking place or equally, widespread deployment of carbon capture and storage to directly manage emissions when fossil fuels are used. This message has been sent loudly from all quarters, including business organisations, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, NGOs and legions of observers in the academic community. The start of the session in Bonn coincided with an article from the Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge, Massachusetts which argued that encouraging linkage of heterogeneous national systems should be a key element of the Paris agreement. Professor Rob Stavins and his colleagues aren’t seeking a complex structure, but a simple provision. The article concludes that;

“. . . . the most valuable outcome of Paris regarding linkage might simply be the inclusion in the core agreement of an explicit statement that parties may transfer portions of their INDCs to other parties and that these transferred units may be used by the transferees to implement their INDCs. Such a statement would help provide certainty both to governments and private market participants. This minimalist approach will allow diverse forms of linkage to arise, among what will inevitably be highly heterogeneous INDCs, thereby advancing the dual objectives of cost effectiveness and environmental integrity in the international climate policy regime.”

Such a provision would encourage (carbon) price discovery through market transactions at both inter-governmental and inter-company levels, which in turn could be passed through the energy supply chain, thereby shifting investment decisions. This isn’t a big ask, yet it seems to be a step too far for the national negotiators, even from countries with a long history of market development and support.

This is exactly what the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) has been advocating for since this time last year and while many of the Parties to the UNFCCC have nodded their heads in agreement, very little has happened. IETA reports from Bonn that the mitigation group under the ADP produced a table that outlines the various issues that fall under the ‘mitigation umbrella’ which Parties want to include in the core Paris Agreement. That table is organised into three columns:

  • A column of issues that are largely agreed by Parties to be in the core Agreement,
  • A column of issues which require ‘further clarity’ on placement in the core Agreement,
  • A column of issues that will be in Decisions at the COP in Paris.

Carbon markets- including their function, governance, accounting, usage eligibility and future work programme all currently fall into the “further clarity” column, where Parties are still debating how to proceed. On the positive side (there is a real need to be upbeat about something) IETA notes that at the start of the mitigation session, some fifteen Parties mentioned the importance of an explicit recognition of market mechanisms in the core of the Agreement. They included the EU, the US, Marshall Islands (on behalf of AOSIS), Columbia, New Zealand, Norway, Tuvalu, Brazil, Australia, Switzerland, South Korea, Japan and Panama. After hearing Parties’ views the co-facilitators proposed to set up a spin off group led by Brazil to look further at joint implementation (i.e. transfers, trading etc.) and market mechanisms (e.g. the CDM is a market mechanism). This probably should have happened a year ago, but like the rest of the agreement it is coming down to the wire.

So the Paris agreement inches forwards and with it the fate of a global carbon market, at least for the near to medium term. The next and presumably last (no others are currently scheduled) negotiating session before Paris is in mid-October.