Archive for the ‘UNFCCC’ Category

The last few weeks have seen a flood of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) arrive at the UNFCCC offices in Bonn, presumably to be included in the assessment of progress promised by the UNFCCC Secretariat for release well before the Paris COP21.

There are now some 150 submissions and assessing them in aggregate requires some thinking about methodology. For starters, the temperature rise we will eventually see is driven by cumulative emissions over time (with a climate sensitivity of about 2°C per trillion tonnes of carbon – or 3.7 trillion tonnes CO2), not emissions in the period from 2020 to 2025 or 2030 which is the point at which most of the INDCs end. In fact, 2025 or 2030 represent more of a starting point than an end point for many countries. Nevertheless, in reading the INDCs, the proposals put forward by many countries give some clues as to where they might be going.

For Europe, the USA and many developed economies, the decline in emissions is already underway or at least getting started, with most having already said that by mid-century reductions of 70-80% vs. the early part of the century should be possible. But many emerging economies are also giving signs as to their long term intentions. For example, the South Africa INDC proposes a Peak-Plateau-Decline strategy, which sees a peak around 2020-2025, plateau for a decade and then a decline. Similarly, China has clearly signalled a peak in emissions around 2030, although with development at a very different stage in India, such a peak date has yet to be transmitted by that government.

Nevertheless, with some bold and perhaps optimistic assumptions, it is possible to assess the cumulative efforts and see where we might be by the end of the century or into the early part of next century. In doing this I used the following methodology;

  1. Use an 80/20 approach, i.e. assess the INDCs of the top 15-20 emitters and make an assumption about the rest of the world. My list includes USA, China, India, Europe, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Canada, Mexico, Russia, Japan, Australia, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. In current terms, this represents 85% of global energy system CO2 emissions.
  2. For the rest of the world (ROW), assume that emissions double by 2040 and plateau, before declining slowly throughout the second half of the century.
  3. For most countries, assume that emissions are near zero by 2100, with global energy emissions nearing 5 billion tonnes. The majority of this is in ROW, but with India and China still at about 1 billion tonnes per annum each, effectively residual coal use.
  4. Cement use rises to about 5 billion tonnes per annum by mid-century, with abatement via CCS not happening until the second half of the century. One tonne of cement produces about half a tonne of process CO2 from the calcination of fossil limestone.
  5. Land use CO2 emissions have been assessed by many organisations, but I have used numbers from Oxford University’s spreadsheet, which currently puts it at some 1.4 billion tonnes per annum of carbon (i.e. ~5 billion tonnes CO2). Given the INDC of Brazil and its optimism in managing deforestation, I have assumed that this declines throughout the century, but still remains marginally net positive in 2100.
  6. I have not included short lived climate forcers such as methane. These contribute more to the rate of temperature rise than the eventual outcome, provided of course that by the time we get to the end of the century they have been successfully managed.
  7. Cumulative emissions currently stand at 600 billion tonnes carbon according to

The end result of all of this are the charts below, the first being global CO2 emissions on an annual basis and the one below that being cumulative emissions over time. The all important cumulative emissions top out just below 1.4 trillion tonnes carbon.

Global CO2 Emissions Post INDC

Global Cumulative Emissions post INDCs

The trillionth tonne point, or the equivalent of 2°C, is passed around 2050, some 11 years later than the current end-2038 date indicated on the Oxford University website. My end point is the equivalent of about 2.8°C, well below 4+°C, but not where it needs to be. The curve has to flatten much faster than current INDCs will deliver, yet as emissions accumulate, the time to do so is ticking away.

Even with a five year review period built into the Paris agreement, can the outcome in 2030 or 2035 really be significantly different to this outlook? Will countries that have set out their stall through to 2030 actually change this part way through or even before they have started along said pathway? One indication that they might comes from China, where a number of institutions believe that national emissions could peak well before 2030. However, the problem with accumulation is that history is your enemy as much as the future might be. Even as emissions are sharply reduced, the legacy remains.

Nevertheless, we shouldn’t feel hopeless about such an outcome. Last week I was at the 38th Forum of the MIT Joint Program on the Policy and Science of Global Change and I was reminded again during one of the presentations of their Level 1 to Level 4 mitigation outcomes which I wrote about in my first book, 2°C Will Be Harder than we Think. These are shown below.

Shifting the Risk Profile

Taking no mitigation action at all results in a potential temperature distribution with a tail that stretches out past 7°C, albeit with a low probability. However, we can’t entertain even a low probability of such an outcome, so some level of mitigation must take place. While Level 1 remains the goal (note however that the MIT 2°C is not above pre-industrial, but relative to 1981-2000), MIT have shown that lesser outcomes remove the long tail and contain the climate issue to some extent. The INDC analysis I have presented is similar to Level 2 mitigation, which means the Paris process could deliver a very substantial reduction in global risk even if it doesn’t equate to 2°C. More appreciation of and discussion around this risk management approach is required, rather than the obsession with 2°C or global catastrophe that many currently present.

Of course, extraordinary follow through will be required. Each and every country needs to deliver on their INDC, many of which are dependent on very significant financial assistance. I looked at this recently for Kenya and India. Further, the UNFCCC process needs its own follow through to ensure that global emissions do trend towards zero throughout the century, which remains a very tall order.

Final steps towards Paris?

The last ten days have seen a rush by nations to publish their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), with the much anticipated INDC from India amongst those submitted. On Monday October 5th, the Co-Chairs of the ADP also released a proposal for a first draft of a new climate change agreement for Paris. So it has been a very busy few days, but are we any closer to a deal and could that deal have sufficient ambition to bend the emissions curve?

The India INDC is telling as an indicator of where the developing world really is, versus where the rapidly emerging economies such as China now find themselves. In the case of the latter group, there is thinking towards an emissions peak with China indicating that this will be around 2030 and continuing signals from the academic and research community in that country indicating that it may well be earlier. One such article appeared recently in the Guardian. But for the much poorer developing countries the story remains very different.

The submissions from India is 38 pages long, but of this some 28 pages is supporting evidence and context, explaining the reality of Indian emissions, the need to grow the economy to take hundreds of millions out of poverty and the expected use of fossil fuels to power industry, including areas such as metal smelting, petrochemicals and refining. With a focus on efficiency in particular, India expects to achieve a 33 to 35 percent reduction in CO2 intensity of the economy, but in reality that means a rise in energy related emissions to around 4 billion tonnes or more by 2030, up from some 2+ billion tonnes per annum at present (1.954 Gt in 2012, IEA). This could be tempered by a further element of their contribution which aims to increase forest sinks by some 3 billion tonnes of CO2 in total through to 2030.

There has been considerable speculation as to the renewable energy component of India’s INDC, with a hope that this would show enormous progress in solar deployment in particular. The INDC took the somewhat unusual route of talking in capacity additions, rather than generation (and therefore emissions). India aims to achieve 40% cumulative electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel based resources by 2030. This is significant, but less than it might appear. In a very simple example where 100 GW of generating capacity is comprised of 40 GW solar PV and 60 GW coal, the generation mix might be around 14% renewables and 86% coal. This is assuming a 20% capacity factor for the solar PV (maximum is 50% with day-night) and 80% capacity factor for the coal.

India has also put a considerable price tag on their INDC, with a mitigation effort of some US$ 834 billion through to 2030. In a previous post I looked at the costs assumed in the Kenyan INDC, which came to some $25 billion, but for a population of ~60 million (average through to 2030). With a projected population of some 1.5 billion by 2030, the finance side is in the same ballpark as the Kenyan INDC, albeit on the higher side.

Finally, the last few days have seen new draft text appear – shortened dramatically from some 80 pages to a manageable 20. But references to government led carbon markets, carbon pricing systems or even the use of transfer mechanisms between parties are largely missing. Article 34 of the Draft Decision does hint at the need to rescue the CDM from the Kyoto Protocol by referring to the need to build on Article 12 of the Protocol, but it will be of little use if there isn’t substantial demand for credits in developing and rapidly emerging economies. Simply creating a new crediting mechanism or even bringing the CDM into the Paris agreement won’t on its own direct the finance to the likes of Kenya and India. That demand and related finance flow will only come if the developed and emerging economies are building emissions trading systems (such as in China) and have the ability and confidence to transfer units related to it across their borders. So a great deal of work remains to be done.



Where are the carbon market provisions?

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With just 100 days to run until COP21 in Paris and a tenth of that available for formal negotiations, the various national delegations met in Bonn last week to try and push forward the 80+ pages of text, replete with hundreds of bracketed options, into something that looks like a climate treaty. By all media outlet accounts progress was slow. Although the process hasn’t reached the point where alarm bells are ringing, the political pressure is mounting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon set to confront world leaders at the end of September in New York.

A key issue that remains under discussion yet with little to show for months of effort is that of the role of carbon pricing in the Paris agreement. While the decision to implement a carbon price within a national economy will always remain a sovereign one, encouragement from the top is nevertheless important. After all, if a carbon price doesn’t make its way into the global energy system, it’s difficult to see significant curtailment of fossil carbon extraction taking place or equally, widespread deployment of carbon capture and storage to directly manage emissions when fossil fuels are used. This message has been sent loudly from all quarters, including business organisations, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, NGOs and legions of observers in the academic community. The start of the session in Bonn coincided with an article from the Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge, Massachusetts which argued that encouraging linkage of heterogeneous national systems should be a key element of the Paris agreement. Professor Rob Stavins and his colleagues aren’t seeking a complex structure, but a simple provision. The article concludes that;

“. . . . the most valuable outcome of Paris regarding linkage might simply be the inclusion in the core agreement of an explicit statement that parties may transfer portions of their INDCs to other parties and that these transferred units may be used by the transferees to implement their INDCs. Such a statement would help provide certainty both to governments and private market participants. This minimalist approach will allow diverse forms of linkage to arise, among what will inevitably be highly heterogeneous INDCs, thereby advancing the dual objectives of cost effectiveness and environmental integrity in the international climate policy regime.”

Such a provision would encourage (carbon) price discovery through market transactions at both inter-governmental and inter-company levels, which in turn could be passed through the energy supply chain, thereby shifting investment decisions. This isn’t a big ask, yet it seems to be a step too far for the national negotiators, even from countries with a long history of market development and support.

This is exactly what the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) has been advocating for since this time last year and while many of the Parties to the UNFCCC have nodded their heads in agreement, very little has happened. IETA reports from Bonn that the mitigation group under the ADP produced a table that outlines the various issues that fall under the ‘mitigation umbrella’ which Parties want to include in the core Paris Agreement. That table is organised into three columns:

  • A column of issues that are largely agreed by Parties to be in the core Agreement,
  • A column of issues which require ‘further clarity’ on placement in the core Agreement,
  • A column of issues that will be in Decisions at the COP in Paris.

Carbon markets- including their function, governance, accounting, usage eligibility and future work programme all currently fall into the “further clarity” column, where Parties are still debating how to proceed. On the positive side (there is a real need to be upbeat about something) IETA notes that at the start of the mitigation session, some fifteen Parties mentioned the importance of an explicit recognition of market mechanisms in the core of the Agreement. They included the EU, the US, Marshall Islands (on behalf of AOSIS), Columbia, New Zealand, Norway, Tuvalu, Brazil, Australia, Switzerland, South Korea, Japan and Panama. After hearing Parties’ views the co-facilitators proposed to set up a spin off group led by Brazil to look further at joint implementation (i.e. transfers, trading etc.) and market mechanisms (e.g. the CDM is a market mechanism). This probably should have happened a year ago, but like the rest of the agreement it is coming down to the wire.

So the Paris agreement inches forwards and with it the fate of a global carbon market, at least for the near to medium term. The next and presumably last (no others are currently scheduled) negotiating session before Paris is in mid-October.

Do we have a wicked problem to deal with?

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Two recent and separate articles in Foreign Affairs highlight different routes forward for tacking the climate issue. One, by Michael Bloomberg, argues that the mitigation solution increasingly lies with cities (this isn’t just about city resilience) and the other puts the challenge squarely in front of the business community.

These are just two in a salvo of pre-Paris articles that seek to direct the negotiations towards a solution space, including some by me and other colleagues arguing the case for carbon pricing systems. The articles reminded me of a similar article in 2009, the Hartwell Paper, in which a group of UK economists cast the climate issue as a ‘wicked problem’, but still went on to propose a very specific solution (a big technology push funded by carbon taxes). That paper also built its argument on the back of the Kaya Identity, which I have argued simplifies the emissions problem such that it can lead to tangential solutions that may not deliver the necessary stabilization in atmospheric carbon dioxide. Nevertheless, there is still merit in focusing on a specific way forward – at least something useful might then get done.

But the description of the climate problem as ‘wicked’, is one that deserves further thought. The use of the word wicked in this context is different to its generally accepted meaning, but instead pertains to the immense difficulty of the problem itself. Wikipedia gives a good description;

A problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. The use of the term “wicked” here has come to denote resistance to resolution, rather than evil. Moreover, because of complex inter-dependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems.

It is also important to think about which problem we are actually trying to solve. For example, it may turn out that the issue of climate change is immensely more difficult to solve than the issue of carbon dioxide emissions. There is now good evidence that emissions can be brought down to near zero levels, but this doesn’t necessarily resolve the problem of a changing climate. Although warming of the climate system is being driven by increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the scale on which anthropogenic activities are now conducted can also impact the climate through different routes. Moving away from fossil fuels to very large scale production of energy through other means is a good illustration of this. In a 2010 report, MIT illustrated how very large scale wind farms could result in some surface warming because the turbulent transfer of heat from the surface to the higher layers is reduced as a result of reduced surface kinetic energy (the wind). This is because that energy is converted to electricity. This is not to argue that we shouldn’t build wind turbines, but rather to highlight that with a population of 7-10 billion people all needing energy for a prosperous lifestyle, society may inadvertently engage in some degree of geoengineering (large-scale manipulation of an environmental process that affects the earth’s climate) simply to supply it.

Even narrowing the broader climate issue to emissions, the problem remains pretty wicked. Inter-dependencies abound, such as when significant volumes of liquid fuels may be supplied by very large scale use of biomass or when efficiency drives an increase in energy use (as it has done for over 100 years), rather than the desired reduction in emissions.

An approach to managing wicked problems (Tim Curtis, University of Northampton) first and foremost involves defining the problem very succinctly. This involves locking down the problem definition or developing a description of a related problem that you can solve, and declaring that to be the problem. Objective metrics by which to measure the solution’s success are also very important. In the field of climate change and the attempts by the Parties to the UNFCCC to resolve it, this is far from the course currently being taken. There is immense pressure to engage in sustainable development, end poverty, improve access to energy, promote renewable technologies, save forests, solve global equity issues and use energy more efficiently. Although these are all important goals, they are not sufficiently succinct and defined to enable a clear pathway to resolution, nor does solving them necessarily lead to restoration of a stable climate. The INDC based approach allows for almost any problem to be solved, so long as it can be loosely linked to the broad categories of mitigation and adaptation. The current global approach may well be adding to the wickedness rather than simplifying or even avoiding it.

The short article referenced above concludes with a very sobering observation;

While it may seem appealing in the short run, attempting to tame a wicked problem will always fail in the long run. The problem will simply reassert itself, perhaps in a different guise, as if nothing had been done; or worse, the tame solution will exacerbate the problem.

In climate change terms, this translates to emissions not falling as a result of current efforts, or even if they do fall a bit this has no measurable impact on the continuing rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.

But that is not to say we should give up, as the counter to this observation is that having defined a clear and related objective to the wicked problem that is being confronted, declare that there are just a few possible solutions and focus on selecting from among them. For me, that comes down to implementing a cost for emitting carbon dioxide through systems such as cap-and-trade or carbon taxation. As such, I am about to release a second book in my Putting the Genie Back series, this one titled Why Carbon Pricing Matters. It will be available from mid-September but can be pre-ordered now.

Why Carbon Pricing Matters

Assessing the INDCs

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It is now just 100 days until COP21 in Paris.

The summer months have seen many Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC prior to the assessment deadline of October 1st. This is the date when the UNFCCC secretariat will start work on a synthesis report on the aggregate effect of the INDCs as communicated by Parties. Many organisations are already offering assessments of progress, with most basing this on reductions through to 2030 against a notional 2°C pathway.

However, the climate system doesn’t care about 2030 nor does it respond to changes in annual emissions. The real metric is cumulative emissions over time, with each trillion tonnes of carbon released into the atmosphere equivalent to about 2°C rise in temperature rise (this isn’t precisely linear, but it is a reasonable rule of thumb to use). This means that any assessment must look well beyond 2030 and make some bold assumptions as to where the emissions pathways then go. It also means that the wide variety of pledges using metrics such as the share of renewable energy in the power generation mix, installed solar capacity or emissions per GDP, whilst important in the context of energy system development, offer limited insight into the trend for cumulative emissions.

A good example of this comes from looking at the INDC from China. They have pledged the following;

  • To achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 and making best efforts to peak early;
  • To lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level;
  • To increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20%; and
  • To increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters on the 2005 level.

From an energy emissions context, only the first part of this pledge is really important, but little information is given allowing an assessment of its real impact on the climate system. Some big assumnptions will have to be made.

According to the Oxford Martin School carbon emissions counter, global cumulative emissions now stand at nearly 600 billion tonnes of carbon (2.2 trillion tonnes CO2). Back in November 2014 when China and the USA announced their climate deal, I speculated that the Chinese side of the Sino-US deal could see their emissions rising to as much as 14.5 billion tonnes CO2 per annum by 2030 based on the following assumption;

The USA and China appear to have adopted a “Contraction and Convergence” approach, with a goal of around 10 tonnes CO2 per capita for 2030, at least for energy related emissions. For China this means emissions of some 14.5 billion tpa in 2030, compared with the latest IEA number for 2012 of 8.3 billion tonnes, so a 75% increase over 2012 or 166% increase over 2005. It also has China peaking at a level of per capita CO2 emissions similar to Europe when it was more industrial, rather than ramping up to the current level of say, the USA or Australia (both ~16 tonnes). By comparison, Korea currently has energy CO2/capita emissions of ~12 tonnes, so China peaking at 10 is some 17% below that.

Of course China could still peak at lower levels than this and the economic downturn they currently seem to be facing may ensure this. Nevertheless, two reduction pathways following 2030 give a very different cumulative outlook for the period 2015-2100. It is this cumulative outcome that matters, not where China might happen to find itself in 2030. While the period up to 2030 is important, it only tells a fraction of the story. Chinese emissions over that period will likely add some 50 billion tonnes of carbon to the global cumulative total, but this is small compared to their potential remaining cumulative contribution (i.e, before they are at net-zero emissions). The two pathways below illustrate the difference;

  1. A plateau for about a decade, followed by a long slow reduction through to near zero by 2100 means cumulative emissions from 2015 are around 800 billion tonnes of CO2, or 220 billion tonnes of carbon. In this scenario, Chinese emissions alone take the global carbon emissions total to 820 billion tonnes.
  2. A sharp decline from 2030 to zero before 2080 gives cumulative emissions of 550 billion tonnes, or 150 billion tonnes carbon. In this case the global total rises to 750 billion tonnes carbon based on Chinese emissions alone.

Either way, China will have a profound impact on global cumulative emissions. But this fairly simple analysis illustrates that the period from 2030 onwards is where the real story lies, which to date isn’t covered by any of the INDC submissions. For a 2°C outcome, even the lower of the two scenarios above leaves little carbon space for the remaining 7+ billion people living on the planet throughout the 21st century.

Impact of Chinese Cumulative Emissions

The cost of contributions

The process of national governments submitting Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the UNFCCC is well underway, with a number of developing and least developed economies also submitting plans. Most recent amongst these is a detailed and ambitious plan from the government of Kenya.

The Kenya INDC proposes a 30% reduction in national greenhouse gas emissions from a business-as-usual (BAU) trajectory, which it is also very clear in defining. The plan notes that Kenya strives to be a newly industrialized middle income country by 2030. Current emissions are very low, with the majority coming from land use change (LULUCF). In 2010 emissions were 73 MtCO2eq, with the IEA reporting energy CO2 emissions of 11.4 Mt for that year. Given the population of 41 million in 2010, that gives an energy linked CO2 per capita of 0.28 tonnes, amongst the lowest in the world. Kenya has projected BAU emissions of 143 MTCO2eq by 2030, so that gives them a goal of just on 100 MTCO2eq for that year on the basis of their INDC.

Kenya has also made it clear that their INDC is subject to international support in the form of finance, investment, technology development and transfer, and capacity building. With some of this support coming from domestic sources, they estimate the total cost of mitigation and adaptation actions across sectors at US$40 billion, through to 2030. My first reaction to this was that it seemed like quite a hefty bill, but better to look at the numbers.

First of all, a few assumptions. These are all open to challenge, but they help frame the issue and allow some assessment of the numbers to at least establish a ballpark estimate of value for money and the implications flowing from that.

  1. I will look at mitigation only, so let’s assume that the $40 billion is split between mitigation and adaptation, but with emphasis on mitigation. That allows ~$10+ billion for major public works and capacity building programmes focussed on areas such as water and agriculture and $20-$30 billion in the energy system.
  2. I will assume that energy system growth and adaptation funding allows for a plateau and then gradual decline in LULUCF emissions, such that by 2050 these are below 10 MT per annum.
  3. A BAU for energy emissions only would see Kenya rising to nearly 2 tonnes per capita by 2030 (current Asia, excluding China) and 6 tonnes per capita by 2050 (approaching current Europe). This would mean extensive use of fossil fuels, but supplemented by their geothermal and hydroelectric resources in particular. This is the pathway that they might be on in the absence of this INDC.
  4. Kenya’s population rises in line with the UN mid-level scenario, i.e. to 66 million by 2030 and 97 million by 2050.

Based on the above, energy emissions could rise to some 120 Mt p.a. by 2030 and 600 Mt p.a. by 2050 under a BAU scenario. But in the INDC scenario, this could be curtailed such that they are at 70 Mt p.a. in 2030 and perhaps as low as 130 Mt p.a. in 2050, or 70-80% below BAU. The 2030 number is the more important one for this calculation as this is what the $20-$30 billion delivers, although the benefits of the investment stretch beyond 2030. However, further additional investment would be required to keep emissions at such a low level through to 2050 as energy demand grows.

The deviation from BAU is nearly 50 Mt p.a. by 2030, with that deviation starting in the early 2020s. If the gains are held through to 2050, then the cumulative emission reduction over the period is around 1 billion tonnes. On a simple 20 year project life with no discounting, that equates to around $25 per tonne of CO2 against the $20-$30 billion investment in the 2020s. On that basis, this looks like a good deal and is well within the bounds of plausibility. It could equate to a mixture of expanded renewable energy deployment, natural gas instead of coal and possibly some biofuel development for transport.

What is perhaps more interesting is how this scales up across Africa and other parts of the world where energy access is currently limited. If 1-2 billion people globally need support for similar energy infrastructure, that implies a financial requirement of about US$1 trillion over the period 2020-2030 just for mitigation (i.e. 30+ times the Kenya population of 50 million, multiplied by $US30 billion). This equates to $100 billion per annum, which is also the number that was agreed in Copenhagen in 2009 as the call on increased financial flows to developing countries, although that was for both mitigation and adaptation purposes. It also implies that if the world does reach the US$100 billion per annum goal, then most of this will be for mitigation in the least developed economies as they build their 21st century energy systems.

The flip side of this is that the emerging economies will probably have to self-fund, which argues for the implementation of a carbon price on a far wider basis than is currently envisaged. China is leading the way here, but so too are countries like Mexico and Chile.

The Kenya INDC offers some interesting insight into climate politics in the years to come.

Four demands for Paris

The call was very clear, here were “four demands” for Paris COP21 being presented to a group in London. But the surprise was the presenter; not a climate focussed NGO or an activist campaigning for change, but Fatih Birol, Chief Economist for the International Energy Agency. He was in an optimistic mood, despite the previous two weeks of ADP negotiations in Bonn that saw almost nothing happen. He opened the presentation by saying “This time it will work” (i.e. Paris, vs. Copenhagen and all the other false starts).

On June 15th Mr Birol launched the World Energy Outlook Special Report: Energy and Climate Change. The IEA usually launch a special supplement to their annual World Energy Outlook (WEO) and this one was the second to focus on the climate challenge and the policy changes required for the world to be on a 2°C emissions pathway. It was also something of a shot over the bow for the Paris COP21 process which had just completed another two weeks of negotiations in Bonn, but with little to show for the effort. Mr Birol is a master of such presentations and this one was memorable. He focussed almost entirely on the short term, although the publication itself looks forward to 2030 for the most part. With regards to the energy system, short term usually means 5 years or so, but in this case short term really meant December but with the resulting actions being very relevant for the period 2016-2020.

Mr Birol outlined four key pillars (as they are referred to in the publication) for COP21, but restated them as “demands”. They are;

  1. Emissions must peak by 2020. The IEA believes that this can be achieved with a near term focus on five measures;
    1. Energy Efficiency.
    2. High efficiency coal, both in new building and removing some existing facilities. IEA proposed a ban on building sub-critical coal.
    3. An even bigger push on renewable energy, with an increase in investment from $270 billion in 2014 to $400 billion in 2030.
    4. Oil and gas industry to reduce upstream methane emissions.
    5. Phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies to end-users by 2030.
  2. Implement a five year review process for NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) so that they can be rapidly adjusted to changing circumstances. I discussed the risk of a slow review process when MIT released a report on the possible COP21 outcome.
  3. Turn the global 2°C goal into clear emission reduction targets, both longer term and consistent shorter term goals.
  4. Track the transition – i.e. track the delivery of NDCs and transparently show how the global emissions pathway is developing as a result.

Interestingly Mr. Birol didn’t mention carbon pricing once, at least not until a question came up asking why he hadn’t mentioned carbon pricing – “Is carbon pricing no longer an important goal, you didn’t mention it?” asked a curious member of those assembled at the Foreign Office. He said yes it was, but given his focus was on Paris and that he saw little chance of a global approach on carbon pricing being agreed in that time-span, he didn’t mention it! I think this represents a major oversight on the part of the IEA although there is at least some discussion on carbon pricing in the publication. While it is true that a globally harmonised approach to carbon pricing won’t be in place in the near term, I would argue that an essential 5th pillar (or 5th demand) for Paris is recognition of the importance of carbon pricing and creation of the necessary space for linking of heterogeneous systems to take place. This looks like the fastest route towards a globally relevant price.

Mr. Birol didn’t mention CCS either, which is perhaps more understandable given the 5 year focus of much of the publication. However, Chapter 4 within the publication deals extensively with CCS and the IEA highlights the importance of CCS in their 450 ppm scenario through the chart below.


Finally, there was some discussion around the climate statement made by the G7 the week before and their commitment out to 2100. Looking at the statement released by the G7, they said;

“. . . . .we emphasize that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required with a decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of this century. Accordingly, as a common vision for a global goal of greenhouse gas emissions reductions we support sharing with all parties to the UNFCCC the upper end of the latest IPCC recommendation of 40 to 70 % reductions by 2050 compared to 2010 recognizing that this challenge can only be met by a global response.”

My reading of this is that the G7 are recognizing the need to be at or nearing global net zero emissions by 2100. However, this isn’t how the statement has been reported, with several commentators, media outlets and even one of the presenters alongside Fatih Birol interpreting this as an agreement to be fossil fuel free by 2100. These are two very different outcomes for the energy system; the first one potentially feasible and the second being rather unlikely. Both the Shell Oceans and Mountains New Lens Scenarios illustrate how a net zero emissions world can potentially evolve, with extensive use of CCS making room for continued use of fossil fuels in various applications. The core driver here will be the economics of the energy system and the competitiveness of fossil fuels and alternatives across the full spectrum of needs. It is already clear that alternative energy sources such as solar PV will be very competitive and could well account for a significant proportion of global electricity provision. Equally, there are areas where fossil fuels will be very difficult to displace; I gave one such example in a case study I posted recently on aviation. Energy demand in certain sectors may well be met by fossil fuels for all of this century, either with direct use of CCS to deal with the emissions or, as illustrated in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report, offset by bio-energy and CCS (BECCS) elsewhere. Unfortunately the nuances of this issue didn’t make it into the IEA presentation.

That’s it from me for a couple of weeks or so. I am heading north on the National Geographic Explorer to see the Arctic wilderness of Svalbard and Greenland.

A new report from the IMF

Last week many representatives of the global business community gathered at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris for the Business and Climate Summit, a prequel of sorts to the main COP21 event in December, but with only the business community involved. The goal was to demonstrate the involvement of the business community in the climate change issue and to set the stage for the business response to whatever is agreed by the Parties to the UNFCCC in December.

The event had significant political backing, with President Hollande speaking at the opening session. His speech went straight to the heart of the issue, with very matter of fact references to the important role of carbon pricing and the need for carbon capture and storage. Even UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Christiana Figures, endorsed CCS, not something she is known to do very often. The remarks by the President were backed up by many speakers, but Angel Gurria, Secretary General, OECD was perhaps the most memorable with his call for “a price, a price, a big fat price on carbon.”

The opening on May 20th set the scene for a major session on carbon pricing the next morning, with the World Bank and various business leaders taking the podium. While these speakers were all in agreement on the importance of carbon pricing, the harmony of the day before wasn’t quite as strong, with something of an argument between Tony Hayward, Chairman of Glencore and Kerry Adler, CEO of Skypower (solar) over the respective role of solar and coal in the coming decades. Mr Hayward saw little possibility of solar filling the breadth of industrial needs currently fulfilled by coal (and other fossil fuels).

The economic purpose of a cost on carbon dioxide emissions (carbon price) is as a response to the externality presented by our collective use of fossil fuels. This externality (the impact related to rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere) was discussed on several occasions during the Summit with regular reference to a new IMF report which argues that fossil fuel subsidies now stand at $5.3 trillion per annum. The vast majority of this arises from unaccounted externalities, such as the emissions of carbon dioxide and the impact of black carbon. Given that global fossil fuel production is some 10+ billion tonnes of oil equivalent per annum, then $5 trillion of externality equates to a charge for each tonne of production of some $500. The IMF report says that about a quarter of this relates to carbon dioxide emissions.

The publication of this number caused some excitement at the Summit and of course it got picked up in the media very quickly, in many cases with very little explanation as to its meaning. The IMF paper dwells at length on the need to cost in the externality and argues that despite a huge rise in energy costs that would result from such a charge, there would be a net welfare benefit to society at large. The report discusses the work of 19th Century Economist Arthur Pigou, who introduced the concept of externalities and proposed that negative externalities could be corrected by the imposition of a tax, now known as Pigouvian taxation. In the case of the climate issue, a carbon tax or the need to purchase emission allowances from the government are examples of Pigouvian taxes. The IMF report notes;

When the consumption of a good by a firm or household generates an external cost to society, then efficient pricing requires that consumers face a price that reflects this cost. In the absence of a well-functioning market for internalizing this cost in the consumer price, efficiency requires the imposition of a Pigouvian tax equal to the external cost generated by additional consumption.

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Eliminating post-tax subsidies in 2015 could raise government revenue by $2.9 trillion (3.6 percent of global GDP), cut global CO2 emissions by more than 20 percent, and cut pre-mature air pollution deaths by more than half. After allowing for the higher energy costs faced by consumers, this action would raise global economic welfare by $1.8 trillion (2.2 percent of global GDP).

But it is also important to consider the current value that is delivered by the availability of energy, a point also made by Tony Hayward on the carbon pricing panel. From an economic standpoint, it is worth taking this a step further. After all, why would the world be producing and using a fuel that brings such apparent economic hardship to society (i.e $5 trillion per annum worth of hardship)? The answer to this question implies that a positive externality must be outweighing this factor.

Although the IMF report doesn’t mention it, Pigou didn’t just talk about externalities in the negative sense, but also in the positive sense. Someone creating a positive externality—say, by educating himself and making himself more interesting or useful to other people—might not invest enough in education because he would not perceive the value to himself as being as great as the value to society. Pigou even advocated for subsidies for activities that created such positive externalities.

Despite the issues associated with using them, fossil fuels have brought tremendous value to society and continue to do so. Almost everything we take for granted in modern society from the food we eat to the iPhone we constantly use are here because of fossil fuels. This wealth creation that is tied to their use but not reflected in the price is a positive externality. Such a positive externality should be apparent in the price of fossil fuels, but because of their relative abundance around the world and the dislocation that often exists between extraction and use, this may not be the case. The positive externality is potentially so large that it is likely the root cause of some governments offering real incentives and (Pigouvian) subsidies to promote additional fossil fuel production. The IMF report calls these Producer Subsidies, but notes that they are relatively small.

None of the above is meant as an argument for not dealing with the environmental externalities associated with fossil fuels use. As noted many times during the Summit and as I have discussed often in the past, a carbon price is essential. But as other forms of energy scale up to the level at which we use fossil fuels, new externalities will present themselves. There will of course be the ongoing positive externality associated with energy provision, but negative externalities will almost certainly make themselves known as new industries emerge and new materials are introduced into society for everyday use (e.g. very large scale use of lithium). Perhaps the lesson from the IMF report is to start dealing with externalities much earlier in the cycle of production, before they reach a level which challenges our economic system to correct.

More steps towards Paris

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At the end of last week (May 15th) Canada submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the UNFCCC, becoming the 37th state to do so (including 28 countries within the EU). The three key points of the Canadian INDC submission are:

  • An emissions reduction pledge of 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 (the US has pledged a target of 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025);
  • The reduction will be economy-wide and will cover all GHGs recognized under the UNFCCC;
  • Canada “may also use international mechanisms to achieve its target, subject to robust systems that deliver real and verified emissions reductions.”

This means that substantial progress is being made towards a good coverage of INDC submissions by the time of the Paris COP, although many eyes will now be turning to the emerging economies (e.g. China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Chile, Saudi Arabia etc.) for the real signal with regards tackling global emissions. Mexico has made a good start in that regard.

In just two weeks the national negotiators will meet again, this time in Bonn, to continue their deliberations in the lead up to COP21. But is the process in good shape?

Compared to this time in 2009 with the Copenhagen COP looming, I think it is in better shape. Although there are many details to be agreed, the negotiators at least know what it is they are trying to agree on; a relatively lean framework within which can sit the collection of INDCs from all countries for scrutiny and review. It has taken many years to get to this point and the process is far from complete, but the task at hand is now clear even though many will argue that it won’t be sufficient to deliver the goal to limit warming of the climate system to less than 2°C. At least there is thematic consensus which I don’t think existed in May 2009; was it to be top down or bottom up, what would happen to the Kyoto Protocol, should there be a global goal on temperature rise? These and many other questions were still in play.

Looking back on some of my first year of blog posts which were written in 2009, it was all very different.

  • Many eyes were on the deliberations of the US House of Representatives and the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade Bill, with every expectation that the USA would take the lead on establishing a carbon price. Today, those eyes are on the world’s largest emitter, China, as it proceeds with its carbon pricing provincial trials and expansion to a nationwide system.
  • It wasn’t until the June 2009 UNFCCC meeting that the team from the Oxford University Department of Physics first presented their new thinking on a global carbon emissions limit of 1 trillion tonnes over the industrial era; now negotiators are actually considering the concept of net-zero emissions and therefore an end date to the ongoing accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
  • The British government produced a first of its kind report on the idea of global carbon trading. In some respects not much has changed, but the discussion has matured and the likes of the World Bank are now taking this concept forward. A linked market even exists between California and Quebec.
  • In July 2009 I came across the first electric vehicle charging stations in London and met a person who was taking delivery of the seventh Tesla in the UK. In 2014 there were 15,000 EV and PHEV newly registered and right now on AutoTrader there are 10 used Tesla cars for sale!!
  • The UNFCCC negotiations were operating on two tracks, the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and Long term Cooperative Action (LCA), with no real sign of them coming together.
  • There was little consensus on climate finance; today the Green Climate Fund has been established and there is an active process underway to start disseminating the initial developed country funding.
  • There was little sign of targets and goal setting from the major developing countries; today China has indicated a plateau in emissions by around 2030 and other countries are following their lead.

In hindsight it isn’t surprising that all of these issues were not resolved by the following December. The goals for Paris may not be as lofty as those for Copenhagen, but at least from the perspective of a mid-year review they appear more achievable. It’s been a few months since I have added a piece to my “Paris Puzzle”, but it is perhaps timely to do this now.

Jigsaw May 2015

Accounting isn’t enough

As the World Bank and others ramp up the discussion on carbon pricing, heads are turning towards Paris with thoughts on how the issue will be incorporated into the expected COP21 global climate deal. I have said many times in the past that unless a carbon price makes its way into the whole global energy system, then its success in bringing down emissions is far from assured. While local carbon pricing wins will appear, the global effort could be undermined by a lack of global coverage.   This is true of other policy approaches as well, but in the case of carbon pricing there is the significant benefit of economic efficiency.  For me, the signs so far aren’t great, with the text that came out of the Geneva ADP meeting showing few signs of tackling this important issue.

In recent weeks I have heard some commentators and national climate negotiators argue that the Framework Convention itself is sufficient to underpin cooperative carbon market development and that all the COP21 deal needs is a framework to ensure that accounting of carbon based trades is robust and avoids issues such as double counting (two parties each counting a particular reduction under their own emissions inventory). The underpinning language within the Convention can be found in several places (examples below), but the references are oblique and without direct recognition of carbon pricing or carbon markets;

  • Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties;
  • These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention;
  • Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of the Convention;

While this language could be interpreted as a mandate to develop a global carbon market and the ensuing exchange of carbon pricing instruments between Parties, or companies within the jurisdiction of those Parties, it hardly encourages this process to take place, let alone become a key activity in implementing a global deal. Similarly, if a Paris deal just addresses accounting issues, I don’t believe that this will act as the necessary catalyst for carbon market development either. It’s a bit like agreeing how to calculate the GDP and then not opening the national mint to print and issue the currency!!

Looking back at the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism provides some valuable learning. While it isn’t a comprehensive carbon pricing instrument the Protocol nevertheless catalysed its development with a few paragraphs of text, to the extent that it eventually pushed some $100 billion (some have estimated much higher levels) in project investment into various developing country economies. This far eclipses the $10 billion that has so far been pledged to the Green Climate Fund, clearly demonstrating that market based approaches will almost always outstrip direct public financing or funding.    To meet the developed countries’ commitment to mobilize $100bn per annum by 2020, it is clear that carbon market approaches including linking will be required.  It is difficult to see how it will be met without incentivizing the private sector in this way.

This is the sort of step that I think the negotiators in Paris need to take. Rather than just elaborating on core accounting principles, I believe that they need to incorporate a means of actively encouraging carbon market expansion. Given the nationally determined contribution based architecture that is emerging, such a development will probably be a bottom up process, perhaps with heterogeneous linking between various market based systems. The Harvard Kennedy School are offering valuable insight into how this might transpire.

One organisation, IETA, has put forward a proposal for Paris along these lines. It is a light touch approach, given the opposition that a real carbon market proposal seems to foster, but hopefully it will be enough to get things started. The IETA proposal calls for the development of a “unified international transfer system”, in effect a “plug-and-play” linkage approach for national trading systems. With wording along these lines in the Paris agreement, later COP decisions could establish the modalities for such a system, thus opening up and accelerating the process that the likes of California and Quebec went through to link their respective trading systems. Such modalities would include the common accounting framework that is needed irrespective of the approach taken to encourage the development of a global market. In all cases, accounting still remains central to progress.

I won’t claim that this is the quickest and most effective way forward, but it is where we are and probably the best that can be achieved, assuming the push from above is there to encourage it. Without such a push, we are all left to hope that something may transpire on carbon markets, but wishful thinking isn’t a solution to 2°C.