Category: Net zero emissions

Reflecting on the IPCC Synthesis Report through new Shell scenarios

dchone March 23, 2023

After a year of work, with a few hints along the way offered via this blog, the Shell scenarios team launched The Energy Security Scenarios this week. This is the team I am proud to be a member of and our new scenarios offer a very different perspective on the world in a time of challenging circumstances. With an almost identical release date, the IPCC 6^th Assessment Synthesis Report also landed this week. The scenarios also offer a new lens through which to view the IPCC findings.

The Energy Security Scenarios are built on the foundation of a world in which a security mindset is becoming pervasive, be it national security based on military threats, energy security following a year of supply disruption and price volatility, economic security as we watch the banking system being challenged by some defaults or climate security as the global average surface temperature continues to rise and impacts are becoming more visible. How countries respond to energy price volatility and supply disruption is highly variable, but nevertheless a pattern has emerged that ties together disparate responses such as India buying Russian crude oil and the USA pumping billions of dollars into direct air capture. These behaviours form part of an archetype framework that underpins our new scenarios. This foundation also offers some colour to the energy story we tell, with our archetypes classified as Innovation Wins, Green Dream, Surfers and Great Wall of Change.

Two key drivers shape the stories that we explore, notably the call at COP26 in Glasgow to deliver net-zero emissions globally by 2050 and deep cuts in emissions by 2030 and the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine which has stressed the global energy system over the past twelve months. As a result, two new scenarios emerge which embrace both drivers, but prioritise them differently as the world moves forwards. We look out not just to 2030 or 2050, but all the way to 2100 and even draw one surprising conclusion about what the 22^nd century has to offer. These are stories that describe a world locked in an energy transition not only driven by cooperative change as called for by many, but instead trending towards a world of more intense competition as countries seek to shore up their energy system for the 21^st century. The scenarios are Sky 2050 and Archipelagos. Both scenarios see the energy transition accelerating, but at different paces. In Sky 2050 climate security is the priority, whereas in Archipelagos there is more attention to ongoing energy security.

Highlighting the increasing pace of the transition is the recognition of an inflection point in this decade as fossil fuels begin to lose market share in primary energy, finally shifting away from the 80% role they have played for many decades. The pace in Sky 2050 is about twice that of Archipelagos, but both represent a trend break.

Meanwhile, the IPCC is very focussed on the diminishing carbon budget and the rapidly narrowing opportunities for limiting warming to 1.5°C. In the Synthesis Report they broadly conclude that action will be insufficient to contain warming below 1.5°C in the near term, which points to an overshoot outcome and therefore the need to recover the situation later in the century. This is similar to the pathway visible in Sky 2050, which does see global emissions start to fall in the 2020s and net-zero emissions reached in 2050, but nevertheless the surface temperature rises above 1.5°C in the mid-2030s. However, a burgeoning new direct air capture industry, borne out of initiatives such as the Inflation Reduction Act in the USA, appears in Sky 2050. It grows to such an extent than in combination with extensive change in land management practices, from forestry to farming, as much carbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere between 2050 and 2100 as has been added from now to 2050. The result is that by 2100 surface temperature warming in Sky 2050 has returned to today’s levels, with the potential for climate restoration during the 22^nd century.

The IPCC make the case that only a drastic reduction in near term emissions can avoid passing 1.5°C, with CO2 emissions needing to fall by 48% by 2030 relative to 2019 levels. These numbers will become higher with each passing day that emissions do not reduce. The table below comes from the Synthesis Report released on Monday and outlines what must happen in the seven years to 2030, then to 2035, 2040 and 2050.

Source: IPCC 6th Assessment Report – Synthesis

In The Energy Security Scenarios we do not see the scope for such large near term action reductions, with Sky 2050 achieving a reduction of around 12% by 2030. In Archipelagos emissions are higher in 2030 than in 2019. Although the Synthesis Report calls for immediate reductions, the IPCC note that of their modelled scenarios, only a small number of the most ambitious global modelled pathways limit global warming to 1.5°C by 2100 without exceeding this level temporarily. The IPCC state the following:

Global warming will continue to increase in the near term (2021-2040) mainly due to increased cumulative CO2 emissions in nearly all considered scenarios and modelled pathways. In the near term, global warming is more likely than not to reach 1.5°C even under the very low GHG emission scenario (SSP1-1.9) and likely or very likely to exceed 1.5°C under higher emissions scenarios. In the considered scenarios and modelled pathways, the best estimates of the time when the level of global warming of 1.5°C is reached lie in the near term.

In the case of overshoot, i.e. temporarily exceeding 1.5°C, they also note that the application of large scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies and practices is required to progressively reverse the overshoot situation. However, they also note that any overshoot brings with it the added risk of long term irreversible changes in the global ecosystem.

In short, the Synthesis Report paints a concerning picture of the world exceeding 1.5°C and taking on the associated climate risks. While the report makes every attempt to say that the possibility of not doing so still exists, there is little solid content to argue that this is achievable, a finding backed up by the analysis presented in The Energy Security Scenarios. The temperature outcomes for Sky 2050 and Archipelagos are presented below. The assessments were made by the MIT Joint Program using their climate model and also reported with the release of the Shell scenarios. You can also explore the scenario data here.

The Energy Security Scenarios complement the IPCC Synthesis Report well in that Sky 2050 sets out a very clear and unambiguous pathway to 2100, that both recognises the near term prospect of overshoot and the steps to take to more than redress the situation. By contrast, Archipelagos sets out a plausible pathway forward based on current tensions, but also shows that even under trying circumstances the world may find that 2.2°C is now the upper maximum for warming. While 2.2° is not considered safe territory by IPCC, the Archipelagos outcome is well positioned at the lower end of the range of outcomes that IPCC consider, which exceed 4°C in the worst case. Archipelagos is a story of global political headwinds buffeting the transition, but not to the extent that it slows in comparison with today. Quite the opposite – the pace increases as security concerns and competition drive the system away from fossil fuels.

You can find more on The Energy Security Scenarios here, which I would encourage readers to explore. But if you don’t have the time right now, this short video introduction may be of interest.

Finally, an EU foot in the removals door

dchone March 6, 2023

As the EU continues to develop and progress legislation around its 2030 and net-zero emissions goals, one key proposal has surfaced that will be with us for decades to come. It is the EU proposal to create a certification framework for removals – i.e. measuring and certifying the amount of CO₂ that is removed from the atmosphere and permanently stored through some anthropogenic activity. Examples might include direct air capture with geological storage (DACCS) or reforesting an otherwise barren land area (nature base solution or NBS). The proposal includes the very clear reason why it is needed;

The European Climate Law provides for the EU to become climate neutral by 2050. This requires that GHG emissions are significantly reduced, and that the unavoidable emissions and removals should be balanced within the European Union at the latest by 2050, with the aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter. To achieve this objective, both natural ecosystems and industrial activities should contribute to removing several hundred million tonnes of CO₂ per year from the atmosphere. Today and with current policies, the EU is not on track to deliver these quantities: carbon removals in natural ecosystems have been decreasing in recent years, and no significant industrial carbon removals are currently taking place in the Union.

Readers of my previous posts will know that this is something of a pet subject for me and so it is pleasing to see that the EU if finally recognising the importance of removals. The need for a tradable carbon dioxide removal unit is essential for net-zero emissions, in fact it is the essence of the phrase because of the use of the word ‘net’. However, while a first step is important, time is not on the side of the EU, so they will have to move much faster.

In a 2022 post I noted that the revised EU ETS allowance decline rate built into the Fit for 55 framework would take the system to zero new allowances in 2040, but that would almost certainly be ahead of the point in time at which there would be zero emissions in the covered sectors. As such, some form of new allowance would be needed, with the obvious candidate being a carbon removal unit brought in as an external credit. That would make the EU ETS a vibrant carbon removal trading platform, creating a market for carbon removals and establishing a clear price.

But it would seem that the EU is not yet prepared to take such a step. While the certification proposal is important, it lacks one key element, a business model to encourage businesses to use it. The EU appears to be pinning its hopes on voluntary activities, or companies looking to create or acquire certified removals to use for their net-zero commitments. This will happen to an extent, but mainly at the lower cost end of the spectrum such as soil carbon projects, land use change projects and similar. These do form an important part of the EU Fit for 55 framework, but so does the need for DACCS and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS).

The voluntary market and a certification process are no match for the $180 per tonne CO₂ on offer in the USA for DACCS under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). In the EU there is the Innovation Fund to help drive technologies such as DACCS, but it isn’t operating on the same scale as the IRA. The Innovation Fund could provide EUR 40 billion of support over 2020-2030 for the commercial demonstration of innovative low-carbon technologies, whereas IRA is around USD 330 billion. And IRA has a specific and clearly defined incentive for carbon dioxide removal, which isn’t the case for the EU Innovation fund, although a DACCS would be considered within the framework. It’s therefore not difficult to guess where the DACCS projects will end up and which country will benefit from the investment. That being said, ETS revenues and other mechanisms could bridge this gap if directed more towards energy technology development and demonstration.

The EU could create demand for DACCS and BECCS on a large scale if it opened the EU ETS up to such units, recognising that they will be needed by 2040, but almost certainly prior to that as the ETS reaches reductions in excess of 80%, a point it will hit around 2035. That is in 12 years. The EU Commission may well have such a move in their future plans, but history would argue that if they don’t start now, time will defeat them. Major changes in direction for the EU ETS take at least 5-10 years to be developed and bed in. For example, the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) started life in about 2011 with proposals for a set-aside of allowances to remove the post financial crisis surplus, then came backloading and finally the first implementation of the MSR and some tweaks a bit later. In 2023 it operates very well.

Given the need for a clear market price signal, i.e. the €100 per tonne CO₂ price now available from the EU ETS, a clear set of implementation rules to support projects, and recognition that a functioning DACCS industry will take at least a decade to establish, if not more, the inclusion of removals within the EU ETS becomes rather urgent. Encouraging the use of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to facilitate carbon dioxide removal technologies is another area that I have written about and is also relevant to the EU in this context. At the moment, the only signal on offer is an indication of a review of negative emissions and trading in a few years’ time.

A chat with ChatGPT about emissions mitigation

dchone January 12, 2023

In a recent article from the World Economic Forum the authors made the point that artificial intelligence (AI) systems will be essential for the emissions mitigation task that society faces. In fact they go so far as to say that “without AI, we won’t meet ESG goals and address climate change”. In the article they refer to specific systems now coming into use, with different systems tasked with managing particular tasks within the overall mitigation journey. They conclude by noting;

Corporations that connect all their relevant data within a unified AI platform — not just ESG and financial data streams — will benefit the most. When corporations can see the entire picture and understand all the ESG metrics, only then will we produce goals that provide meaningful change and avoid the worst effects of climate change.

At the societal level, AI platforms are also starting to emerge and they are being designed to tackle a broad range of issues and questions by being introduced to huge amounts of data, such as you and I might come across if we sit all day and trawl through hundreds of internet sites and pages. The skill of the AI platform will be to integrate this data and use it to derive clear answers to questions and offer proposals for change so that progress can be made. Ideally the systems should develop insights that are not obvious to humans looking at the same data, perhaps because of the amount of data presented, which the AI system can easily handle.

Late last year one of the newest versions of such a system was made available for public testing. It is called ChatGPT and can be accessed here. To be fair this is a system that is designed more to engage in a conversation than to solve the world’s problems, but it does still draw on an immense data resource in compiling its responses. As such, I thought it would be interesting to engage with the system over the Christmas break and see what conclusions it might draw from a discussion on emissions mitigation. Note that the answers below are abbreviated, simply to limit the length of the blog post.

I started with posing a simple question;

Q: Atmospheric CO2 is now over 420 ppm. Why is this a problem?

A: Rising temperatures, changing climate, ocean acidification and therefore overall negative impacts on human health. Overall, it is important to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions and limit the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere in order to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change and protect the health of people and ecosystems.

Q: So how might carbon dioxide emissions be reduced very quickly, say halved by 2030?

A: Increasing the use of renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, planting trees, electrifying transportation and making use of carbon capture and storage: Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology that captures CO2 emissions from power plants and other industrial facilities and stores them underground. CCS has the potential to significantly reduce CO2 emissions from these sources, but it is not yet widely deployed.

So ChatGPT certainly understands the issue and is clear on the direction of travel. It also sees the importance of CCS without any prior reference to the technology by me (other than it may have read my blog posts as part of its learning), so that’s a good start. But getting it to be specific on how quickly these technologies could be scaled and how much difference they might make by 2030 turned out to be much more difficult.

Q: How quickly would these steps need to be scaled to cut emissions in half by 2030?

A: The rate at which these measures would need to be scaled up in order to cut carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in half by 2030 would depend on the current level of emissions and the specific measures being implemented. For example, transitioning to electric vehicles (EVs) and public transportation could make a significant dent in transportation-related CO2 emissions, but it would require a rapid expansion of charging infrastructure and a significant shift in consumer behavior towards EVs. Improving energy efficiency in buildings and appliances and increasing the use of renewable energy sources could also make a significant impact on CO2 emissions, but again, it would require policy changes, infrastructure investments, and the deployment of new technologies. Planting trees and implementing carbon capture and storage (CCS) could also contribute to reducing CO2 emissions, but these measures alone are unlikely to be sufficient to achieve a 50% reduction by 2030. Overall, reducing CO2 emissions by 50% by 2030 would require a rapid and concerted effort across multiple sectors, including transportation, energy, and industry, and would likely involve significant policy and infrastructure changes, as well as the deployment of new technologies.

From this point the conversation became rather circular, with the system continually rephrasing the answer it had already given in different ways, depending on how I asked the question. More than once it said;

A: However, it is generally understood that the increased deployment of low-carbon technologies, such as EVs, solar PV, and advanced nuclear technologies, can make a significant contribution to reducing CO2 emissions.

A: However, if these technologies were widely deployed and powered by low-carbon energy sources, they could make a significant contribution to reducing CO2 emissions.

But the system was reluctant to offer a numerical assessment even when asked, although eventually it offered a number:

Q: By how much would global emissions fall if EV production, solar PV module production and nuclear power deployment all quintupled by 2030.

A: It is difficult to estimate by exactly how much global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions would fall if electric vehicle (EV) production, solar PV module production, and nuclear power deployment all quintupled by 2030, as it would depend on a number of factors, including the current level of emissions, the specific technologies being deployed, and the mix of energy sources used to power these technologies.

Q: Can you make a numerical estimate of the likely reduction in emissions?

A: It is difficult to make a numerical estimate of the likely reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that would result from quintupling electric vehicle (EV) production, solar PV module production, and nuclear power deployment by 2030, as it would depend on a number of factors, including the current level of emissions, the specific technologies being deployed, and the mix of energy sources used to power these technologies.

Q: Can’t you make an estimate based on some simple assumptions?

A: It is possible to make a rough estimate of the likely reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that could result from quintupling electric vehicle (EV) production, solar PV module production, and nuclear power deployment by 2030 based on some simple assumptions. However, it is important to note that such an estimate would be highly speculative and would not take into account a number of important factors that could affect the actual reduction in CO2 emissions. For example, if we assume that:

All EVs are powered by electricity from low-carbon sources and replace gasoline-powered vehicles
All solar PV modules are used to displace coal-fired power plants
All nuclear power is used to displace coal-fired power plants

. . . . and we further assume that these technologies are able to completely displace the higher-emitting technologies they are replacing, we can estimate the potential reduction in CO2 emissions that could result from these measures. Under these assumptions, if EV production, solar PV module production, and nuclear power deployment were all quintupled by 2030, it is possible that CO2 emissions could be reduced by a rough estimate of around 15-20%. However, it is important to note that this is a highly speculative estimate and the actual reduction in CO2 emissions could be higher or lower depending on a range of factors.

Q: Do you mean 15-20% of total global anthropogenic CO2 emissions?

A: Yes, the estimate of a 15-20% reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that I provided is based on total global anthropogenic CO2 emissions, which are emissions that are produced by human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.

There we have it; after some pushing the AI system was able to determine that quintupling (5x) the current deployment of solar PV, EVs and nuclear power generation would give us a 15-20% reduction in emissions by 2030, although this is still along way from the 45% goal of the Glasgow Climate pact. With that in mind I asked a follow-up question.

Q: So what extra steps would need to be taken to get a 45-50% reduction in global emissions?

I was back in the same loop I had started with in that ChatGPT didn’t want to be specific on the measures. After some additional pushing I hadn’t progressed out of the loop, but one extra important insight emerged.

A: Implementing carbon pricing: Establishing a price on carbon, through mechanisms such as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, can provide incentives for businesses and individuals to reduce their CO2 emissions.

At least as a set of basic insights and discussion points, ChatGPT seems to have a grip on the climate issue, but it is far from making clear recommendations on what needs to happen, when and at what scale. That still seems to be a job for the energy modelling community . . . . . at least for now!!

ChatGPT is an open system to try and use, which is what I have done. This post isn’t meant as a recommendation or a criticism of ChatGPT, but just a look at how AI is developing.

Happy New Year!

New business models required

dchone December 6, 2022

With COP27 now behind us and no significant changes to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) on offer (e.g. from China), various commentators are now remarking that meeting the goal of 1.5°C may be in doubt. This means passing the 500 Gt carbon budget that the IPCC linked to the 1.5°C goal.

I have discussed this in many earlier posts, for example here and here. However, passing 1.5°C in the short term certainly isn’t the end of the story.

Many recent IPCC scenarios also show 1.5°C being breached, but deploying removals later in the century to draw carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere is then used in the scenario to reverse the balance and at least meet the 1.5°C goal by 2100. In the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C released in 2018, all four model pathways required some form of future removal, ranging from very little in P1 to significant in P4, depending on the lifestyle and transition pathway the particular scenario embraced and the level of overshoot of 1.5°C. Both nature based and technological removals are required. In the 2018 report technological removals were shown as bioenergy processing with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), but today we could realistically envisage both BECCS and direct air capture with CCS (DACCS) playing a role. The latter has advanced considerably in just five years.

**Source: IPCC SR15 Summary for Policy Makers**

So as well as requiring CCS to get to net-zero emissions, society will almost certainly have to consider removals as a technology to deliver negative emissions globally, i.e. after the goal of net-zero emissions is achieved. Large scale removals might also offer the much longer-term prospect (i.e. in the 22nd century) of winding the atmospheric carbon dioxide levels back towards pre-industrial levels.

While global net-negative emissions on a scale that shifts the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is technically possible, the contrast with the very limited scale of deployment of BECCS and DACCS today seemingly takes the task into the realms of science fiction. Yet a century ago the scale on which energy is generated now would also have seemed like science fiction, so the task should not be dismissed. Nevertheless, the longer term could require these technologies and changes in land use to scale to many billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide removal per year. The question this poses is not whether it is possible, but how can it be made to happen.

Carbon capture and storage has become a commercially available technology over the past twenty years, yet global deployment remains very limited. The technology itself isn’t the issue, it is the lack of sustainable business models for deployment. There is a carbon price in Europe, but for many years it languished at just a few Euros and other similar systems currently operating throughout the world typically maintain prices at levels well below what is required for CCS and therefore, not surprisingly, well below the levels required for a 1.5°C transition. Bespoke CCS deployment policies are almost non-existent outside the United States. In the USA a specific tax-credit mechanism exists at the Federal level and the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard will allow the use of credits based on DACCS. As a result the USA is the global leader in CCS deployment and the pipeline of projects looks impressive, largely based on the revised tax credit available through the Inflation reduction Act. There are also DACCS projects emerging and a BECCS ethanol facility has operated in Illinois for some time now.

CCS requires a very long term business model, based on some form of market pull. Today the support for CCS comes largely from direct government grants and support mechanisms for early stage technology, but there is always a limit to such incentives. However, with net-zero emissions now becoming a clear goal in most energy system policy frameworks, a more sustainable model is likely to emerge as businesses seek to mitigate their own emissions, either due to direct policy requirements or indirect consumer preference for zero carbon emission goods and services. A balance will be found between the cost of new technologies such as green hydrogen for industry and making use of CCS in industries that continue to use fossil fuels. Society will find ways to absorb these costs over time as net-zero emissions is reached and whether this results in large or small scale deployment of CCS remains to be seen, depending on the relative costs between competing pathways.

But the next stage of the CCS journey, possibly commencing as early as the 2040s for some, will be to deliver net-negative emissions via DACCS and BECCS, i.e. drawdown of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. While this may seem like a long way off, the history of creating basic CCS business models points to the need for an early start. The journey probably commences at the UNFCCC level, where a framework for net-negative emissions would need to be established including a global goal, some form of burden sharing agreement between nations and a discussion on the role of nature versus the role of technological drawdown solutions. Unfortunately, with history as a guide, this could take some time. But perhaps the bigger challenge will be for national governments to cascade the need into the economy and find ways to spread the cost of net-negative emissions across society within goods and services and even through taxation. This may not be popular given the net cost of the task, yet with no immediate tangible benefit. Imposing deep emission reduction goals is still proving to be a difficult task in some economies today, let alone asking the population to pay for atmospheric drawdown of carbon dioxide. However, the very long term benefit can be measured in practical terms, such as avoiding metres of sea level rise.

With the prospect of a 1.5°C overshoot scenario looking likely, future biological and geological storage of atmospheric carbon dioxide becomes essential. This task may lead to the development of huge industries engaged in such activities, or very little activity at all, depending on the policy frameworks and business models that emerge.

And just like that, zero emissions looms

dchone October 14, 2022

Some time ago I posted a discussion on the allowance decline within EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), with no new allowances available after 2058 based on the proposed linear rate of decline of 2.2% each year, but assuming that this would be brought forwards to 2050. Back in early 2020 the EU was in the first stage of laying out its ambition for the 2020s and I noted then;

Based on a continuation of the EU ETS under the current trajectory it won’t reach zero until the late 2050s. . . . Under a revised EU ETS, from January 1st 2050 (or perhaps 2051) there will be no further allocation of allowances, either by auction or freely given. Yet this may not be a time in which there are no emissions – thirty years is possibly insufficient time for the complete turnover of everything in the large emitters system.

A great deal of water has passed under the bridge since then and today as we look at the EU ETS, a radically different picture emerges. The EU has announced its Fit for 55 package and as part of that has also announced a significant change for the EU ETS. Notably, they have said;

In phase 4 of the EU ETS (2021-2030), the cap on emissions continues to decrease annually at an increased annual linear reduction factor of 2.2%. The Union-wide cap for 2021 from stationary installations is fixed at 1,571,583,007 allowances. The annual reduction corresponding to the linear reduction factor is 43,003,515 allowances. . . . . The Commission is proposing a new target to reduce emissions from the EU ETS sectors by 61% by 2030, compared to 2005 levels. This represents an increase of 18 percentage points compared to the -43% target under the existing legislation. To reach this target, the Commission proposes a one-off reduction of the overall emissions cap by 117 million allowances (‘re-basing’), and a steeper annual emissions reduction of 4.2% (instead of 2.2% per year under the current system).

The above is more easily viewed graphically and is shown below. As previously discussed, the original 2.2% line meant that the EU ETS finally reached zero new allowances in the late 2050s, but the changes proposed under Fit for 55 bring that forwards. Note that the rebasing proposal is a one-off reduction of 117 million allowances to bring the cap in line with a pathway that would have materialised if the 4.2% reduction factor would have been applied from 2021 onwards, but the chart below shows the new line as continuous from 2021.

The market doesn’t currently know what the plans are for post 2030 when annual allowance allocation will be around 800 million tonnes, but if the 4.2% linear reduction factor continues, then new allowance allocation will cease in 2041. That would bring the date for zero allocation forwards 17 years from the current 2.2% reduction factor line.

Zero emissions for the ETS sectors (power generation, industry, aviation and soon to include marine) in 2040 is incredibly ambitious and I could argue with some certainty that those same sectors won’t be emissions free in that time. There is no doubt that significant progress will have been made, but the idea that every plane will run on 100% sustainable aviation fuel or a new fuel, e.g. hydrogen, or that every cement plant will incorporate carbon capture and storage in just 18 years is unlikely. As such, the Commission will either have to alter the post 2030 trajectory or plan on a somewhat different outcome.

Altering the post 2030 trajectory such that the system reaches zero allowances in, say, 2050 may seem like the simple solution, but by the late 2020s when this could be under discussion, society may well be facing a situation where Europe both wants and needs to reach net-zero emissions prior to 2050. This would be linked with the global emissions pathway relative to the meagre carbon budget remaining for 1.5°C (now <400 Gt). In short, we will be heading for over-expenditure, which in turn means at least some regions reaching net-zero emissions even earlier than 2050. However, incorporating other sectors into the EU ETS, such as road transport, could also offer some flexibility with regards the decline rate of the cap.

The second approach is one that I have written a great deal about (e.g. here and here), but one that is still not part of the current EU ETS. It is to embrace net-zero and recognise that the ETS will need to become a platform for trading and surrendering carbon removal units against ongoing emissions. Removal units might come from within the EU in the form of units representing Direct Air Capture with geological storage (DACCS) or from outside under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The latter could include a much broader range of removals, such as the capture and storage of CO₂ from ethanol manufacture in a country such as Brazil. Whatever is included will need to be the subject of extensive consultation, but without it the EU ETS will likely become an infeasible system (meaning that the only option for emitters is to default or shut down) as the zero allowances point is approached. The earlier that zero allowances is set, the more likely is the infeasibility.

Removals are near to becoming essential in Europe and it is important that the Commission accelerates its thinking on incorporating them within the EU ETS. Removals need to form part of the system within the 2020s, such that during the 2030s the mechanisms to create them can flourish and deliver.

Refreshed climate ambition from two key countries

dchone September 23, 2022

In recent months, two key countries have sent revised nationally determined contributions (NDC) to the UNFCCC, notably my home country Australia and India. An NDC is a national submission to the UNFCCC outlining what steps that country will take in the near term (5-10 years) towards meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. Australia might not seem important in the grand scheme of things, given its small population, but the new NDC seeks to change the national discussion on climate by setting an aggressively ambitious goal for 2030. This matters because Australia has often been cast as a laggard on reducing emissions, with the pace of change in that country having broader international implications politically than just domestic emissions at home. India is of course critical given it’s population and potential for significant use of fossil fuels to grow its economy over the coming decades.

In the case of Australia, the government has pledged to reduce national emissions by 43% by 2030 against a 2005 baseline. This target is building towards a goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. The previous 2030 goal was a 26-28% reduction.
In the case of India, the government has pledged to reduce Emissions Intensity of its GDP by 45 percent by 2030, from the 2005 level and to achieve about 50 percent cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030, with the help of transfer of technology and low-cost international finance including from Green Climate Fund (GCF). Both these elements of the NDC represent increases of some 10% points over the previous NDC. This represents the first major steps by India towards its goal of net-zero emissions in 2070, as Prime Minister Modi announce at COP26 in Glasgow.

These new NDCs are very welcome news, but how do they look when compared to an overall global decarbonisation scenario that limits warming to 1.5°C? Last year the Shell scenario team launched the Energy Transformation Scenarios, within which the Sky 1.5 scenario meets the Paris goal. The scenario includes data for Australia and India which provides an interesting comparison to the revised NDC announcements.

For Australia in Sky 1.5, the period from the late 2020s to 2035 is the inflection point for a rapid fall in emissions, but the actual scenario reduction in 2030 (23% fall), relative to 2005, does not match the ambition of the new Australian goal (43% fall). However by 2035 Sky 1.5 exceeds the revised 2030 goal (45%), hence the description of this period being an inflection point. It would appear that the government has matched the stretching ambition of COP26 in Glasgow with a similar stretching goal for Australia, which is commendable. However, even at 23% in 2030, significant change is required. For example, when comparing Sky 1.5 in 2030 to 2020, there is nearly five times the solar energy generated and over triple the electricity coming from wind. In Sky 1.5 electric passenger vehicles (EV) deliver over a quarter of the kilometres driven in 2030, which implies that by the late 2020s most sales in Australia are EV. Australia has long been a leader in managing land use towards greater carbon uptake using carbon markets, but even in this domain it will have its work cut out. By the late 2040s in Sky 1.5 it is land use change that delivers net-zero emissions overall, with fossil fuel emissions taking two decades more to reach net-zero in combination with carbon capture and storage.

The shift in primary energy required in Australia to underpin such a change is profound. Solar PV becomes the dominant source.

For India, the new NDC pledges represent an important first step towards their journey to net-zero emissions in 2070. Sky 1.5 also achieves this goal in 2070, but India needs to make large scale use of carbon capture and storage to do so.

In terms of emissions as a function of GDP, the chart above translates to a reduction of 36% in CO₂ per GDP by 2030 and 43% by 2035, which places India’s revised goal of 45% as quite stretching for which they should be thanked. This is based on the GDP assumptions underpinning Sky 1.5 and an analysis of potential land use change opportunities in India, so it may also be the case that the revised India NDC is assuming a higher GDP growth than Sky 1.5. Nevertheless, to achieve such an outcome India needs to continue its economic growth while introducing large scale change in the power sector. In Sky 1.5 the share of non-fossil generating capacity in 2030 is above 50% and over 60% in 2035, which is in the same range as the revised India goal. That compares with 21% in 2020.

In these times of uncertainty with regards energy security and energy costs, it is commendable that nations are building on the commitments made at COP26 in Glasgow with real action and therefore taking steps to increase the ambition of their NDCs.

Article 6 and 1.5°C

dchone June 20, 2022

The 56th session of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice took place in Bonn over the past two weeks and one of the features of the session was further progress in operationalising Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, particularly after completion of the rule-book at COP 26 in Glasgow. But like many other aspects of the Paris Agreement and the global effort to significantly reduce emissions, Article 6 is making good progress but not rapid progress, yet it is rapid progress that is needed. My colleague, Malek Al-Chalabi, was in Bonn for SBSTA 56 and together we thought it would be useful to reflect yet again on the critical importance of this somewhat overlooked corner of the Paris Agreement. Article 6 was the last piece of the Agreement to fall into place in December 2015 and the last part to have its rule-book agreed, taking three years longer than every other part of the Agreement (but addmitedly not helped by COVID-19).

The importance of Article 6 stems from the clear message delivered by WGIII of the recent IPCC 6th Assessment Report; that carbon dioxide removals (CDR) are vital if the world is to achieve 1.5°C, the more ambitious goal of the UN Paris Agreement. This includes direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), afforestation (NBS or nature-based solutions), and bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).

Arguably, there is no net-zero emissions without Article 6. Not all countries will have the same geographic and geological ability to harness or deploy CDR options or reduce emissions at the same rate, and the majority of countries cannot expect to reduce emissions to zero such that CDR is not needed. This is where trade is relevant.

Trade underpins economic activity and offers society the flexibility to provide the wide range of goods and services that we all benefit from. Trade is often the underpinning reason for foreign direct investment. It encourages the business sector to engage in projects and activities outside their traditional base with a view to bringing goods and services into that base. Cooperation between nation states is often pursued through some form of trading arrangement.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is a tailored and comprehensive policy that can enable cost reductions for lowering emissions via trade between nations. It allows countries to work together via ‘cooperative approaches’ through its voluntary nature. An International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), University of Maryland, and Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC) study has shown that cost reductions from cooperative implementation under Article 6 can be achieved through improved economic efficiency over independent implementation of countries’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs). According to the trade models used by the University of Maryland, the potential benefit is up to ~$250 billion per year in 2030.

In addition to the direct commercial benefit, it is the ‘net’ of ‘net-zero emissions’ that Article 6 unlocks. Large scale cross border investment that would otherwise not take place can result from the development and trading of carbon removal units. This is why Article 6 is so important – it helps all sectors and Parties to the Paris Agreement reach net-zero emissions. This can be illustrated with a simple example shown below. The country and the aviation sector both have a target of zero emissions, but neither is able to realise that goal through direct reductions. A regional partner has untapped carbon removal potential, but no need to use it as emissions are already at zero. By cooperating through the trading provisions of Article 6, the end result is that net emissions of 200 units CO₂ across the three are brought to net-zero emissions.

While removals such as afforestation are well known, DACCS and BECCS have growing but still limited experience. That is why further international cooperation is needed alongside Article 6. In order to bring technologies like DACCS and BECCS to scale at an economic price and to further afforestation, cross border capacity building, joint research and development opportunities to pilot CDR options, and integrated policies and funding will also be required. This can make CDR more economically viable.

There are encouraging signs of international cooperation taking place, including countries agreeing to pilots and agreements using Article 6. However, these agreements are few and at the moment not used at scale. In order to maximize the use of Article 6, IETA has identified the following elements for governments to consider (see the full IETA paper here):

Announce whether and how the country will authorize Article 6 credits and/or accept towards the achievement of its NDC.
Provide a clear strategy and stable guidelines on which sectors, activities and vintages will be eligible for Article 6 credits.
Articulate how the use of Article 6 will help achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.
Elaborate what policy framework the host country will adopt and how it will interact with the receiving country.
Establish an effective interaction between compliance instruments and the voluntary carbon market (VCM).
Support the emergence of a widely accessible traded market for carbon credits.
Ensure a suitable digital registry or other infrastructure for GHG accounting and reporting is in place.
Address key risks in the activity cycle and identify mechanisms to reduce them.
Emphasize the areas where capacity building is required and the role of international organizations.

Article 6 remains an innovative and new policy framework which has not been globally tested and used and it is understandable why some countries and regions may look to meet their own NDCs targets domestically instead of internationally. There are many areas to align, including how to formalize reporting mechanisms and ensuring that the deals that are made between countries (either directly or through business-to-business transactions) are set at prices and in frameworks that are transparent and benefit both.

However, if countries are to reach their NDCs independently of one another, it will be more expensive than working together and net-zero emissions will become an elusive goal. Article 6 has the potential to improve economic efficiency while helping reduce emissions across countries and sectors and provide access to opportunities only possible through cooperation. The opportunity exists to use it – and hopefully that can be maximized.

Article 6: The importance of the corresponding adjustment

dchone December 13, 2021

With COP26 behind us and the Article 6 rule book complete, attention should turn to operationalising Article 6 and particularly the transfer process that is detailed in 6.2 but applies to 6.4 units when they are created. There is real enthusiasm for getting 6.4 up and running, but there is also concern about the environmental integrity and inherent ambition associated with the units created. The ambition discussion emerged at the time of the Paris Agreement and is embodied in 6.4(d) which requires delivery of an overall mitigation in global emissions. That in turn has resulted in an automatic 2% retirement of all 6.4 units that are created.

With a focus on ambition, we therefore might expect greater scrutiny over the selection of projects, the baselines chosen and the verification process. Certainly these were important aspects of the process surrounding the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM). But Article 6 functions differently to the CDM, with one critical extra requirement – the corresponding adjustment. I have described this in several earlier blogs, but in short it functions as shown in the chart below;

In the example country A attracts inward investment for an avoided emissions wind project and exports 100 units to country B, which needs to reach net-zero emissions but has no further local abatement opportunities to call on. Under the transfer provisions of 6.2 country A adjusts its nationally determined contribution (NDC) accounts by 100 units as a corresponding adjustment for the sale, but then must take enhanced domestic action to maintain its net zero emissions NDC goal. In the example this comes in the form of additional natural sinks for which it has abundant potential. The difference with the CDM is that the last step would not have taken place.

The important action here, other than the investment that delivers energy infrastructure to country A, is the corresponding adjustment and the subsequent domestic actions it triggers. It is perhaps more important than a focus on the project itself.

Project verification leading to the issuance of emission reduction units (ERU) focuses on numerous factors, but the stringency of the chosen baseline was always important in the CDM. A generous baseline, for example arguing that the national alternative to wind was coal when in fact natural gas was the more likely outcome, would mean more reduction units being issued and a potentially larger carbon trading income for the project. But it also meant more units being sold into the international market, possibly undermining global ambition.

In the Article 6 process, a generous project baseline may result in an ‘own goal’ of sorts. When a project is set up under Article 6.4 it creates an economic incentive for the project in the form of carbon unit income, but at the same time it creates an economic liability for the host country due to the additional domestic actions that must be taken to balance the NDC. How governments ultimately deal with this liability remains to be seen, but allowing excessive credit issuance will likely be a non-starter as this will simply deepen the national liability to balance the sale made.

For quantified NDCs the corresponding adjustment rule is as follows;

Each participating Party with an NDC measured in t CO₂ eq shall apply corresponding adjustments pursuant to paragraph 7 above, resulting in an emissions balance as referred to in decision 18/CMA.1, annex, paragraph 77(d)(ii) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, reported pursuant to paragraph 23 of this guidance, for each year, by applying corresponding adjustments in the following manner to the anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks from the sectors and GHGs covered by its NDC consistently with this chapter and relevant future decisions of the CMA:

Adding the quantity of ITMOs authorized and first transferred, for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes occurred pursuant to paragraph 7 above;
Subtracting the quantity of ITMOs used pursuant to paragraph 7 above for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes are used towards the implementation and achievement of the NDC, ensuring that the mitigation outcomes are used within the same NDC implementation period as when they occurred.

The above offers a very transparent approach to the adjustment, but of course not every country will have a quantified NDC. Where the basis of an NDC is policies and measures, then the rule shifts;

. . . to the anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks for those emission or sink categories affected by the implementation of the cooperative approach and its mitigation activities and by those policies and measures that include the implementation of the cooperative approach and its mitigation activities . . . .

Adding the quantity of ITMOs authorized and first transferred, for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes occurred, pursuant to paragraph 7 above;
Subtracting the quantity of ITMOs used pursuant to paragraph 7 above for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes are used towards the implementation and achievement of the NDC, ensuring that the mitigation outcomes are used within the same NDC implementation period as when they occurred.

Emissions accounting and corresponding adjustments on the above basis is more challenging than via explicit carbon budgets and may not be purely quantitative in nature in that a qualitive decision will need to be made in defining the scope of the categories and activities affected. Over time we may see Article 6 being a catalyst for change in NDC structure, with countries that wish to attract project investment and engage in ERU export shifting to quantified NDC and the transparency that they bring. This gives greater certainty to receiving countries that the transaction has not somehow increased global emissions. Ultimately that puts the world on course for more rigorous carbon budget management, which is where we need to be to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Arguably the environmental integrity of Article 6 sits more with the corresponding adjustment than with the project itself and its verification. Provided the adjustment is transparent and the change is balanced by other actions by the host country, then the integrity of the project is less important than would otherwise be the case. It may transpire that receiving countries accept units more on the basis of how the corresponding adjustment is executed than on the precise baseline and emission reductions achieved by the project. It also means that verifiers may need to shift their approach from local analysis of a project to a broader look at the NDC, its reporting and the way in which the host country counts emissions.

The last chance COP? Some more carbon budget maths!

dchone November 1, 2021

With world leaders and thousands of delegates and observers meeting in Glasgow for COP26, there is much talk of this being the last chance to save 1.5°C. It wouldn’t be the first time a COP has been described as the last chance we have, but in the case of COP26 and 1.5°C, it is a fair assessment of the situation. It all rests on the available carbon budget which I discussed in a recent post.

In the August 2021 6th Assessment Report from IPCC WGI, the carbon budget analysis for 1.5°C was published, as shown in the table below.

Estimates of historical CO₂ emissions and remaining carbon budgets (Source: IPCC)

In its recent NZE 2050 scenario, the IEA used the mid range figure of 500 Gt from 1.1.2020 as the carbon budget for the analysis, although we should recognise that for a greater degree of certainty of not exceeding 1.5°C a lower number is more desirable. But we are two years on from the baseline of 1.1.2020 with cumulative carbon dioxide emissions since that time of some 80 Gt, so from 1.1.2022 which is now just a few weeks away, the carbon budget for 1.5°C is closer to 400 Gt. This sits against global annual carbon dioxide emissions of over 40 Gt, comprising 33 Gt from fossil fuel use, 3 Gt from the calcination of limestone for cement manufacture and 6 Gt as a result of land use change practices, which includes ongoing deforestation.

So with at most 400 Gt of remaining budget and it diminishing by 1 Gt every 9 days (so 1.5 Gt while COP26 is on), the challenge facing the conference is huge. 2021 (originally 2020 in the Paris Agreement but delayed due to COVID-19) is the year in which countries are asked through the Paris Agreement to reassess their initial Nationally Determined Contributions and to increase ambition in light of the prevailing science. Indeed, that process is well underway and a quick look at the UNFCCC NDC Registry will show many new submissions, with more appearing each day.

A quick analysis of the NDCs reveals that in the 2020s global society is likely to consume much of the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C, which implies that the temperature goal is breached soon after the decade is over (although it may be some years after that the IPCC and WMO confirm this). Just ten medium to large emitting countries account for some 200 Gt in the 2020s, based on the emissions pathways they have announced through their existing or revised NDCs and assuming that these are delivered. That list includes China, the USA, India, the EU, Australia, the UK, Canada, Korea, Japan and Russia. These ten make up about two thirds of current global energy system emissions. China is the largest, with emissions currently around 10 Gt per year. Their revised NDC was submitted last week and brings forward their peaking of emissions to ‘before 2030’. I have assumed that their emissions plateau now, then being falling in 2027 and drop to 9 Gt per year by 2030.

Most of the countries outside my ten, albeit not all, either have modest current emissions and are therefore likely to see short term increases as development continues, or at best will plateau at their current levels. This includes Brazil, Indonesia and all of the African (1.3 Gt energy emissions in 2019) and Middle East (2.1 Gt energy emissions in 2019) countries. The 10+ Gt per year for nine years that these countries represent is around 100+ Gt, so that takes the total to 300+ Gt. Add to this international aviation and marine bunkers over a decade and another 15-20 Gt of the budget is consumed. The total by 2030 is therefore becoming perilously close to 400 Gt and will certainly exceed the tighter 67% and 83% numbers in the table above. At best the NDCs might see carbon dioxide emissions at around 30 Gt per year by 2030, with a remaining budget of 60-80 Gt going into the 2030s and beyond.

While there is a very strong focus at COP26 on net-zero emissions in 2050, the real challenge for 1.5°C is within this decade. The next round of NDCs won’t be submitted until 2025 if the Paris schedule is maintained, by which time another 160-200 Gt of carbon dioxide could have been emitted based on a global plateau at current levels. This really will be too late to make changes for 1.5°C, so it has to be in 2021 with COP26 acting as the catalyst for change.

Article 6 at COP26

dchone October 11, 2021

My home country, Australia, seems to reside permanently in the international climate doghouse, but a closer look reveals that they have made steady progress on some of the less advertised fronts related to mitigation. This was highlighted again recently when the government’s Energy and Emissions Reduction Minister Angus Taylor announced that carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects would be eligible for emission reduction credits.

This might seem like a distraction to some, but Australia has been forging a clear path towards growing its carbon removal capacity for some years now. The Federal Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) has long targeted opportunities in soil carbon, forest management and reforestation and now CCS is added to the list. Short of a miracle in energy technology development and deployment, the current mechanisms for energy supply do not hold within them a net-zero emissions solution available within 30 years, so it is only through the addition of direct carbon dioxide management in the form of removals that the goal of the Paris Agreement can be met. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem to be widely appreciated, with the exception of the United States and their 45Q tax incentives for CCS, Canada with their early demonstration projects and Australia with its behemoth Gorgon CCS project, creation of the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute and domestic focus on removals. Other countries are now scrambling to establish similar initiatives, but are somewhat lagging.

The case for CCS and carbon removals is an easy one to make – it emerges from any credible analysis of the energy system that accounts for likely future energy demand, real world deployment rates and the expected fossil fuel legacy that will persist into the 22^nd century even as significant reductions in use are made. Depending on assumptions, removals can stretch to a trillion tonnes of carbon dioxide over the course of the century. It is only in a scenario with a very constrained future energy demand that removals become less important, but still don’t disappear. The chart below, which I have posted before, shows the four IPCC 1.5°C archetype scenarios (P1, a high sustainability consciousness develops across society, to P4, a technology driven society with high energy demand and technical solutions to environmental issues) and the Shell Sky 1.5 scenario – all require carbon removals. In the P1 scenario sink use is quite low, highlighted by an end to land based anthropogenic emissions and the subsequent development of the land as an enhanced sink from mid-century on, at about 5 Gt per year drawdown of carbon dioxide. P1 makes no use of geological storage. By contrast, the P4 scenario makes very extensive use of geological sinks with BECCS playing a substantial role even as land based emissions are eventually reigned in.

So how does all the above relate to COP26? Of course ambition is very much on the agenda and removals are required to deliver on that ambition, but so are many other steps. However, one of the features of carbon removals is that they will likely have to emerge through cooperative action between governments. Remaining emissions and the availability of removal sinks probably won’t exist in the same geographies, so a global trade in emission sinks will need to emerge. This would happen under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which still remains as unfinished business after the rulebook negotiations at COP24 in Katowice. Article 6 establishes a framework for cooperative action between countries in realizing their NDCs, which includes trading carbon units across borders.

The charts below illustrate how a standstill in global emissions (at 300 units in the illustration) is brought to net-zero through cooperative action between governments and the aviation sector. Large scale cross border investment results from the development and trading of carbon units, including removals, that would otherwise not take place. This is why Article 6 is so important – it helps all sectors and Parties to the Paris Agreement reach net-zero emissions.

While the UK Government has many ambitious plans for COP26, and Article 6 is certainly among them, I believe that agreement on the Article 6 rulebook is the most important outcome needed from Glasgow. Apart from its future value to society, an agreement on this difficult piece of rule-making would demonstrate that countries can work together to achieve an outcome that may not be in their immediate self-interest. Article 6 brings a rigour to emissions reporting and accounting that we must have for net-zero emissions. It introduces concepts such as carbon budgets and emissions inventory adjustments for trade to take place, which progressively caps the emissions of nationally determined contributions and forces them towards exact quantification, rather than narrative description. Of course nations aren’t required to use Article 6, it’s voluntary, but once they choose to they must also choose accounting rigour.

After the failure to agree on the Article 6 rule-book at Katowice, great progress was made at COP25 in Madrid, but final agreement still wasn’t possible. Nevertheless, a text emerged that would do the job, although it was entirely bracketed. But the text did capture the key elements that are required for Article 6 to function;

Removals specifically referenced.
A simple but robust approach for adjusting nationally determined contributions (NDC – the national plan for emissions reduction and adaptation put forward by a country) when an Article 6 transfer takes place.
A centralized accounting and reporting platform, with a clear focus on the avoidance of double counting of mitigation actions.
The creation of a supervisory body for the 6.4 mechanism.
Specifications for the design of a 6.4 activity and subsequent issuance of associated emission reduction units.
An approach to meet the requirements for adaptation funding required under 6.6 of the Paris Agreement.
A transition arrangement for ending the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM has left several countries holding project carbon units that they are keen to monetize so as to support the underlying internal project investment.
A simple framework giving some structure to Article 6.8, the non-market approach cooperation.

Nevertheless, some disagreement between countries remains and these issue will need to be resolved in Glasgow.

There is a set of issues related to the scope of an NDC and whether some activities that are in addition to the NDC and involved in a transfer should be subjected to the same adjustments as the Madrid text outlines. This feels like a distraction for two reasons; the NDCs should rapidly expand to cover all activities within an economy and if there are activities still not covered by the NDC, they have no place under Article 6 anyway as this provision of the Paris Agreement is about cooperation to achieve NDCs.

Another tough issue has been the need to give meaning and substance to 6.4 (d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions. The proposal in the Madrid text is to cancel a portion of the emission reduction units issued to the 6.4 activity, but this is unnecessarily punitive. It also risks pushing all activities into simple 6.2 transfers, which would undermine the whole purpose of having a project based mechanism which is more suited to many countries. The discussions in Glasgow simply need to recognize that, by definition, a 6.4 activity and related transfer with NDC adjustments always results in an overall reduction in global emissions. This is illustrated in the diagrams above and is the inherent purpose of an emissions trading structure.

Finally, there is the lingering problem of how best to wind up the CDM and what then becomes of the projects still delivering reductions and the legacy unused CERs sitting in registry accounts. For projects that continue to deliver reductions, the answer seems straightforward – they continue to operate, produce CERs and these are transferred under the provisions of 6.2, which ensures corresponding adjustments to NDCs. In the case of legacy units, I think the IPCC have answered the question, both in the 2018 SR15 and the 2021 AR6 reports. Both reports show that the temperature rise is now around 1.2°C and both offer a carbon budget requirement from 1.1.2018 and 1.1.2020 respectively to ensure that 1.5°C isn’t passed. By rebasing the climate issue in 2020 (in the case of AR6), anything that happened before that is now irrelevant in that it is part of the 1.2°C baseline. The carbon budget they developed has subsequently informed Parties on their NDC requirements and is already being used by the UNFCCC to assess the NDC gap . Adding pre-2020 units to current mitigation activities is simply undermining the carbon budget calculation.

With an agreement hopefully reached on Article 6 in Glasgow, the spotlight will then turn to national governments to open up the possibility of cooperative arrangements. This could come through linking of trading systems, opening up trading systems to external units and encouraging the private sector to develop mitigation projects through Article 6.4. Importantly, governments should also follow the lead of Australia and develop protocols for removals, as these are the units that will be in particular demand as net-zero emission goals and targets need to be met. Europe, in particular, will need to accelerate its removals thinking, an area where it is lagging in its mitigation efforts.

On to Glasgow!