Category: NDC

Refreshed climate ambition from two key countries

dchone September 23, 2022

In recent months, two key countries have sent revised nationally determined contributions (NDC) to the UNFCCC, notably my home country Australia and India. An NDC is a national submission to the UNFCCC outlining what steps that country will take in the near term (5-10 years) towards meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. Australia might not seem important in the grand scheme of things, given its small population, but the new NDC seeks to change the national discussion on climate by setting an aggressively ambitious goal for 2030. This matters because Australia has often been cast as a laggard on reducing emissions, with the pace of change in that country having broader international implications politically than just domestic emissions at home. India is of course critical given it’s population and potential for significant use of fossil fuels to grow its economy over the coming decades.

In the case of Australia, the government has pledged to reduce national emissions by 43% by 2030 against a 2005 baseline. This target is building towards a goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. The previous 2030 goal was a 26-28% reduction.
In the case of India, the government has pledged to reduce Emissions Intensity of its GDP by 45 percent by 2030, from the 2005 level and to achieve about 50 percent cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030, with the help of transfer of technology and low-cost international finance including from Green Climate Fund (GCF). Both these elements of the NDC represent increases of some 10% points over the previous NDC. This represents the first major steps by India towards its goal of net-zero emissions in 2070, as Prime Minister Modi announce at COP26 in Glasgow.

These new NDCs are very welcome news, but how do they look when compared to an overall global decarbonisation scenario that limits warming to 1.5°C? Last year the Shell scenario team launched the Energy Transformation Scenarios, within which the Sky 1.5 scenario meets the Paris goal. The scenario includes data for Australia and India which provides an interesting comparison to the revised NDC announcements.

For Australia in Sky 1.5, the period from the late 2020s to 2035 is the inflection point for a rapid fall in emissions, but the actual scenario reduction in 2030 (23% fall), relative to 2005, does not match the ambition of the new Australian goal (43% fall). However by 2035 Sky 1.5 exceeds the revised 2030 goal (45%), hence the description of this period being an inflection point. It would appear that the government has matched the stretching ambition of COP26 in Glasgow with a similar stretching goal for Australia, which is commendable. However, even at 23% in 2030, significant change is required. For example, when comparing Sky 1.5 in 2030 to 2020, there is nearly five times the solar energy generated and over triple the electricity coming from wind. In Sky 1.5 electric passenger vehicles (EV) deliver over a quarter of the kilometres driven in 2030, which implies that by the late 2020s most sales in Australia are EV. Australia has long been a leader in managing land use towards greater carbon uptake using carbon markets, but even in this domain it will have its work cut out. By the late 2040s in Sky 1.5 it is land use change that delivers net-zero emissions overall, with fossil fuel emissions taking two decades more to reach net-zero in combination with carbon capture and storage.

The shift in primary energy required in Australia to underpin such a change is profound. Solar PV becomes the dominant source.

For India, the new NDC pledges represent an important first step towards their journey to net-zero emissions in 2070. Sky 1.5 also achieves this goal in 2070, but India needs to make large scale use of carbon capture and storage to do so.

In terms of emissions as a function of GDP, the chart above translates to a reduction of 36% in CO₂ per GDP by 2030 and 43% by 2035, which places India’s revised goal of 45% as quite stretching for which they should be thanked. This is based on the GDP assumptions underpinning Sky 1.5 and an analysis of potential land use change opportunities in India, so it may also be the case that the revised India NDC is assuming a higher GDP growth than Sky 1.5. Nevertheless, to achieve such an outcome India needs to continue its economic growth while introducing large scale change in the power sector. In Sky 1.5 the share of non-fossil generating capacity in 2030 is above 50% and over 60% in 2035, which is in the same range as the revised India goal. That compares with 21% in 2020.

In these times of uncertainty with regards energy security and energy costs, it is commendable that nations are building on the commitments made at COP26 in Glasgow with real action and therefore taking steps to increase the ambition of their NDCs.

Article 6 and 1.5°C

dchone June 20, 2022

The 56th session of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice took place in Bonn over the past two weeks and one of the features of the session was further progress in operationalising Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, particularly after completion of the rule-book at COP 26 in Glasgow. But like many other aspects of the Paris Agreement and the global effort to significantly reduce emissions, Article 6 is making good progress but not rapid progress, yet it is rapid progress that is needed. My colleague, Malek Al-Chalabi, was in Bonn for SBSTA 56 and together we thought it would be useful to reflect yet again on the critical importance of this somewhat overlooked corner of the Paris Agreement. Article 6 was the last piece of the Agreement to fall into place in December 2015 and the last part to have its rule-book agreed, taking three years longer than every other part of the Agreement (but addmitedly not helped by COVID-19).

The importance of Article 6 stems from the clear message delivered by WGIII of the recent IPCC 6th Assessment Report; that carbon dioxide removals (CDR) are vital if the world is to achieve 1.5°C, the more ambitious goal of the UN Paris Agreement. This includes direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), afforestation (NBS or nature-based solutions), and bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).

Arguably, there is no net-zero emissions without Article 6. Not all countries will have the same geographic and geological ability to harness or deploy CDR options or reduce emissions at the same rate, and the majority of countries cannot expect to reduce emissions to zero such that CDR is not needed. This is where trade is relevant.

Trade underpins economic activity and offers society the flexibility to provide the wide range of goods and services that we all benefit from. Trade is often the underpinning reason for foreign direct investment. It encourages the business sector to engage in projects and activities outside their traditional base with a view to bringing goods and services into that base. Cooperation between nation states is often pursued through some form of trading arrangement.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is a tailored and comprehensive policy that can enable cost reductions for lowering emissions via trade between nations. It allows countries to work together via ‘cooperative approaches’ through its voluntary nature. An International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), University of Maryland, and Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC) study has shown that cost reductions from cooperative implementation under Article 6 can be achieved through improved economic efficiency over independent implementation of countries’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs). According to the trade models used by the University of Maryland, the potential benefit is up to ~$250 billion per year in 2030.

In addition to the direct commercial benefit, it is the ‘net’ of ‘net-zero emissions’ that Article 6 unlocks. Large scale cross border investment that would otherwise not take place can result from the development and trading of carbon removal units. This is why Article 6 is so important – it helps all sectors and Parties to the Paris Agreement reach net-zero emissions. This can be illustrated with a simple example shown below. The country and the aviation sector both have a target of zero emissions, but neither is able to realise that goal through direct reductions. A regional partner has untapped carbon removal potential, but no need to use it as emissions are already at zero. By cooperating through the trading provisions of Article 6, the end result is that net emissions of 200 units CO₂ across the three are brought to net-zero emissions.

While removals such as afforestation are well known, DACCS and BECCS have growing but still limited experience. That is why further international cooperation is needed alongside Article 6. In order to bring technologies like DACCS and BECCS to scale at an economic price and to further afforestation, cross border capacity building, joint research and development opportunities to pilot CDR options, and integrated policies and funding will also be required. This can make CDR more economically viable.

There are encouraging signs of international cooperation taking place, including countries agreeing to pilots and agreements using Article 6. However, these agreements are few and at the moment not used at scale. In order to maximize the use of Article 6, IETA has identified the following elements for governments to consider (see the full IETA paper here):

Announce whether and how the country will authorize Article 6 credits and/or accept towards the achievement of its NDC.
Provide a clear strategy and stable guidelines on which sectors, activities and vintages will be eligible for Article 6 credits.
Articulate how the use of Article 6 will help achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.
Elaborate what policy framework the host country will adopt and how it will interact with the receiving country.
Establish an effective interaction between compliance instruments and the voluntary carbon market (VCM).
Support the emergence of a widely accessible traded market for carbon credits.
Ensure a suitable digital registry or other infrastructure for GHG accounting and reporting is in place.
Address key risks in the activity cycle and identify mechanisms to reduce them.
Emphasize the areas where capacity building is required and the role of international organizations.

Article 6 remains an innovative and new policy framework which has not been globally tested and used and it is understandable why some countries and regions may look to meet their own NDCs targets domestically instead of internationally. There are many areas to align, including how to formalize reporting mechanisms and ensuring that the deals that are made between countries (either directly or through business-to-business transactions) are set at prices and in frameworks that are transparent and benefit both.

However, if countries are to reach their NDCs independently of one another, it will be more expensive than working together and net-zero emissions will become an elusive goal. Article 6 has the potential to improve economic efficiency while helping reduce emissions across countries and sectors and provide access to opportunities only possible through cooperation. The opportunity exists to use it – and hopefully that can be maximized.

Is it time to open up the EU ETS again?

dchone January 20, 2022

As the new year gets going, the EU is facing much higher energy prices than it has had to contend with in the recent past, topped off with an escalating carbon price driven both by the energy price and the ambitious decarbonisation plans of the EU Commission. Starting in late 2020 at a price of around €20, the purchase of an EU allowance (EUA) in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) now costs between €80 and €90 per tonne of CO₂.

The current allowance price in the EU ETS provides a significant incentive to reduce emissions, including investment in substantial mitigation technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS). As such, this is a welcome and critically important change from over a decade of prices below €20 and a low of €3 where the system did little to encourage the energy transition. For much of the 2010s the ETS was awash in allowances, with the surplus brought about by the financial crisis and subsequent EU recession, the influx of units from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol and the overlaying of other policies in the ETS sector, a practice that erodes the need for a specific carbon price and will undermine its impact.

We are now in a world where the EU ETS is driving substantial mitigation action, which is exactly what it is supposed to do. The question that arises is what comes next? One way of answering that question is to look at a scenario analysis of the EU net-zero emissions goal, such as in the Shell EU Sketch released by the Shell Scenario team a bit over a year ago.

A deeper look at the Shell EU Sketch highlights the ambition of the Fit for 55 (FF55) goal. Even in the scenario, the reduction planned under FF55 for the EU ETS sector isn’t fully met in 2030, but instead requires another five years of effort. In addition the energy transformation in the EU is not yet fully matching that of the Sketch. Take for example the build rate of CCS facilities in the Sketch versus the real world. At the rate of change in the Sketch, some 40 major (~ 1 mtpa each) CCS facilities need to be operating by 2030 and over 100 by 2035. The EU has finally started developing CCS clusters, but not yet fast enough to meet these goals. This implies that during the 2020s the EU ETS could see further price escalation if project activity does not fully match the reduction goals of the system.

The Fit for 55 package of measures and targets is extraordinary ambitious, contributing to the global reductions required to avoid passing 1.5°C of warming and setting up the EU for a landing at net-zero emissions in 2050. It does need a meaningful carbon price to usher in the transition, but in the Shell EU Sketch it rises to around €60 by 2030 and €200 by 2050 (but on a much smaller level of emissions than today). The current price of an EU allowance should usher in real change for industry and industrial processes, which is needed, but a continuing steep up-trend may also be a sign of a system that is becoming overly constrained by the rate of reduction required compared to the rate at which projects can be implemented.

When the EU ETS first started the Kyoto Protocol was coming into force and we all imagined a world of interconnected cap-and-trade systems, ambitious clean energy projects in developing countries and a resultant liquid global carbon market. With substantial demand coming from the Kyoto signatory countries with targets and good supply from clean energy projects, the resultant carbon market would be of sufficient size to deliver cost savings to all participants. Importantly, major price spikes could be managed. Almost none of this happened.

In the process, the EU ETS was designed with external hooks to make use of the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM and Joint Implementation or JI) and to connect with other systems. With the prospect of an Australian ETS about a decade ago the EU began early negotiations with the Australian Government to link the systems, but a change of government in Australia put an end to the Australian efforts. With the US leaving Kyoto and other countries making little use of the mechanisms, the EU ETS was left as the only real buyer of emission reduction units (CER) from the CDM. So it was flooded with them, contributing to the 2008 price collapse. The EU rightly closed the doors and it wasn’t until 2020 when they were partly reopened with a link to the Switzerland ETS.

Industry will be feeling the competitive pressure and rising fuel bills for citizens opens the door to voter anger when it comes to elections if the EU ETS price continues to rise without adequate relief valve mechanisms. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) would offer some reprieve as it starts releasing banked allowances, but a longer term solution could also be found through Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The EU ETS could open itself to projects executed under the 6.4 mechanism and transferred into the EU ETS via 6.2, along with the necessary corresponding adjustments to the counterparty country nationally determined contribution (NDC). I discussed the corresponding adjustment mechanism in my last post of 2021. The transfer provision under 6.2 also provides an opportunity to link with other trading systems, such as the recently created UK ETS.

Making use of Article 6 will be a very different experience to that with the CDM. This is a mechanism that operates between two nationally determined contributions (NDC), each with its own plan to reduce emissions, but each plan must be converted to a carbon budget for the period of the NDC in order to use Article 6. The rules for doing this were thrashed out in Glasgow and can be found in III.B of the decision. When the transfer between NDCs is executed, a corresponding adjustment must be made to the respective carbon budgets. This means that the selling country must make up the amount of the sale through additional actions within their NDC, which ensures that the overall reduction goals of the respective NDCs are maintained. Under the CDM, no such provision existed.

With robust Article 6 accounting standards, the EU can have confidence that environmental integrity is preserved and that real reductions are delivered through the ETS. This was always a concern with the CDM. However, there is a fine balance to be achieved when creating a relief valve in that a sharp fall in the carbon price is not helpful for investment. As such, the EU might initially look to trade with a very limited number of countries, such as those with similar ETS structures. The UK, New Zealand and South Korea could all fall into this category.

By opening up the ETS the EU will promote confidence in international carbon trading, which will become an increasingly important part of the mitigation toolkit as the world gets closer to net-zero emissions. This is because remaining emissions and the availability of sinks to balance won’t always be in the same jurisdiction. But most importantly, a larger trading system will lower overall costs for the same reduction goals or alternatively may promote greater ambition, which is certainly needed and was called for in the Glasgow Climate Pact. This will benefit everyone.

Article 6: The importance of the corresponding adjustment

dchone December 13, 2021

With COP26 behind us and the Article 6 rule book complete, attention should turn to operationalising Article 6 and particularly the transfer process that is detailed in 6.2 but applies to 6.4 units when they are created. There is real enthusiasm for getting 6.4 up and running, but there is also concern about the environmental integrity and inherent ambition associated with the units created. The ambition discussion emerged at the time of the Paris Agreement and is embodied in 6.4(d) which requires delivery of an overall mitigation in global emissions. That in turn has resulted in an automatic 2% retirement of all 6.4 units that are created.

With a focus on ambition, we therefore might expect greater scrutiny over the selection of projects, the baselines chosen and the verification process. Certainly these were important aspects of the process surrounding the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM). But Article 6 functions differently to the CDM, with one critical extra requirement – the corresponding adjustment. I have described this in several earlier blogs, but in short it functions as shown in the chart below;

In the example country A attracts inward investment for an avoided emissions wind project and exports 100 units to country B, which needs to reach net-zero emissions but has no further local abatement opportunities to call on. Under the transfer provisions of 6.2 country A adjusts its nationally determined contribution (NDC) accounts by 100 units as a corresponding adjustment for the sale, but then must take enhanced domestic action to maintain its net zero emissions NDC goal. In the example this comes in the form of additional natural sinks for which it has abundant potential. The difference with the CDM is that the last step would not have taken place.

The important action here, other than the investment that delivers energy infrastructure to country A, is the corresponding adjustment and the subsequent domestic actions it triggers. It is perhaps more important than a focus on the project itself.

Project verification leading to the issuance of emission reduction units (ERU) focuses on numerous factors, but the stringency of the chosen baseline was always important in the CDM. A generous baseline, for example arguing that the national alternative to wind was coal when in fact natural gas was the more likely outcome, would mean more reduction units being issued and a potentially larger carbon trading income for the project. But it also meant more units being sold into the international market, possibly undermining global ambition.

In the Article 6 process, a generous project baseline may result in an ‘own goal’ of sorts. When a project is set up under Article 6.4 it creates an economic incentive for the project in the form of carbon unit income, but at the same time it creates an economic liability for the host country due to the additional domestic actions that must be taken to balance the NDC. How governments ultimately deal with this liability remains to be seen, but allowing excessive credit issuance will likely be a non-starter as this will simply deepen the national liability to balance the sale made.

For quantified NDCs the corresponding adjustment rule is as follows;

Each participating Party with an NDC measured in t CO₂ eq shall apply corresponding adjustments pursuant to paragraph 7 above, resulting in an emissions balance as referred to in decision 18/CMA.1, annex, paragraph 77(d)(ii) of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, reported pursuant to paragraph 23 of this guidance, for each year, by applying corresponding adjustments in the following manner to the anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks from the sectors and GHGs covered by its NDC consistently with this chapter and relevant future decisions of the CMA:

Adding the quantity of ITMOs authorized and first transferred, for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes occurred pursuant to paragraph 7 above;
Subtracting the quantity of ITMOs used pursuant to paragraph 7 above for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes are used towards the implementation and achievement of the NDC, ensuring that the mitigation outcomes are used within the same NDC implementation period as when they occurred.

The above offers a very transparent approach to the adjustment, but of course not every country will have a quantified NDC. Where the basis of an NDC is policies and measures, then the rule shifts;

. . . to the anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks for those emission or sink categories affected by the implementation of the cooperative approach and its mitigation activities and by those policies and measures that include the implementation of the cooperative approach and its mitigation activities . . . .

Adding the quantity of ITMOs authorized and first transferred, for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes occurred, pursuant to paragraph 7 above;
Subtracting the quantity of ITMOs used pursuant to paragraph 7 above for the calendar year in which the mitigation outcomes are used towards the implementation and achievement of the NDC, ensuring that the mitigation outcomes are used within the same NDC implementation period as when they occurred.

Emissions accounting and corresponding adjustments on the above basis is more challenging than via explicit carbon budgets and may not be purely quantitative in nature in that a qualitive decision will need to be made in defining the scope of the categories and activities affected. Over time we may see Article 6 being a catalyst for change in NDC structure, with countries that wish to attract project investment and engage in ERU export shifting to quantified NDC and the transparency that they bring. This gives greater certainty to receiving countries that the transaction has not somehow increased global emissions. Ultimately that puts the world on course for more rigorous carbon budget management, which is where we need to be to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Arguably the environmental integrity of Article 6 sits more with the corresponding adjustment than with the project itself and its verification. Provided the adjustment is transparent and the change is balanced by other actions by the host country, then the integrity of the project is less important than would otherwise be the case. It may transpire that receiving countries accept units more on the basis of how the corresponding adjustment is executed than on the precise baseline and emission reductions achieved by the project. It also means that verifiers may need to shift their approach from local analysis of a project to a broader look at the NDC, its reporting and the way in which the host country counts emissions.

The lesser told story of COP26

dchone November 18, 2021

The much anticipated but delayed COP26 has come and gone, with many articles and commentary focussing on whether 1.5°C is still alive. I commented on this at the start of COP26 and although some additional enhanced NDC pledges have been made since then and there is a new goal to end deforestation by 2030, the situation remains largely unchanged. Apart from one thing! COP26 delivered an agreement on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

Article 6 was the last piece of the Paris Agreement to be negotiated back in 2015 and true to form it has become the last piece of the rule book to be completed. So why has it proved so contentious and why does it help keep 1.5°C alive?

The Article outlines ways in which some Parties can choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions (NDC), but the sub-sections 6.2 and 6.4 have been negotiated primarily as carbon market instruments, designed to allow trading between Parties, through linking of emissions trading systems and cross border investment in mitigation and removals to create tradable carbon credits. Simply put, carbon markets and trading of carbon units unleashes a commercial engine that can operate on a scale far surpassing the limits of local domestic action. It helps align the energy transition with other global commercial activities, offering the potential for lower overall costs to society which in turn can enhance ambition. Trade is a powerful tool that is at the heart of the global economy and carbon trading can serve to unlock mitigation opportunities that would otherwise be neglected. As I discussed in a recent post, a potential future standstill in global emissions is brought to net-zero through Article 6 cooperative action between countries and the aviation sector developing carbon removal opportunities in various parts of the world. Trade requires price discovery, so indirectly Article 6 helps in the development of liquid carbon markets and carbon pricing, although these don’t emerge from Article 6 itself but from national systems which are open to Article 6 transfers.

The newly agreed rules behind 6.2 are simple but powerful and importantly bring clarity to the issue of environmental integrity. Article 6.2 allows transfers between counties in carbon designated units, thus impacting the NDCs of the buyer and the seller. The buyer is able to meet NDC goals more cost effectively and the seller receives an income stream for domestic mitigation activities. This may seem like a straightforward approach to mitigation, so why has it proved so difficult to negotiate?

The rule for a transfer between Parties requires an adjustment to the related NDCs which brings with it a need to account for each NDC in carbon budget terms. Over time, this drives the Paris Agreement to operate more like a rigorous cap-and-trade system rather than a collection of national mitigation activities presented as a list of actions. With national actions based on a carbon budget architecture, transparency is vastly improved and actions are increasingly focused on mitigation rather than simply supplying more clean energy. The two may align but are not necessarily the same. With so much at stake, negotiators have been careful to get the rules right. Further, carbon budgets are easy to add up and derive a global total, which then puts pressure on the Parties when that budget exceeds the available capacity of the atmosphere for a given temperature limit. Ultimately, it may also open up the highly contentious question of who can use the remaining budget. While the Paris Agreement isn’t operating like this today, widespread use of Article 6 could accelerate such a development.

Article 6 also brings with it a mechanism to assign common units to a mitigation project, carefully defining it in terms of tradable carbon credits. These would be issued by a Supervisory Body operating as part of the Paris Agreement implementation. While 6.2 is essentially a bilateral transfer approach, 6.4 is a multilateral mechanism, introducing a notional Paris carbon currency. However, transfer of these units between countries will still follow the rules of 6.2. Article 6.4 follows on from the similar Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, but with a clearly quantified transfer approach.

Both 6.2 and 6.4 are voluntary in that attainment of NDCs can be realised without them, but when used they bring the power of trade to the job of mitigation. Analysis of the benefits of such an approach by the University of Maryland found that international cooperation under a well-functioning Article 6 of the Paris Agreement could save as much as $250 billion per year by 2030. Translating this back into the potential for greater mitigation becomes tangible and meaningful in the already very narrow window of opportunity for limiting warming to 1.5°C.

Glasgow doesn’t mean job done on Article 6, but it does set the stage for activities to commence. The onus is now on national governments to encourage the use of these mechanisms, by allowing their mitigation activities to be open to Article 6 transfers. This could start with well-developed systems such as the EU ETS recognizing 6.4 units, particularly if they are associated with carbon removal projects which the EU will need to meet its goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. Successful implementation could also allow the EU to consider an earlier NZE goal if required to keep 1.5°C in play. But given that the Article 6 rule book was finally agreed in the United Kingdom, perhaps the British government might be the ones to step up and allow Article 6 to flourish within the new UK ETS. After all, in the wake of Brexit trade has become the topic of the day in the UK.

Article 6 has been a hard won policy development, but it’s completion in Glasgow makes COP26 a success, even as some commentators have pronounced some disappointment with the precise wording of the Glasgow Climate Pact. We should thank the negotiators for their efforts over many years and reward their long nights at various COPs with rapid and successful implementation.

The last chance COP? Some more carbon budget maths!

dchone November 1, 2021

With world leaders and thousands of delegates and observers meeting in Glasgow for COP26, there is much talk of this being the last chance to save 1.5°C. It wouldn’t be the first time a COP has been described as the last chance we have, but in the case of COP26 and 1.5°C, it is a fair assessment of the situation. It all rests on the available carbon budget which I discussed in a recent post.

In the August 2021 6th Assessment Report from IPCC WGI, the carbon budget analysis for 1.5°C was published, as shown in the table below.

Estimates of historical CO₂ emissions and remaining carbon budgets (Source: IPCC)

In its recent NZE 2050 scenario, the IEA used the mid range figure of 500 Gt from 1.1.2020 as the carbon budget for the analysis, although we should recognise that for a greater degree of certainty of not exceeding 1.5°C a lower number is more desirable. But we are two years on from the baseline of 1.1.2020 with cumulative carbon dioxide emissions since that time of some 80 Gt, so from 1.1.2022 which is now just a few weeks away, the carbon budget for 1.5°C is closer to 400 Gt. This sits against global annual carbon dioxide emissions of over 40 Gt, comprising 33 Gt from fossil fuel use, 3 Gt from the calcination of limestone for cement manufacture and 6 Gt as a result of land use change practices, which includes ongoing deforestation.

So with at most 400 Gt of remaining budget and it diminishing by 1 Gt every 9 days (so 1.5 Gt while COP26 is on), the challenge facing the conference is huge. 2021 (originally 2020 in the Paris Agreement but delayed due to COVID-19) is the year in which countries are asked through the Paris Agreement to reassess their initial Nationally Determined Contributions and to increase ambition in light of the prevailing science. Indeed, that process is well underway and a quick look at the UNFCCC NDC Registry will show many new submissions, with more appearing each day.

A quick analysis of the NDCs reveals that in the 2020s global society is likely to consume much of the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C, which implies that the temperature goal is breached soon after the decade is over (although it may be some years after that the IPCC and WMO confirm this). Just ten medium to large emitting countries account for some 200 Gt in the 2020s, based on the emissions pathways they have announced through their existing or revised NDCs and assuming that these are delivered. That list includes China, the USA, India, the EU, Australia, the UK, Canada, Korea, Japan and Russia. These ten make up about two thirds of current global energy system emissions. China is the largest, with emissions currently around 10 Gt per year. Their revised NDC was submitted last week and brings forward their peaking of emissions to ‘before 2030’. I have assumed that their emissions plateau now, then being falling in 2027 and drop to 9 Gt per year by 2030.

Most of the countries outside my ten, albeit not all, either have modest current emissions and are therefore likely to see short term increases as development continues, or at best will plateau at their current levels. This includes Brazil, Indonesia and all of the African (1.3 Gt energy emissions in 2019) and Middle East (2.1 Gt energy emissions in 2019) countries. The 10+ Gt per year for nine years that these countries represent is around 100+ Gt, so that takes the total to 300+ Gt. Add to this international aviation and marine bunkers over a decade and another 15-20 Gt of the budget is consumed. The total by 2030 is therefore becoming perilously close to 400 Gt and will certainly exceed the tighter 67% and 83% numbers in the table above. At best the NDCs might see carbon dioxide emissions at around 30 Gt per year by 2030, with a remaining budget of 60-80 Gt going into the 2030s and beyond.

While there is a very strong focus at COP26 on net-zero emissions in 2050, the real challenge for 1.5°C is within this decade. The next round of NDCs won’t be submitted until 2025 if the Paris schedule is maintained, by which time another 160-200 Gt of carbon dioxide could have been emitted based on a global plateau at current levels. This really will be too late to make changes for 1.5°C, so it has to be in 2021 with COP26 acting as the catalyst for change.

Article 6 at COP26

dchone October 11, 2021

My home country, Australia, seems to reside permanently in the international climate doghouse, but a closer look reveals that they have made steady progress on some of the less advertised fronts related to mitigation. This was highlighted again recently when the government’s Energy and Emissions Reduction Minister Angus Taylor announced that carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects would be eligible for emission reduction credits.

This might seem like a distraction to some, but Australia has been forging a clear path towards growing its carbon removal capacity for some years now. The Federal Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) has long targeted opportunities in soil carbon, forest management and reforestation and now CCS is added to the list. Short of a miracle in energy technology development and deployment, the current mechanisms for energy supply do not hold within them a net-zero emissions solution available within 30 years, so it is only through the addition of direct carbon dioxide management in the form of removals that the goal of the Paris Agreement can be met. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem to be widely appreciated, with the exception of the United States and their 45Q tax incentives for CCS, Canada with their early demonstration projects and Australia with its behemoth Gorgon CCS project, creation of the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute and domestic focus on removals. Other countries are now scrambling to establish similar initiatives, but are somewhat lagging.

The case for CCS and carbon removals is an easy one to make – it emerges from any credible analysis of the energy system that accounts for likely future energy demand, real world deployment rates and the expected fossil fuel legacy that will persist into the 22^nd century even as significant reductions in use are made. Depending on assumptions, removals can stretch to a trillion tonnes of carbon dioxide over the course of the century. It is only in a scenario with a very constrained future energy demand that removals become less important, but still don’t disappear. The chart below, which I have posted before, shows the four IPCC 1.5°C archetype scenarios (P1, a high sustainability consciousness develops across society, to P4, a technology driven society with high energy demand and technical solutions to environmental issues) and the Shell Sky 1.5 scenario – all require carbon removals. In the P1 scenario sink use is quite low, highlighted by an end to land based anthropogenic emissions and the subsequent development of the land as an enhanced sink from mid-century on, at about 5 Gt per year drawdown of carbon dioxide. P1 makes no use of geological storage. By contrast, the P4 scenario makes very extensive use of geological sinks with BECCS playing a substantial role even as land based emissions are eventually reigned in.

So how does all the above relate to COP26? Of course ambition is very much on the agenda and removals are required to deliver on that ambition, but so are many other steps. However, one of the features of carbon removals is that they will likely have to emerge through cooperative action between governments. Remaining emissions and the availability of removal sinks probably won’t exist in the same geographies, so a global trade in emission sinks will need to emerge. This would happen under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which still remains as unfinished business after the rulebook negotiations at COP24 in Katowice. Article 6 establishes a framework for cooperative action between countries in realizing their NDCs, which includes trading carbon units across borders.

The charts below illustrate how a standstill in global emissions (at 300 units in the illustration) is brought to net-zero through cooperative action between governments and the aviation sector. Large scale cross border investment results from the development and trading of carbon units, including removals, that would otherwise not take place. This is why Article 6 is so important – it helps all sectors and Parties to the Paris Agreement reach net-zero emissions.

While the UK Government has many ambitious plans for COP26, and Article 6 is certainly among them, I believe that agreement on the Article 6 rulebook is the most important outcome needed from Glasgow. Apart from its future value to society, an agreement on this difficult piece of rule-making would demonstrate that countries can work together to achieve an outcome that may not be in their immediate self-interest. Article 6 brings a rigour to emissions reporting and accounting that we must have for net-zero emissions. It introduces concepts such as carbon budgets and emissions inventory adjustments for trade to take place, which progressively caps the emissions of nationally determined contributions and forces them towards exact quantification, rather than narrative description. Of course nations aren’t required to use Article 6, it’s voluntary, but once they choose to they must also choose accounting rigour.

After the failure to agree on the Article 6 rule-book at Katowice, great progress was made at COP25 in Madrid, but final agreement still wasn’t possible. Nevertheless, a text emerged that would do the job, although it was entirely bracketed. But the text did capture the key elements that are required for Article 6 to function;

Removals specifically referenced.
A simple but robust approach for adjusting nationally determined contributions (NDC – the national plan for emissions reduction and adaptation put forward by a country) when an Article 6 transfer takes place.
A centralized accounting and reporting platform, with a clear focus on the avoidance of double counting of mitigation actions.
The creation of a supervisory body for the 6.4 mechanism.
Specifications for the design of a 6.4 activity and subsequent issuance of associated emission reduction units.
An approach to meet the requirements for adaptation funding required under 6.6 of the Paris Agreement.
A transition arrangement for ending the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM has left several countries holding project carbon units that they are keen to monetize so as to support the underlying internal project investment.
A simple framework giving some structure to Article 6.8, the non-market approach cooperation.

Nevertheless, some disagreement between countries remains and these issue will need to be resolved in Glasgow.

There is a set of issues related to the scope of an NDC and whether some activities that are in addition to the NDC and involved in a transfer should be subjected to the same adjustments as the Madrid text outlines. This feels like a distraction for two reasons; the NDCs should rapidly expand to cover all activities within an economy and if there are activities still not covered by the NDC, they have no place under Article 6 anyway as this provision of the Paris Agreement is about cooperation to achieve NDCs.

Another tough issue has been the need to give meaning and substance to 6.4 (d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions. The proposal in the Madrid text is to cancel a portion of the emission reduction units issued to the 6.4 activity, but this is unnecessarily punitive. It also risks pushing all activities into simple 6.2 transfers, which would undermine the whole purpose of having a project based mechanism which is more suited to many countries. The discussions in Glasgow simply need to recognize that, by definition, a 6.4 activity and related transfer with NDC adjustments always results in an overall reduction in global emissions. This is illustrated in the diagrams above and is the inherent purpose of an emissions trading structure.

Finally, there is the lingering problem of how best to wind up the CDM and what then becomes of the projects still delivering reductions and the legacy unused CERs sitting in registry accounts. For projects that continue to deliver reductions, the answer seems straightforward – they continue to operate, produce CERs and these are transferred under the provisions of 6.2, which ensures corresponding adjustments to NDCs. In the case of legacy units, I think the IPCC have answered the question, both in the 2018 SR15 and the 2021 AR6 reports. Both reports show that the temperature rise is now around 1.2°C and both offer a carbon budget requirement from 1.1.2018 and 1.1.2020 respectively to ensure that 1.5°C isn’t passed. By rebasing the climate issue in 2020 (in the case of AR6), anything that happened before that is now irrelevant in that it is part of the 1.2°C baseline. The carbon budget they developed has subsequently informed Parties on their NDC requirements and is already being used by the UNFCCC to assess the NDC gap . Adding pre-2020 units to current mitigation activities is simply undermining the carbon budget calculation.

With an agreement hopefully reached on Article 6 in Glasgow, the spotlight will then turn to national governments to open up the possibility of cooperative arrangements. This could come through linking of trading systems, opening up trading systems to external units and encouraging the private sector to develop mitigation projects through Article 6.4. Importantly, governments should also follow the lead of Australia and develop protocols for removals, as these are the units that will be in particular demand as net-zero emission goals and targets need to be met. Europe, in particular, will need to accelerate its removals thinking, an area where it is lagging in its mitigation efforts.

On to Glasgow!

Double counting or dual accounting?

dchone September 13, 2021

With growing demand from investors, customers and other stakeholders for companies to become net-zero and/or sell net-zero emission goods and services, there is increasing interest in the voluntary carbon market as a source of carbon offsets. This is because today, very few, if any, goods and services are provided without fossil fuels somewhere in their value chain. Simply storing goods in a warehouse puts fossil fuels into the value chain, because of the construction of the building. And even looking forwards, fossil fuels will remain embedded in global supply chains to some extent for several decades, if not a century.

The voluntary market has been slow to scale over the past two decades, but it is now growing rapidly. There have been ongoing concerns related to the quality of the carbon units that emerge from it. For example, do the carbon units represent real reductions? Would these reductions have happened anyway? Nevertheless, it is poised for more growth, driven by corporate commitments to achieve net-zero emission targets. This means that the voluntary market is poised to become a critical mechanism for helping deliver global emission reductions, to the extent that a special task force was created to address the concerns and put in place practices and approaches for rapid future scaling. The Taskforce was initiated by Mark Carney, UN Special Envoy for Climate Action and Finance; is chaired by Bill Winters, Group Chief Executive, Standard Chartered; and is sponsored by the Institute of International Finance (IIF). The final report was released recently and you can find it here.

One of the many discussion points within the report is how a carbon unit should be viewed with regards actions already underway or planned within the host country for the project. For example, the report discusses the need for a future voluntary market governance body to consider whether or when it may be necessary for projects to demonstrate additionality to the Host Country’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement and the appropriate instruments to implement such a requirement (e.g. corresponding adjustments).

While the quality of carbon units is very important, some perspective on the role and shape of the voluntary market is also needed. The corresponding adjustment is a mechanism under the Paris Agreement to prevent double counting at country level and to maintain environmental integrity against the NDCs. The use of corresponding adjustments is set out clearly within Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It is designed to work at country level where a defined NDC exists and I discussed this at some length in a 2020 post and in a 2019 post.

By contrast, the voluntary market operates at company level. The same emission activities (sinks and sources) can be viewed through two entirely different accounting approaches, one for countries and one for companies. So is the demand for Paris Agreement adjustments in the voluntary market mixing the voluntary and regulatory worlds in a way that is helpful or damaging to the voluntary market?

The voluntary market is a means of channelling capital into emission mitigation projects and it measures the results of that with the issuance of carbon credits that recipients can use as they see fit. Those carbon credits have no immediate value in a regulatory world as the recipient cannot use them to meet compliance obligations nor are they recognised by other jurisdictions. The recipient simply requires them to show that the sum total of their market and investment activities is net-zero emissions. This is a simple model, but one that has worked over time, albeit in a relatively limited way.

In the voluntary world, when a company sells a carbon neutral product in (say) the UK, there are emissions from the product in the UK and this is offset with a unit that might represent a sink from (say) forestry activity in (say) Kenya. These are combined to deliver the claim of carbon neutrality by the company in question. But that forestry activity will also lead to a larger sink in the Kenya official GHG inventory for their Paris Agreement commitments, thereby helping Kenya meet its NDC. Similarly, the emissions from the product use will likewise be counted in the UK inventory, setting back attainment of its NDC.

The two sets of accounts remain in good shape without a corresponding adjustment. Kenya measures its emissions and sinks and reports them under the Paris Agreement and the UK measures its emissions and sinks and similarly reports them. Even though the voluntary carbon neutral claim used a Kenya sink in the UK, the UK inventory doesn’t recognise it as it is counted in the Kenya inventory. Rather, the UK must report the product emissions in its NDC and take action to mitigate it such that their NDC goal is met.

Importantly, the company offering the carbon neutral product isn’t a country, it reports at a company level. The UK’s emission from the product the company is providing and Kenya’s sink from the company investment are added together by the company and reported as it’s footprint, which has nothing to do with the Paris accounting.

None of this is double counting, it’s dual accounting.

If however, the UK had used the Kenya sink and reported it under its inventory for the purposes of its NDC, then Kenya would need to do a corresponding adjustment. But this isn’t happening in the voluntary market.

Further, imagine what would be required if Kenya did need to commit to a corresponding adjustment for the use of its sink in the UK voluntary market. The company making use of the unit could ask the UK to accept the unit under Article 6 and have Kenya implement a corresponding adjustment, but the UK may not necessarily want it. So then the company would have to ask Kenya to do the corresponding adjustment anyway.

The sale in the voluntary market and the corresponding adjustment would require Kenya to find a further reduction somewhere in the economy to balance their NDC, which would create an economic cost beyond that which they had budgeted for the delivery of the NDC. While the project itself would benefit from the sale of the voluntary unit, the economy is penalised, which in turn would likely require the project developers to fund the difference. This then raises the cost of carbon units in the voluntary market and potentially diminishes investment into projects. It also means turning the voluntary market over to governments, because they will rightly seek scrutiny of local developments that result in changes to their Paris Agreement accounts.

The solution is to recognise that the voluntary market and the Paris Agreement are two distinct ways of looking at the same set of emitting activities and sinks. The voluntary market offers a mechanism for people and companies to invest in the attainment of NDCs through the purchase of carbon neutral goods and services. This is a positive development and it should be encouraged, particularly because some developing countries and most least developed economies, where many such voluntary market projects lie, are asking for help to finance their NDCs. Further, in the country where the carbon neutral goods and service are provided, the process raises emissions mitigation awareness. However, it will be essential to build understanding with voluntary market participants that the activity they are engaged in may be helping other countries attain their NDC and not necessarily the country they are living in. This can also help build wider appreciation for the role of carbon trading. But penalizing the voluntary market with requirements that stem from a completely different accounting structure may not be helpful and might have the perverse effect of slowing down emission reductions and choking off an expanding flow of climate finance into developing countries.

Eventually the voluntary market may merge into a framework regulated under Article 6, but for now these are two very different approaches to emissions management. Neither has matured yet, so an early melding of the two may not be in the best interests of overall carbon market development.

An ambitious step-up on transport

dchone May 21, 2021

Last week the German government announced a step-up in their ambition to reduce emissions, with a new target date for net-zero emissions of 2045. This will bring with it an even faster transition in the coming decade to 2030, which the government outlined by sector as follows;

Sector	2019 reductions from 1990	2030 reduction goal relative to 1990
Electricity generation	45.5%	62.5%
Buildings	41.9%	66.7%
Transport	0.6%	42.1%
Industry	33.8%	50.7%
Agriculture	24.4%	35.6%
Other	76.3%	86.6%
Overall ambition	35.7%	56.5%

While most sectors have made significant progress to date, transport stands out as having not changed since 1990. The reality here is that the same basic energy service technologies are still in place for planes, trucks, ships and automobiles and that efficiency improvements have been broadly offset by demand growth, meaning no change in thirty years. In 1990 personal transport demand in the Eastern part of Germany would have been quite low, albeit rather inefficient, so the demand increase over the years would have been a factor. This is illustrated in the figure below (Source: Car ownership and usage trends in Germany – Response to the Commission on Travel Demand’s Call for Evidence: Understanding Travel Demand, Tobias Kuhnimhof, Institute of Transport Research at the German Aerospace Center (DLR), May 2017).

Key car stock and vehicle kilometres traveled trends in Germany since the early 1990

The goal for 2030 represents a very sudden and fast paced deployment of battery electric vehicles (BEV) or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (FCEV), although the auto industry in Germany is not approaching this from a standing start. Over the past few years the likes of VW, Audi, BMW, Daimler and Porsche have been developing a new range of electric vehicles and releasing them into the market. In a recent statement by the CEO of Volkswagen Passenger Cars, he noted that 2020 was a turning point for Volkswagen and marked a breakthrough in electric mobility. Last year, the brand delivered nearly 134,000 battery electric vehicles (+197 percent versus 2019). However, despite a challenging market environment, Volkswagen delivered around 5.328 million vehicles across all drive systems to customers around the world, so this represents 2.5% of their production.

In Germany, transport emissions are 95% road based, with internal aviation, barges, coastal ships and trains making up the rest. Within the road sector, this breaks down to about 65% passenger vehicles, 25% heavy freight and 10% light commercial (N.B. this breakdown is approximate based on a variety of articles and EU data sources). As noted, many models of passenger BEV are now available to purchase and this is also becoming a reality for light commercial vans and small trucks, although the range isn’t as extensive at the moment. However, it is not the case for heavy freight trucks, where some BEVs and FCEVs have been demonstrated, but commercial availability is very limited.

So if we assume little change in the 5% non-road transport emissions and large scale rollout of heavy freight BEVs and FCEVs from 2025, the heavy lifting for the transport goal will have to be done by rapid uptake of passenger EVs and light commercial EVs. The overall picture from 2020 (pre-COVID) to 2030 could look like the table below;

Mode of transport	2019 total emissions (scaled to 100)	2030 emissions relative to 2020 scale
Passenger vehicles	62	30
Light commercial	9	5
Heavy freight	24	18
Non-road transport	5	5
Total	100	58
		(or 42% reduction)

Based on the above, the deployment calculation is relatively straight forward. In 2019 the sale of passenger BEVs in Germany was 65,000 units in a total market of 3.6 million units. However, in 2020 this number tripled to 194,000 units, so we enter the decade with BEV sales at around 5%. There are some 47 million vehicles on the road in Germany with, at best, 1% being electric (470,000 vehicles) at the start of 2021. Although sales of cars at between 3 and 4 million and a 47 million car fleet points to an average age greater than 10 years, assume nevertheless that 10% of the fleet is turned over each year – perhaps the German government will introduce policies to accelerate the retirement of older less efficient vehicles. The calculation will also assume, as a starting point, that 10% of the sales in 2021 are battery electric, or double the 2020 number.

The chart below shows how the fleet emissions change as sales change. As indicated in the table above, passenger vehicle emissions need to halve by 2030 such that Germany reaches its transport sector goal. That doesn’t happen until the deployment annual growth rate of BEVs reaches nearly 50%, or a doubling of sales every two years until 2027 when all passenger vehicle sales are BEV from then on.

A deployment rate that requires doubling production every two years is a formidable task. Although EV sales tripled in 2020 vs. 2019, this was from a very small base. Such a rate won’t be maintained as numbers climb. For rapid BEV growth it isn’t just about retooling the existing auto plants but also building new battery plants, sourcing the necessary minerals for the batteries (e.g. lithium, nickel, cobalt), ensuring sufficient infrastructure is available for battery recharging and most importantly, building customer confidence in the product. Should Germany fall behind this rate of deployment, the only remaining option will be much higher turnover rates for vehicles later in the decade, but that will mean temporarily producing new cars at a rate that is unsustainable in later years.

By 2025 Germany will need to produce nearly two million electric cars per year for domestic use, which will also mean battery production capacity of some 160 GWh (assuming an 80 KWh battery for each car). At the moment the battery ‘gigafactory’ pipeline for Germany has several projects, with the total approaching this sort of scale and there are plans for future production increases. The Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI, even suggests that EU production capacities of 300 to 400 GWh could be achieved by 2025. The website Battery-News.de anticipates that the German market alone will account for more than 170 GWh of production capacity. By way of comparison, Europe currently has around 30 GWh of production capacity.This ambitious German plan for e-mobility is getting underway!

A ten year reduction challenge for the USA

dchone May 4, 2021

In April, at the opening of the White House Climate Summit, President Biden announced the United States Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for the period up to 2030, encompassing a target of greenhouse gas reductions 50-52% below 2005 levels. The US Greenhouse Gas inventory is available on the US EPA website and is summarised in the table below.

Sector and gases(Mt CO₂e)	2005	Latest data for 2019

CO₂ Fossil Fuel Combustion	5753.5	4856.7
CO₂ Non-Energy & Industrial	381	399.1
CH₄ from all sources	686.1	659.7
N₂O from all sources	455.8	457.1
HFCs, PFCs, SF₆, NF₃ from various industries	146.5	185.6
Total Emissions (Sources)	7423	6558.3

LULUCF Emissions	16.8	23.5
LULUCF Carbon Stock Change	(804.8)	(812.7)

Net Emissions (Sources & Sinks)	6635.0	5769.1

Given a baseline of 6635 Mt CO₂e, a 50% reduction in 2030 would require US emissions to be 3318 Mt or lower in that year. The 2019 data represents a reduction of 13% over 2005, so the reduction in the next 10 years must be nearly triple that of the last 15 years. The reduction seen to date from fossil fuel combustion is running slightly ahead of the overall improvement, with a reduction from 2005 to 2019 of nearly 16%.

The goal that President Biden put forward is aligned with a strategy that is designed to achieve a goal of net-zero emissions for the US in 2050. Recently, the Shell Scenario team released a US Sketch outlining one possible pathway to such an outcome. The Sketch is illustrated below (N.B. 2020 figures are a pre-pandemic view of US emissions which the US is approaching again as the recovery gains momentum).

The Sketch provides the opportunity to look at the nature of the transition required in the 2020s for the NDC. The Sketch energy system emissions in 2030 are 3440 Mt against a 2005 baseline of 6030 Mt (small differences in baselines result from different categorizations of emissions), or a reduction of 43%. While this isn’t exactly aligned with the NDC, it could be in that the NDC makes specific reference to a major expansion of sink capacity through enhanced soil carbon uptake in the agricultural sector.

Key elements of the journey to 2030 outlined for the US in the Sketch are as follows;

In 2020 (pre-COVID calculation) the US generated 3970 TWh of electricity, with 80% from coal, gas and nuclear. Solar and wind made up less than 10% of the total. By 2030 in the Sketch, the generation mix has shifted to natural gas and solar each making up about 25% of the total, with wind, nuclear and coal combined at around 40%. Notably, total electricity generation has increased to 5720 TWh, or 43% over 2020. This is in a pathway that still sees electricity system emissions at 600 Mt in 2035, the year President Biden has targeted for a zero emission system. His goal is about 5 years ahead of the Sketch.
The increase in electricity consumption comes from an increasing proportion of electricity in final energy, displacing gasoline in cars, natural gas in homes and coal in industry. Electrification is a major lever for decarbonisation. The proportion of electricity as final energy rises in a decade from 22% to 35%, breaking a near century long trend which if continued, would otherwise see it rise to 25% at most.
Over the 2020s, solar generation of electricity grows fastest, increasing by a factor of nearly 12 in a decade. The U.S. installed 19.2 gigawatts (GWdc) of solar PV capacity in 2020 to reach 97.7 GWdc of total installed capacity. With a utilisation factor of 15-20%, this could be expected to generate around 150 TWh of electricity, although the Energy Information Agency reported a total of 130 TWh (perhaps because the capacity at the start of the year was 79 GWdc). In any case, capacity by 2030 will need to grow to at least 1 TWdc, assuming some efficiency improvement in new installations compared to existing facilities. With a year-on-year installation growth of 30%, the US could be installing some 260 GWdc per year by 2030, bringing the total installed capacity to 1.2 TW by the end of that year. Very large scale energy storage will also have to deploy to support solar.
The Sketch also shows a three-fold increase in wind generation throughout the 2020s and importantly, no decline in nuclear generation. The latter becomes increasingly important as other non-intermittent generation sources decline in use.
Electric vehicle (EV) deployment is an important part of the trend towards electrification and it emerges rapidly in the Sketch. By 2030 the US will need to see 20% of all passenger vehicle use as electric, with hydrogen fuel cell vehicles rapidly appearing in the large SUV sector. At the moment, there are about 1.5 million EVs on the road, out of a total US passenger vehicle fleet of some 280 million. To reach a level of 20% EVs in terms of use, sales will need to climb rapidly from some 400,000 vehicles per year now, to over 13 million in 2030, or nearly 80% of all sales. This represents a year-on-year growth rate in EV sales of 42% through the decade.
Road freight makes less use of electricity, although it does impact the lighter end of the freight market. For larger, longer haul freight trucks, hydrogen emerges during the 2020s, with some 200,000 trucks on the road by end of the decade. This is still relatively small, but the sector is non-existent today. In the second half of the century in the Sketch, hydrogen becomes the dominant fuel for heavy road freight.
Natural gas, propane and oil are used widely in the US for cooking and/or heating in homes. Although the majority use electricity for cooking, heating is provided mostly by gaseous hydrocarbon fuels. In the US Sketch, heating and cooking in residences shifts from 13% electricity to 42% electricity in just a decade. Of all the transition tasks ahead, this may be the most challenging in that it involves convincing millions of households, individual consumers and landlords to change their behaviour, refit existing properties, invest money for the change and in some instances make use of a less preferred energy option.
While electricity already plays a significant role in light industry, this is not the case for heavy industry where very high temperatures and high thermal loads are often required for conversion processes. Heavy industry energy use in the US is currently three-quarters gas, coal and biomass and one quarter electricity. This begins to shift rapidly and by 2030 in the Sketch, 40% of energy demand for heavy industry is supplied by electricity. In addition, hydrogen is emerging, with the first industrial installations making commercial use of this fuel. While the amount is small in 2030 it could mean significant development, design and engineering of new processes in a limited amount of time. Alternatively, the amount could point to natural gas being topped up with hydrogen as a mixed fuel for industrial furnaces, prior to converting whole processes over to hydrogen based fuels.
The many changes across the energy landscape result in steep decline in the use of fossil fuels in the Sketch, with coal falling fastest. By 2030 there is a 40% reduction in coal use, a 14% reduction in natural gas and a 25% reduction in oil within the economy, compared to 2020 (pre-COVID) use.
But even by 2050 in the Sketch, natural gas and oil still play an important but significantly diminished role in the US economy. That points to the need for carbon capture and storage (CCS), both directly linked to facilities and indirectly as an atmosphere removal mechanism (e.g. BECCS). The US already has the most mature CCS industry in the world, underpinned by years of enhanced oil recovery using carbon dioxide. But an order of magnitude change is required here as well during the 2020s, with a shift from some 30 mtpa carbon dioxide stored to some 300 mtpa.

While the Sketch does not require nature based solutions (NBS) for the US energy system to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, natural carbon sinks do provide an additional lever to support the transition and the NDC also discusses this aspect of emissions mitigation. In the US, national forests cover 193 million acres, an area larger than Texas. Apart from their significant bioenergy potential, forests act as natural carbon sinks. The US could reduce CO₂ emissions by up to 300 million tons a year by 2050 through afforestation – the planting of new trees where there were none before. While new forests represent significant additional sinks, there is also potential to expand areas such as wetlands and mangrove swamps, and perhaps most importantly to encourage farmers to adopt practices that enhance soil carbon. The US NDC references this opportunity.

The rates of change outlined above are substantial, with year-on-year growth rates for several new energy technologies of 20-50%, depending on the sector. While growth at this level can be sustained when a sector is very small and this has been observed for renewable energy deployment, it becomes increasingly difficult as the sector grows and absolute levels of deployment become very large. Many of the sectors mentioned will face this issue during the 2020s. Nevertheless, the Sketch was designed to show what is possible given the right policy levers for innovation and deployment, sufficient and targeted financing and overall transition design.

Note: Scenarios don’t describe what will happen, or what should happen, rather they explore what could happen. Scenarios are not predictions, strategies or business plans. Please read the full Disclaimer here.