Archive for the ‘Carbon capture & storage’ Category

As we head towards COP21 in Paris at the end of 2015, various initiatives are coming to fore to support the process. So far these are non-governmental in nature, for example the “We Mean Business”  initiative backed by organisations such as WBCSD, CLG and The Climate Group. In my last post I also made mention of the World Bank statement on Carbon Pricing.

2 C Puzzle - 3 pieces

This week has seen the launch of the Pathways to Deep Decarbonization report, the interim output of an analysis led by Jeffrey Sachs, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and of the UN Sustainable Development Network. The analysis, living up to its name, takes a deeper look at the technologies needed to deliver a 2°C pathway and rather than come up with the increasingly overused “renewables and energy efficiency” slogan, actually identifies key areas of technology that need a huge push. They are:

  • Carbon capture and storage
  • Energy storage and grid management
  • Advanced nuclear power, including alternative nuclear fuels such as thorium
  • Vehicles and advanced biofuels
  • Industrial processes
  • Negative emissions technologies

These make a lot of sense and much has been written about them in other publications, except perhaps the second last one. Some time back I made the point that the solar PV enthusiasts tend to forget about the industrial heartland; that big, somewhat ugly part of the landscape that makes the base products that go into everything we use. Processes such as sulphuric acid, chlorine, caustic soda and ammonia manufacture, let alone ferrous and non-ferrous metal processes often require vast inputs of heat, typically with very large CO2 emissions. In principle, many of these heat processes could be electrified, or the heat could be produced with hydrogen. Electrical energy can, in theory, provide this through the appropriate use of directed-heating technologies (e.g. electric arc, magnetic induction, microwave, ultraviolet, radio frequency). But given the diversity of these processes and the varying contexts in which they are used (scale and organization of the industrial processes), it is highly uncertain whether industrial processes can be decarbonized using available technologies. As such, the report recommends much greater efforts of RD&D in this area to ensure a viable deep emission reduction pathway.

Two key elements of the report have also been adopted by the USA and China under their U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In an announcement on July 9th, they noted the progress made through the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group, in particular the launching of eight demonstration projects – four on carbon capture, utilization, and storage, and four on smart grids.

Reading through the full Pathways report I was a bit disappointed that a leading economist should return to the Kaya Identity as a means to describe the driver of CO2 emissions (Section 3.1 of the full report). As I noted in a recent post it certainly describes the way in which our economy emits CO2 on an annualised basis, but it doesn’t given much insight to the underlying reality of cumulative CO2 emissions, which is linked directly to the value we obtain from fossil fuels and the size of the resource bases that exist.

Finally, Sachs isn’t one to shy away from controversy and in the first chapter the authors argue that governments need to get serious about reducing emissions;

The truth is that governments have not yet tried hard enough—or, to be frank, simply tried in an organized and thoughtful way—to understand and do what is necessary to keep global warming below the 2°C limit.

I think he’s right. There is still a long way to go until COP21 in Paris and even further afterwards to actually see a real reduction in emissions, rather than reduction by smoke and mirrors which is arguably where the world is today (CO2 per GDP, reductions against non-existent baselines, efficiency improvements, renewable energy goals and the like). These may all help governments get the discussion going at a national or regional, which is good, but then there needs to be a rapid transition to absolute CO2 numbers and away from various other metrics.

With the USA (at a Federal level) going down the regulatory route instead, the Australian Prime Minister touring the world arguing against it and the UNFCCC struggling to talk about it, perhaps it is time to revisit the case for carbon pricing. Economists have argued the case for carbon pricing for over two decades and in a recent post I put forward my own reasons why the climate issue doesn’t get solved without one. Remember this;

Climate formula with carbon price (words)

Yet the policy world seems to be struggling to implement carbon pricing and more importantly, getting it to stick and remain effective. Part of the reason for this is a concern by business that it will somehow penalize them, prejudice them competitively or distort their markets. Of course there will be an impact, that’s the whole point, but nevertheless the business community should still embrace this approach to dealing with emissions. Here are the top ten reasons why;

Top Ten

  1. Action on climate in some form or other is an inconvenient but unavoidable inevitability. Business and  industry doesn’t really want direct, standards based regulation. These can be difficult to deal with, offer limited flexibility for compliance and may be very costly to implement for some legacy facilities.
  2. Carbon pricing, either through taxation or cap and trade offers broad compliance flexibility and provides the option for particular facilities to avoid the need for immediate capital investment (but still comply with the requirement).
  3. Carbon pricing offers technology neutrality. Business and industry is free to choose its path forward rather than being forced down a particular route or having market share removed by decree.
  4. Pricing systems offer the government flexibility to address issues such as cross border competition and carbon leakage (e.g. tax rebates or free allocation of allowances). There is a good history around this issue in the EU, with trade exposed industries receiving a large proportion of their allocation for free.
  5. Carbon pricing is transparent and can be passed through the supply chain, either up to the resource holder or down to the end user.
  6. A well implemented carbon pricing system ensures even (economic) distribution of the mitigation burden across the economy. This is important and often forgotten. Regulatory approaches are typically opaque when it comes to the cost of implementation, such that the burden on a particular sector may be far greater than initially recognized. A carbon trading system avoids such distortions by allowing a particular sector to buy allowances instead of taking expensive (for them) mitigation actions.
  7. Carbon pricing offers the lowest cost pathway for compliance across the economy, which also minimizes the burden on industry.
  8. Carbon pricing allows the fossil fuel industry to develop carbon capture and storage, a societal “must have” over the longer term if the climate issue is going to be fully resolved. Further, as the carbon pricing system is bringing in new revenue to government (e.g. through the sale of allowances), the opportunity exists to utilize this to support the early stage development of technologies such as CCS.
  9. Carbon pricing encourages fuel switching in the power sector in particular, initially from coal to natural gas, but then to zero carbon alternatives such as wind, solar and nuclear.
  10. And the most important reason;

It’s the smart business based approach to a really tough problem and actually delivers on the environmental objective.

Scaling up for global impact

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A visit to Australia offers a quick reminder of the scale to which Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) production has grown over recent years. This was a technology that first appeared in the 1960s and saw a scale up over the 1970s and 1980s to some 60 million tonnes per annum globally. As energy demand soared in the 1990s and 2000s, LNG production quickly rose again to around 300 million tonnes per annum today and could reach 500 million tonnes per annum by 2030 (see Ernst & Young projection below).

2012OGJcolors

Flying into Australia we crossed the coast near Dampier in Western Australia, which is currently “Resource Central” for Australia. The waters were dotted with tankers (I counted 14 on the side of the plane I was sitting on) waiting for loading, many of which had the distinctive LNG cryogenic tanks on their decks. Two days later the first shipment of LNG from the new Papua New Guinea project took place and this received considerable coverage in the Australian media. Clearly LNG is booming in this region, with even more to come. Most major oil and gas companies have projects in development and there are several LNG “startups” considering projects.

This is a great example of technology scale up, which is going to be key to resolving the climate issue by progressively shifting energy production and use to near zero emissions over the course of this century. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is one of the technologies that needs to be part of that scale up if we are serious about net zero emissions in the latter part of the century.

There are many parallels between LNG production and CCS which may offer some insight into the potential for CCS. Both require drilling, site preparation, pipelines, gas processing facilities, compression and gas transport, although LNG also includes a major cryogenic step which isn’t part of the CCS process.

LNG production and CCS are both gas processing technologies so the comparison between them needs to be on a volume basis, not on a tonnes basis. CO2 has a higher molecular weight than CH4 (methane), so the processing of a million tonnes of natural gas is the same as nearly 3 million tonnes of CO2. As such, the production scale up to 500 million tonnes of LNG by 2030 could be equated to nearly 1.5 billion tonnes of CO2 per annum in CCS terms, which is a number that starts to be significant in terms of real mitigation. The actual scale up from today to 2030 is projected to be 200-250 million tonnes of LNG, which in CCS terms is about 700 million tonnes of CO2.

This is both a good news and bad news story. The scale up of LNG shows that industrial expansion of a complex process involving multiple disciplines from across the oil and gas industry is entirely possible. LNG took two to three decades to reach 100 million tonnes, but less than ten years to repeat this. In the following ten years (2010-2020) production should nearly double again with an additional 200 million tonnes of capacity added. These latter rates of scale up are what we need now for technologies such as CCS, but we are clearly languishing in the early stages of deployment, with just a few million tonnes of production (if that) being added each year.

What is missing for CCS is the strong commercial impetus that LNG has seen over the last fifteen years as global energy demand shot up. With most, if not all, of the technologies needed for CCS already widely available in the oil and gas industry, it may be possible to shorten the initial early deployment stage which can last 20 years (as it did for LNG). If this could be achieved, CCS deployment at rates of a billion tonnes per decade, for starters, may be possible. This is the minimum scale needed for mitigation that will make a tangible difference to the task ahead.

The commercial case for CCS rests with government through mechanisms such as carbon pricing underpinned by a robust global deal on mitigation. That of course is another story.

For a country that has been so polarised on the climate issue and has struggled to make progress implementing effective mitigation policy, it is surprising how often the subject appears on the front pages of the national newspapers. I am in Australia for a couple of weeks visiting friends and relatives and seemingly on cue the carbon issue is front and centre of The Australian [$$] on the day I arrive. A previous visit timed itself perfectly with the announcement by then Prime Minister Julia Gillard that the country would have a carbon tax (now in the process of being repealed).

This time, the story headline is “Heartache as carbon credits turn to debt” and it discusses the challenge that one particular farmer is having banking his soil carbon credits. This may sound a bit obscure for the front page of a national daily, but such is the issue in Australia that a story like this becomes national news. Soil carbon is now at the heart of the national mitigation effort, with the government implementing an Emission Reduction Fund to encourage farmers to change their tilling, land management and crop growing practices to build up carbon in the soil. The increase in soil carbon can be converted to carbon credits and sold to the government.

EC11127_Fa

In the case of the farmer in this story, the stored carbon on his property and its potential for credit issuance is not being recognised as an asset by his bank and therefore his farm is under threat due to debt issues (unrelated to the credits). The problem the bank has is that under the current rules soil carbon credit issuance requires a guarantee of permanence that stretches out 100 years. This in turn ties up the land for that period, which potentially impacts on the bank should it end up with the property due to mortgage default.

There are plans by the current government to change the permanence requirement to 25 years, which may help solve the problem above and others like it, but in turn raises a new problem related to the mitigation potential of soil carbon. The point about carbon sequestration, whether it be via CCS, reforestation, soil carbon buildup or other means is that it should be permanent because of the cumulative nature of carbon emissions to the atmosphere. Simply reducing the flow of carbon to the atmosphere in a given year isn’t good enough if that same carbon eventually makes its way into the atmosphere later on.

While a 100 year permanence requirement doesn’t guarantee true sequestration either, it does at least shift any future release of that carbon into a time when the energy system should have substantially changed and other anthropogenic emissions are therefore much lower or even approaching zero. This can’t be said for a 25 year requirement. In such a relatively short space of time the energy system will still look largely as it does today, even if big change is underway. We need to be able to store carbon well beyond the fossil era or ensure that permanence actually means permanent.

With soil carbon now so important to Australia, these and other issues related to its implementation and most importantly, effectiveness and therefore recognition internationally are bound to continue to make news. While resource development is now the primary generator of national wealth, the country is nevertheless turning again to its rural sector to make ends meet.

In the lead up to the UN Climate Summit in September this year, the Abu Dhabi Ascent was held on May 4-5th as the only preparatory event. Former Vice President Al Gore was one of the keynote speakers and perhaps got the most tweeted line, which came in response to a question from the moderator regarding the single policy he would ask for if he had only one choice. He said, “. . . . put a price on carbon in markets and put a price on denial in politics”. In fact this is two things, but I wouldn’t expect anything less of Al Gore.

This comment set the scene for Rachel Kyte of the World Bank to launch their call for countries and companies to put a price on carbon. This isn’t the first time such a call has been made, but it is perhaps the first time such a call has been made directly to governments at a forum designed for governments by a multilateral agency linked with governments.

The call is a relatively simple one at this stage and fills a glaring gap in the UNFCCC agenda as it has been developing over recent years. Arguably the UNFCCC started the multilateral process back in the 1990s with a carbon pricing approach, in that the Kyoto Protocol is in part built around the idea of allowances, offsets and trading which in turn implies a price on carbon. Over time as the Kyoto Protocol has waned, talk of carbon pricing at the international level has gone in a similar direction. By the end of the Warsaw COP last year, all talk of markets and carbon pricing had been largely put to one side in favour of the efforts just to get everybody around the table and talking about contributions.

“Contributions” may be the political language of the day, but they will do little to stem emissions if carbon pricing isn’t core to the national effort underpinning said contributions. Some countries seem to have figured this out, but the actual price on carbon that currently prevails in those economies that have tried to create it is a far cry from anything that might actually make a difference. While the efforts to date may be a good start from the perspective of building the necessary national institutional capacity for carbon pricing, there is little evidence that governments, business and consumers are actually prepared to accept a carbon price that will deliver a tangible change in energy investment.

I would suggest that this  is where The World Bank most needs to focus its attention. If not, I believe that we may end up with a complex system of carbon markets, linkages, trade and compliance all operating at under $10, which will look impressive on paper but in reality won’t make a difference to global emissions. The acid test for a carbon pricing system is its ability to deliver carbon capture and storage (probably with some additional fiscal support for the first generation of projects). At least for the next few decades, carbon pricing below this point may put a dent in the profitability of fossil fuels, but it won’t make them go away. This will inevitably lead to one thing – regulation. That might sound like the answer for some, but the reality will be a much higher cost for economies to bear for the same mitigation effort.

World bank Carbon pricing Cliff

Betting everything on one colour

In my last post I provided a short review of the IPCC 5th AR, WGIII on Mitigation, with the emphasis on one table which showed how much more expensive mitigation will be over this century without carbon capture and storage. Unfortunately, this pearl from the IPCC didn’t get much coverage. Looking another layer down into the WGIII Technical Report, Chapter 6, the CCS case is very clear;

As noted above, the lack of availability of CCS is most frequently associated with the most significant cost increase (Edenhofer et al., 2010; Tavoni et al., 2012; Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a; Riahi et al., 2014), particularly for concentration goals approaching 450 ppm CO2eq, which are characterized by often substantial overshoot. One fundamental reason for this is that the combination of biomass with CCS can serve as a CDR technology in the form of BECCS (Azar et al., 2006; van Vliet et al., 2009; Krey and Riahi, 2009; Edmonds et al., 2013; Kriegler et al., 2013a; van Vuuren et al., 2013) (see Sections 6.3.2    and 6.9  ). In addition to the ability to produce negative emissions when coupled with bioenergy, CCS is a versatile technology that can be combined with electricity, synthetic fuel, and hydrogen production from several feedstocks and in energy‐intensive industries such as cement and steel. The CCS can also act as bridge technology that is compatible with existing fossil‐fuel dominated supply structures (see Sections 7.5.5, 7.9, and 6.9   for a discussion of challenges and risks of CCS and CDR). Bioenergy shares some of these characteristics with CCS. It is also an essential ingredient for BECCS, and it can be applied in various sectors of the energy system, including for the provision of liquid low‐carbon fuels for transportation (see Chapter 11, Bioenergy Annex for a discussion of related challenges and risks). In contrast, those options that are largely confined to the electricity sector (e.g., wind, solar, and nuclear energy) and heat generation tend to show a lower value, both because they cannot be used to generate negative emissions and because there are a number of low‐carbon electricity supply options available that can generally substitute each other (Krey et al., 2014).

Importantly, this isn’t just about the cost of mitigation, but about the feasibility of meeting the global 2°C goal. As such, you would expect that CCS should figure at the top of the agenda at a climate conference, but this is rarely the case – in fact, in my experience it is only the case when the conference is actually about CCS.

On May 4-5th, the global climate fraternity will meet in Abu Dhabi for the Abu Dhabi Ascent, the first and only preparatory conference for the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit on September 23rd in New York. The objectives of the meeting are as follows;

The objective of the Abu Dhabi Ascent is to provide an opportunity for all Governments to be fully informed about the Climate Summit, including how they can bring bold announcements and actions to the Summit, as requested by the Secretary-General. The Ascent will be the only meeting before the Summit in which Governments, the private sector and civil society will come together to explore international and multi-stakeholder efforts that have high potential for catalysing ambitious action on the ground. The Secretary-General set two objectives for the Summit: to catalyse ambitious action on the ground to reduce emissions and strengthen climate resilience, and to mobilize political momentum for an ambitious, global, legal agreement in 2015.

That certainly sounds like a conference where CCS would get some air time, but no, the agenda only includes the following;

  • Energy Efficiency
  • Renewable Energy
  • Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (SLCPs)
  • Transportation
  • Cities
  • Agriculture
  • Forests
  • Climate Finance
  • Adaptation, Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)
  • Economic Drivers

Top of the list is my “old favourite”, energy efficiency, a great way to spur economies and stimulate economic growth, but almost certainly a red herring in the drive to contain cumulative emissions over the course of this century. My real favourite, carbon pricing, is there but well hidden under the obscure heading of “Economic Drivers”. As noted, CCS isn’t there at all.

We might imagine a world of clean, efficient renewable energy and we will need that, but it isn’t obtainable today and possibly not even by the end of this century. It will take time to evolve as the current energy system has evolved over the last 200 years. But the CO2 issue presents us with a pressing problem today that somehow needs a solution. The concern is that in the casino we live in, we seem to be betting all our chips on one colour, green, which might be a gamble too far. The even money bet on CCS and alternatives (renewables, nuclear) is what is needed.

The learning from IPCC WGIII and their scenario analysis seems to be lost on those who are leading the challenging process to bring nations together to solve the climate issue. There is something almost comical about this situation – perhaps an echo from Dr. Strangelove would be “You can’t talk about CCS here, this is a climate conference!”.

The last of the three IPCC 5th Assessment Reports has now been published, but with a final Synthesis Report to come towards the end of the year. The “Mitigation of Climate Change” details the various emission pathways that are open to us, the technologies required to move along them and most importantly, some feeling for the relative costs of doing so.

As had been the case with the Science and Impacts reports, a flurry of media reporting followed the release, but with little sustained discussion. Hyperbole and histrionics also filled the airwaves. For example, the Guardian newspaper reported:

The cheapest and least risky route to dealing with global warming is to abandon all dirty fossil fuels in coming decades, the report found. Gas – including that from the global fracking boom – could be important during the transition, but only if it replaced coal burning.

This is representative of the general tone of the reporting, with numerous outlets taking a similar line. The BBC stated under the heading “World must end ‘dirty’ fuel use – UN”:

A long-awaited UN report on how to curb climate change says the world must rapidly move away from carbon-intensive fuels. There must be a “massive shift” to renewable energy, says the study released in Berlin.

While it is a given that emissions must fall and for resolution of the climate issue at some level, anthropogenic emissions should be returned to the near net zero state that has prevailed for all of human history barring the last 300 or so years, nowhere in the Summary Report do words such as “abandon” and “dirty” actually appear. Rather, a carefully constructed economic and risk based argument is presented and it isn’t even until page 18 of 33 that the tradeoff between various technologies is actually explored. Up until that point there is quite a deep discussion on pathways, emission levels, scenarios and temperature ranges.

Then comes the economic crux of the report on page 18 in Table SPM.2. For scenarios ranging from 450ppm CO2eq up to 650 ppm CO2eq, consumption losses and mitigation costs are given through to 2100, with variations in the availability of technologies and the timing (i.e. delay) of mitigation actions. The centre section of this table is given below;

 IPCC WGIII Table SPM2

Particularly for the lower concentration scenario (430-480 ppm) the table highlights the importance of carbon capture and storage. For the “No CCS” mitigation pathway, i.e. a pathway in which CCS isn’t available as a mitigation option, the costs are significantly higher than the base case which has a full range of technologies available. This is still true for higher end concentrations, but not to the same extent. This underpins the argument that the energy system will take decades to see significant change and that therefore, in the interim at least, CCS becomes a key technology for delivering something that approaches the 2°C goal. For the higher concentration outcomes, immediate mitigation action is not so pressing and therefore the energy system has more time to evolve to much lower emissions without CCS – but of course with the consequence of elevated global temperatures. A similar story is seen in the Shell New Lens Scenarios.

Subtleties such as this were lost in the short media frenzy following the publication of the report and only appear later as people actually sit down and read the document. By then it is difficult for these stories to surface and the initial sound bites make their way into the long list of urban myths we must then deal with on the issue of climate change.

Revisiting Kaya

Today we see a huge focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency as solutions for reducing CO2 emissions and therefore addressing the climate issue. Yet, as I have discussed in other posts, such a strategy may not deliver the outcome people expect and might even add to the problem, particularly in the case of efficiency. I am not the only one who has said this and clearly the aforementioned strategy has been operating for some 20 years now with emissions only going one way, up.

Kaya Yoichi

A question that perhaps should be asked is “why have many arrived at this solution set?”. Focusing on efficiency and renewable energy as a solution to climate change possibly stems from the wide dissemination of the Kaya Identity, developed in 1993 by Japanese energy economist Yoichi Kaya (pictured above). He noted that:

 Kaya formula

 Or in other words:

Kaya formula (words)

Therefore, by extension over many years (where k = climate sensitivity): 

Climate Kaya formula (words)

In most analysis using the Kaya approach, the first two terms are bypassed. Population management is not a useful way to open a climate discussion, nor is any proposal to limit individual wealth or development (GDP per person). The discussion therefore rests on the back of the argument that because rising emissions are directly linked to the carbon intensity of energy (CO2/Energy) and the energy use per unit of GDP (Energy/GDP or efficiency) within the global economy, lowering these by improving energy efficiency and deploying renewable energy must be the solutions to opt for.

But the Kaya Identity is just describing the distribution of emissions throughout the economy, rather than the real economics of fossil fuel extraction and its consequent emissions. Starting with a simple mineral such as coal, it can be picked up off the ground and exchanged for money based on its energy content. The coal miner will continue to do this until the accessible resource is depleted or the amount of money offered for the coal is less than it costs to pick it up and deliver it for payment. In the case of the latter, the miner could just wait until the price rises again and continue deliveries. Alternatively, the miner could aim to become more efficient, lowering the cost of pickup and delivery and therefore continuing to operate. The fossil fuel industry has been doing this very successfully since its beginnings.

The impact on the climate is a function (f) of the total amount delivered from the resource, not how efficiently it is used, when it is used, how many wind turbines are also in use or how many people use it. This implies the following;

Climate formula (words)

This may also mean that the energy price has to get very low for the miner to stop producing the coal. Of course that is where renewable energy can play an important role, but the trend to date has been for energy system costs to rise as renewable energy is installed. A further complication arises in that once the mine is operating and all the equipment for extraction is in place, the energy price has to fall below the marginal operating cost to stop the operation. The miner may go bankrupt in the process as capital debt is not being serviced, but that still doesn’t necessarily stop the mine operating. It may just get sold off to someone who can run it and the lost capital written off.

This doesn’t have to be the end of the story though. A price on the resultant carbon emissions can tilt the balance by changing the equation;

Climate formula with carbon price (words)

When the carbon price is high enough to offset the profit from the resource extraction, then the process will stop, but not before. The miner would then need to invest in carbon capture and storage to negate the carbon costs and restart the extraction operation.

What this shows is that the carbon price is critical to the problem. Just building a climate strategy on the back of efficiency and renewable energy use may never deliver a reduction in emissions. Efficiency in particular may offer the unexpected incentive of making resource extraction cheaper, which in turn makes it all the more competitive.

 

The EU ETS isn’t out of trouble just yet

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On January 22nd the EU Commission launched its White Paper which lays out the major components of its energy and climate policy through to 2030. This is the first major step in what could well be a lengthy debate and parliamentary process before a new package of measures is finally agreed. The Commission has proposed a 40% EU wide greenhouse gas reduction target for the year 2030, an EU wide target of 27% renewable energy by the same year and a supply side mechanism to adjust the overall number of allowances in circulation within the EU ETS.

The latter component is clear recognition by the Commission that the ETS has been awash in allowances for some time now and with a price of just a few Euros is doing nothing to drive emissions management across the EU. There are multiple reasons for the situation the ETS currently finds itself in, but one major contributor has been overall energy policy design in the EU. This has imposed renewable energy targets to the extent that further emission reductions under the ETS are not required once the former have been met. Hence the near zero CO2 price. There are two parts to this particular story – the first is the overall level of the renewable energy target and the second is the reality that transport (oil) and commercial / residential (natural gas) sectors hardly contribute to this, so it forces a much higher renewable energy penetration in the power sector, which is under the ETS.

But with a 2030 reduction target of 40% and a new renewable energy goal of 27%, is the problem now remedied?

This of course depends on how the renewable energy target is met. Importantly, it will not be imposed on Member States as it was in the period to 2020, but is only binding at EU level. This could mean that the Commission expects to be at 27% renewables based on the impact of policies such as the ETS, rather than requiring that Member States guarantee a certain level of renewable energy use and therefore effectively forcing them to enact policies to deliver such goals. But many Member States are likely to continue their support of renewable energy and may force it into the overall energy mix right through to 2030.

The worst case outcome for the ETS would be one that sees the whole 27% renewable energy goal met with explicit policies at Member State level. The chart below shows this – note that this is a simple model of the EU for illustrative purposes. Assume that at the end of 2012 EU power generation and industry sector emissions are at 2000 million tonnes CO2. By 2020, with a 1.74% annual reduction under the ETS, they need to be at ~1730 million tonnes. But with renewable energy being forced into the power generation system (although not quite reaching the 20% across the EU) and the EU easily meeting its overall 20% CO2 goal, sector emissions are below the ETS cap, which implies nothing else need be done, hence the low CO2 price. Projecting this out to 2030 with the proposed 2.2% annual reduction and meeting the 27% renewable energy goal across the EU energy system, shows that sector emissions are only slightly above the cap (about 50 million tonnes), which again implies a low to modest CO2 price. Assume further that a CCS programme is actually running and delivering 50 mtpa storage (through direct incentives) and no further action is required – so a zero CO2 price once again! The model also assumes about 30% growth in electricity generation from 2012 to 2030.

 EU ETS RET impact to 2030

This very simple model doesn’t account for the large allowance surplus that exists in 2012 (> 1 billion allowances), which would therefore be unlikely to vanish through normal growth in electricity demand, industrial production and so on. This makes it imperative that the EU also implements the supply side mechanism within the ETS, which would then remove much of the surplus through the early 2020s. Ideally, implementation of this should be immediate and also with immediate effect, rather than waiting until post 2020.

Should Member States not implement specific renewable energy policies and the supply side mechanism is active and functioning, we might just have an ETS that actually drives change in the large emitters sector, but there are two big “ifs” here. Otherwise, expect continued price weakness and probably a higher overall cost of energy as a result.

As the EU Commission gears up to release its 2030 Energy and Climate White Paper in Davos week, there is considerable discussion regarding the emissions reduction target that will be recommended. Historically the EU has been keen on multiple targets, but in recent years this has backfired, with conflicting goals and multiple policy instruments leading to a weak carbon market and a lack of investment in one critical climate technology in particular, carbon capture and storage (CCS).

For the period 2020-2030, it is hoped that the EU will retreat on the number of targets and focus instead on a single greenhouse gas target that then becomes the main driver of change in the energy system. Such an approach could help restore the EU ETS and ultimately deliver the key carbon emissions goal at a lower overall cost, therefore also helping restore some EU positioning in terms of international competitiveness.

Most commentators are expecting the GHG target to be in the range of 35 to 40% from a 1990 baseline (vs. 20% for 2020), but there is very little discussion on how that target might be structured. There are two basic approaches;

  1.  Emissions must meet a particular goal in a given year.
  2. Cumulative emissions over a period of time must be below the baseline year on an average basis.

While a single statement such as “Emissions in 2020 must be 20% below 1990” is often used to cover both these cases, the goals are very different. This is a critical consideration as the EU sets out its position for 2030, but perhaps more importantly as future goals are tabled for the UNFCCC in Q1 2015.

The UNFCCC has, to date, monitored and reported on national objectives through the Kyoto Protocol, which is based on the second approach given above, i.e., cumulative emissions. In the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU commitment for the period 2013-2020 is a reduction of 20% below 1990. This is because the Kyoto Protocol is based on allowances (Assigned Amount Units or AAUs) and that these must be surrendered for each tonne emitted over the period. This is also how the atmosphere sees CO2 emissions – cumulatively. Every tonne matters as CO2 accumulates in the atmosphere over time. It doesn’t matter at all what the emissions are in a given year, only that the cumulative amount over time is kept below a certain amount. The EU ETS works in the same way – every tonne counts.

However, as if to confuse, the Doha Amendment also gives the EU Copenhagen pledge of a 20% (or 30% under certain conditions) reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 as a percentage of the reference year, 1990. In the particular case of the EU, due to the expectation of relatively flat emissions over the period 2013 to 2020, these two goals are very similar, such that the difference issue hasn’t really seen the light of day. Further to this, the Kyoto Protocol allows for carryover of AAUs from 2008-2012 into the 2013-2020 period, so the difference is further dampened. But when it comes to 2030, big differences could show up (see chart below).

 Eu Emissions Goal 2030

 In the case of a 35% target (for example), the brown line shows a pathway to this as a fixed goal in 2030, but equally any pathway would be okay as long as the emissions are 35% below 1990 levels in 2030. But on a cumulative emissions basis, assuming a linear reduction, this is only a 28% reduction for the period 2021 to 2030.

The green line equates to a 35% cumulative emissions reduction for the same period, but in the year 2030 a reduction of about 47% is actually needed to achieve this, a much more ambitious requirement then a simple 2030 goal.

Exactly what the EU says on January 22nd remains to be seen, with considerations such as the high level number itself and domestic vs. international action being the main discussion points. But the big difference might just lie in the eventual wording (“by 2030” or “through to 2030”) and the need to table commitments with the UNFCCC at some point, particularly if the latter still works on a cumulative basis after a global agreement is reached.