Category: Industry

The pencil problem

dchone October 9, 2023

Many years ago the well know economist Milton Friedman made a short film about pencils that continues to resonate today. While the film can be interpreted as simply a defence for capitalism, which Friedman was famous for defending, it nevertheless does make a good point about the complexity of the world we live in. The manufacture of an item as simple as a pencil requires such a wide range of resources, skills, machines and knowledge that no one person could easily craft a pencil as refined as the product we can buy for not very much money in a local shop or online.

The steps to make a pencil are many, but at least the basics are outlined in this short video.

What is missing however, from both Friedman’s and the manufacturing video, is any reference to the energy (and hydrocarbon materials) required and where that energy (and hydrocarbons) might come from. There’s almost an underlying assumption that the energy is just there, available in abundance. But the complexity of the system to deliver the pencil relies entirely on a complex energy system that we are collectively now trying to change. Unfortunately a rhetoric has emerged that this change will be both simple and quick, yet neither are true. The energy system that delivered the pencil took over 150 years to evolve, and it continues to do so even without the more recent changes related to renewable energy. But the pencil that emerges has CO₂ emissions related both directly and indirectly to its manufacture, largely because of the energy system used to power the manufacturing steps, which of course is why that energy system needs to change. However, that energy system is only there because we need pencils, and other manufactured goods and energy services.

Within the pencil the most visible material is wood, which is often cedar as noted in the above video. While this is entirely natural, sourcing it requires considerable amounts of energy to fell trees, transport the logs, cut and shape the wood, then move the final wood pieces to the pencil manufacturing plant. While some of this energy is electricity, there is considerable use of diesel for transport.

The pencil lead is noted as being a mixture of graphite and clay, baked at over 800°C in a furnace. The world’s largest graphite producers are China, Madagascar, Mozambique and Brazil, so there will almost always be considerable transport involved, probably by sea using marine fuel oil or marine diesel. As well as the energy used in the mining and refining process, baking the graphite with clay will likely require natural gas. But there is also synthetic graphite as an alternative. Synthetic graphite is produced through a complex process of baking petroleum coke at very high temperatures. Synthetic graphite can have a purity of over 99% carbon, and it is used in manufactured products where extremely pure material is required, which includes pencils.

Then there is the glue. Modern wood glues are largely synthetic, made from petroleum-derived plastics like polyvinyl acetate (PVA). Almost all vinyl acetate monomer is now produced via the vapor-phase reaction of ethylene and acetic acid over a noble-metal catalyst, usually palladium. The reaction is typically carried out at 175–200 ºC and 5–9 bar pressure. The ethylene might come from an ethane cracker, such as the Shell facility in Pennsylvania which uses the ethane in natural gas to produce ethylene for the further manufacture of chemicals and plastics (like polyethylene). But along the way considerable energy is required for the synthesis process, also coming from fuels such as natural gas, but some electricity as well which could be sourced renewably.

The ferrule at the end of the pencil is made of aluminium, which is also an energy intensive mining, refining, electrolysis based process with multiple transport steps. Much of this requires liquid fuels and natural gas, although the electrolysis step often uses renewable electricity in places of abundance, like Iceland. However, the electrolysis currently requires graphite in the anode and cathode, with the anode being consumed during the electrolysis process (producing CO₂) and needing constant replacement.

Finally there is the pencil eraser, which may be made from natural rubber sourced from a country such as Malaysia and transported on ships using marine fuels. But much of the global rubber industry is now based on synthetic rubber, which derives from yet another complex chemical process. Synthetic rubber production begins with the refining of oil or other hydrocarbons. During the refining process, naphtha is produced. The naphtha is then used to produce monomers such as styrene and isoprene, which are necessary for the production of synthetic rubber. The most common synthetic rubber is styrene-butadiene rubber (SBR) derived from the copolymerization of styrene and 1,3-butadiene.

The paint used to decorate the pencil may also have various components in it derived from crude oil and the manufacturing process will require energy as well.

So far I have only discussed the pencil itself, but there is an enormous dependency on milling machines, cutting devices, refineries, pipes, ships, trucks, tanks, storage depots, roads, trains and various other pieces of infrastructure, many of which are made of steel and therefore require iron ore mining and coal fired smelting for production. And all the roads used for transport, including the final delivery of the pencil to a shop or to a home to fulfil an online order, are largely made of bitumen, derived from crude oil.

While the pencil itself is a relatively simple implement, as Milton Friedman points out it requires the cooperation of thousands of people to produce. But it also requires the operation of hundreds of different mining, chemical and energy production facilities, not to mention factories making machines, trucks, ships and other pieces of equipment. All of these run on energy and most will use coal, oil or natural gas to do so. Only a fraction have been fully converted to renewable power, although many more may use some renewable energy as part of the electricity the facility uses or the final delivery may be in an electric van. Some of the processes required to ultimately make a pencil may not yet have an alternative that doesn’t use oil or natural gas as a feedstock for the carbon in the final product.

The job ahead is to convert all of these, or rebuild them, to facilities that don’t use coal, oil products or natural gas for energy. In our recently released Sky 2050 scenario, the near 80 years between now and the end of the century sees a world largely achieve this, but at a pace of change that is unprecedented. In the Sky 2050 scenario, in the year 2100, fossil fuels make up less than 5% of primary energy demand, with a good portion of that going into products like pencils rather than being used for energy. But this is not the case at all in 2050, when fossil fuels are still about a third of primary energy and therefore emissions from their use must be managed through land use mechanisms and geological storage of CO₂. This is what net zero is all about, since zero use of fossil energy is much more a 22^nd century possibility than it is a 21^st century reality.

Note: Shell Scenarios are not predictions or expectations of what will happen, or what will probably happen. They are not expressions of Shell’s strategy, and they are not Shell’s business plan; they are one of the many inputs used by Shell to stretch thinking whilst making decisions. Read more in the Definitions and Cautionary note. Scenarios are informed by data, constructed using models and contain insights from leading experts in the relevant fields. Ultimately, for all readers, scenarios are intended as an aid to making better decisions. They stretch minds, broaden horizons and explore assumptions.

It’s climate target season, but one more target is needed

dchone July 31, 2023

One of the features of an upcoming COP is that the months prior often bring with them a slew of proposals for new global targets and initiatives. This year is no different, perhaps also driven by the extreme heat and precipitation that has been challenging the Northern Hemisphere. In July, COP 28 President, Dr. Sultan al-Jaber, put forward a proposed COP28 action plan in a letter to the Parties. Along with a number of calls for increasingly rapid transformation and improved financing for developing countries, the plan includes the following three specific energy system targets which were also widely reported on in the media:

Reach a global tripling of renewables capacity by 2030.
Doubling of the average global rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030.
A dramatic scale up of new low-carbon hydrogen production and decarbonization of existing hydrogen production to reach an overall doubling of hydrogen production.

The plan also includes emission reduction targets for the oil and gas industry to achieve by 2030 and includes a call to transform heavy-emitting sectors, including scaling up use of low-carbon hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, and carbon dioxide removal, aligned with science. However, no specific targets are included for these heavy-emitting sectors. This all represents quite a formidable ambition, but to put these three energy system targets into context the recent Shell Energy Security Scenarios provide a useful backdrop.

The scenarios comprise two different stories for the decades ahead, but both are built from the security-focused world in which we currently find ourselves. In Sky 2050, the troubles of the 2020s give way to intense global competition in a race to gain market share in the delivery of clean energy systems. Mutual interest prevails and net-zero emissions is achieved in 2050. But in the second scenario, Archipelagos, distrust, self-interest and security concerns prevail. Although a rapid transition takes place and emissions fall throughout the century, the net-zero goal isn’t realised until early in the 22^nd century. Nevertheless, warming is limited to 2.2°C above the 1850-1900 baseline period.

The Energy Security Scenarios data shows global renewable capacity at around 3,500 GW in 2023, implying a 2030 goal of around 10,000 GW. The 2023 capacity is comprised of 1,200 GW hydroelectricity, 1,200 GW solar PV (commercial at 800 GW and rooftop at 400 GW) and 1,100 GW wind power. There’s also 100 GW of commercial biomass burning, but not everyone considers this as renewable energy. While hydro and biomass show only modest increases over the remainder of this decade, wind and solar increase substantially in both scenarios. In 2023, solar PV looks to be increasing by about 300 GW and wind by 100 GW, although some of this may be related to COVID delayed projects now coming online. With seven full years before the end of 2030, delivery at these scales could mean some 3,300 GW of solar in total and 1800 GW of wind in 2030, but this is well below the goal of some 10,000 GW even with hydro and biomass included. The deployment rate needs to substantially increase and that is exactly what is happening in Sky 2050.

In Sky 2050 and Archipelagos, the growth to 2035 is shown below.

In Sky 2050 the goal is reached in 2030 but, in Archipelagos, it’s not until about 2035. This isn’t about different levels of ambition across the scenarios, but instead represents the very real headwinds that rapid deployment could face, particularly in the circumstances of Archipelagos. Trade disruption is a major outcome of the story, yet there is an important dependency on trade within the solar PV story. The minerals required, the manufacture of the panels, the grid expansion (including across borders) and even the labour required for installation all depend on good trading relationships and the free movement of people for work. For a goal of 10,000+ GW, which might include 5,000 GW of solar PV, the current global manufacturing capacity and installation capability of around 300+ GW per year would have to at least triple to around 1000 GW per year, which means adding 100 GW of new production and installation capability each and every year between now and 2030. The project pipeline for new manufacturing facilities looks robust, with the limitation on deployment in many locations being grid connectivity.

The second goal is the desire to double the average global rate of energy efficiency improvements across sectors. This is quite hard to unpick without further details, but it certainly doesn’t mean ‘doubling energy efficiency’ as reported by some media outlets. The goal could be in relation to the energy intensity of the global economy, which would be measured in energy use per unit of GDP, or on the provision of energy services, i.e. a true efficiency measure, which could be in units such as tonne-km/MJ for road freight. For this discussion I will focus on the former.

In 2022 global energy use was about 4.6 GJ per US$1000 (2016) GDP. This had improved from 5.64 GJ in 2010, meaning an improvement of some 20% or about 1.5% per year. Presumably the ambition means shifting this to 3% per annum. If this were the case then energy use would fall to around 3.7 GJ per USS$1000 by 2030. Both Sky 2050 and Archipelagos are within this range, sitting respectively 0.1 GJ either side in 2030. Apart from general societal improvements in energy efficiency, which have been ongoing for decades (9.5 GJ per US$1000 (2016) GDP back in 1960), the main driver of change in this decade will be electrification of energy services. For example, using gasoline to power a car has a well-to-wheel efficiency of about 25%, but using electricity derived from solar or wind has a turbine-(or panel)-to-wheel efficiency of around 70% or more (losses in transmission and storage of electricity combined with the efficiency of the vehicle itself). This COP28 goal is a proxy for electrification, in all its forms. That means road transport, home cooking and heating and industrial use of electricity for heat. It looks quite possible, even in the slower Archipelagos transition.

Finally there is the goal relating to hydrogen production, which seems very ambitious, but perhaps this depends on how it is interpreted. The letter calls for an overall doubling of hydrogen production, without a year being given. The Financial Times reported this as ‘Double hydrogen production to 180mn tonnes per year by 2030’. This number relates to the current global production of hydrogen which is about 90 million tonnes per year, but most of this sits within industrial processes such as the Haber process to make ammonia. The Haber process starts with natural gas, and hydrogen is an intermediate product in the production. Most global hydrogen production today comes from natural gas, releasing carbon dioxide as part of the conversion process. Some also comes from coal, with significantly increased emissions as a result.

Hydrogen is also produced as a final energy product where it is then sold for other uses, such as in a fuel cell to power a truck or within a subsequent industrial process. This is where the future lies, with final energy green hydrogen replacing fuels such as diesel in trucks, Jet A1 in planes and coal in iron ore smelting. These applications amount to a small production of final energy hydrogen today, perhaps only 100,000 tonnes per annum. So doubling this number wouldn’t be ambitious at all and is almost certainly not what the letter is calling for.

If we use the current overall global production of hydrogen and wish to double that by 2030, then the COP28 target would have the world at 180 million tonnes per year (as the Financial Times noted), which presumably means about 80 million tonnes for new final energy applications such as fuel cells in transport and iron ore smelting. This is considerably in excess of even the Sky 2050 scenario, which sees 10 million tonnes in 2030 and doesn’t reach 80 million tonnes of final energy hydrogen until 2040. In Archipelagos that date moves out to 2055.

The challenge for hydrogen may not be the ability to produce it, given that electrolyser manufacturing capacity is ramping up very quickly. 80 million tonnes per annum of green hydrogen would require some 600 GW of electrolyser capacity to produce. According to the IEA, global electrolyser manufacturing capacity reached almost 11 GW per year in 2022, and based on company announcements, the global manufacturing capacity for electrolysers could reach more than 130 GW per year by 2030. This could deliver nearly 400 GW of capacity by 2030, still short of the COP28 goal but not markedly so. It’s also possible that significant electrolyser capacity could be introduced to replace the existing steam reforming of natural gas for ammonia production and this would certainly reduce emissions; but it wouldn’t create new demand for hydrogen as required by the target.

The real issue for hydrogen as final energy (or a hydrogen carrier such as ammonia which is being looked at for ships) is creating that demand. There is almost none today. There are very few trucks that use hydrogen fuel cells – no planes, no ships and almost no industrial processes (other than those where it is an intermediate product now). In natural gas-based direct reduction ironmaking hydrogen does play a role, though this is in combination with carbon. Pure hydrogen is not currently used in ironmaking applications apart from a handful of pilot plants. The 10 million tonnes of new hydrogen final energy demand in Sky 2050 by 2030 is largely split between industry and road freight. Shipping is only just emerging in 2030 and aviation not until the 2040s.

While the hydrogen goal seems almost misplaced in its ambition or perhaps has simply been misinterpreted, the package of targets still represents an important step to achieve by the end of this decade. But what is puzzling is why the package didn’t include a specific target for carbon capture and storage given that the UAE and Dr. Sultan al-Jaber have discussed the importance of the technology on many occasions. Irrespective of the objections of some environmental groups, repeated analyses by multiple organisations (including the Shell scenarios) show that without carbon capture and storage technology the 1.5°C goal cannot be realised. We also shouldn’t forget that while CCS projects can take a few years to deliver, their scale is significant at 1+ million tonnes CO₂ per year per project once operational.

A substantial but not unachievable goal for 2030 would be to see the construction of 500 large scale (> 1 million tonnes per annum CO₂) CCS facilities. As of late 2022, the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute reported 30 facilities in operation, 11 under construction and about 150 in various stages of planning.

Note: Shell Scenarios are not predictions or expectations of what will happen, or what will probably happen. They are not expressions of Shell’s strategy, and they are not Shell’s business plan; they are one of the many inputs used by Shell to stretch thinking whilst making decisions. Read more in the Definitions and Cautionary note. Scenarios are informed by data, constructed using models and contain insights from leading experts in the relevant fields. Ultimately, for all readers, scenarios are intended as an aid to making better decisions. They stretch minds, broaden horizons and explore assumptions.

Could the transition drive emissions up?

dchone July 12, 2022

One question that comes up quite regularly about the energy transition is the amount of energy, and therefore emissions, required for the transition itself. This is the energy required for making solar PV modules, wind turbines, batteries and so on. Further up the supply chain there is also the energy required for the additional minerals, such as the lithium, nickel, cobalt and copper found in an electric vehicle (EV). These not only have to be mined, but also go through extensive industrial transformation and refining processes to make the actual materials required for the end use. Today, most of these processes use oil, coal and gas for energy, giving rise to carbon dioxide emissions.

Perhaps the most energy intensive part of the energy transition is the manufacture of lithium-ion batteries, now being widely deployed in EVs. Some commentators have even questioned the effectiveness of the EV as a mitigation route, particularly when the battery is made in China (currently a heavy reliance on coal for energy) and the vehicle is driven in a country with a high electricity emissions intensity (e.g. a country like Poland still largely dependent on coal fired power stations). The problem with this argument is that transitioning in a series of steps (e.g. first decarbonise the electricity supply, then start deploying electric cars) would take decades longer than transitioning in parallel steps (i.e. decarbonising the electricity supply at the same time EVs are deployed). Nevertheless, the parallel approach could drive up emissions in the short term, the question is by how much?

The manufacture of batteries for EVs provides a good example of the problem. In a recent article, MIT report that the Tesla Model 3 holds an 80 kWh lithium-ion battery and the CO₂ emissions for manufacturing that battery would range between 3120 kg (about 3 tons) and 15,680 kg (about 16 tons), depending on the manufacturing location. The article notes that the vast majority of lithium-ion batteries—about 77% of the world’s supply—are manufactured in China, where coal is the primary energy source. That means most batteries are currently made with CO₂ emissions at the higher end of the range, although as battery factories spring up across the world and particularly in the EU and US, that picture will change.

Bringing together a few assumptions about battery manufacture, EV deployment and embedded CO₂ in both manufacture of EV batteries and driving EV cars, it is possible to get a back-of-the-envelope view of the scale of the issue. I will assume the following;

EV production rises from current levels (some 7 million vehicles per year) to all EV production globally by the mid-2030s (i.e. no more internal combustion engine cars are built after that time). This is an aggressive transition, but probably the minimum that is required for a 1.5°C goal.
Higher CO₂ emission battery manufacture is currently at 77%, but the share declines to 40% by 2060 and the higher CO₂ emissions also fall by 75% over the same timeframe as the manufacturing system decarbonises.
Lower CO₂ emissions manufacture is therefore 23% now, but rises to 60% by 2060 and the manufacturing CO₂ emissions fall to zero by 2050. Decarbonising industry to such an extent will require a variety of technologies, with carbon capture and storage playing a critical role.
The 80 kWh battery delivers 300 miles of range and the average vehicle travels 10,000 miles per year.
The electricity supply which EVs use is on average 0.4 tonnes CO₂ per MWh now, falling to zero by 2060. The actual global average grid intensity is higher than 0.4 today, but EVs tend to be driven in lower intensity regions at the moment, e.g. the EU, California etc.
An EV produced today has a 15 year life.
The EV mitigates emissions from internal combustion engine vehicles at a rate of 120 gms/km. As a simplification, this doesn’t change throughout the calculation. It assumes that smaller cars are replaced earlier and that the average fleet efficiency of internal combustion vehicles improves over time.
The battery represents a net increase in car manufacturing emissions with other emissions in the manufacturing process about the same for both EVs and internal combustion vehicles.

The calculation is for net-emissions, which is;

[Battery manufacturing emissions] + [Indirect EV emissions during driving] – [Gasoline / Diesel emissions backed out by EVs] = Net Emissions

What we see from the charts below is that global passenger car emissions rise before they start falling when net-emissions cross the zero line. This happens in 2035. Clearly the year in which this happens depends on the assumptions made, with the CO₂ from internal combustion vehicles not being used being a key determinant. For example, if this is raised to 180 gm CO₂/km, the crossover point is around 2030.

The outcome certainly points to the longer term benefit of the EV transition, with global cumulative emissions over 25 Gt lower in 2060 than they would otherwise be. This is a material reduction when thinking about a 500 Gt carbon budget for 1.5°C. However, it also highlights an issue with the current global goal to reduce emissions by 45% by 2030 relative to 2010, as set out in the Glasgow Climate Pact; the EV revolution that we are currently in the midst of is unlikely to contribute to that reduction. If anything, it could make the task even more difficult.

In a post some time back I noted that the only real opportunities for change which could make a material difference to global CO₂ emissions by 2030 are where replacement technologies are already being manufactured at scale or where governments are prepared to create social change. This quickly reduces the options to only three major opportunities:

Significantly curtailing coal-fired power generation through replacement with renewables;
Replacing internal combustion engine vehicles with electric vehicles; and
Ending deforestation.

Passenger vehicle emissions account for 4 Gt, or 10%, of global CO2 emissions today. If change in this sector can’t deliver any net reductions by 2030 and potentially adds to global emissions, then it calls into question any possibility of a 45% reduction in 8 years. Almost perversely, if EV production could be ramped up in the short term, the problem for 2030 gets worse while the longer term net global cumulative emissions picture gets better.

None of the above is to meant to argue against an EV transition, it is clearly the right way to go. But like many other aspects of the energy transition, it is more complex than it looks.

The role of CCS in hydrogen production

dchone February 9, 2022

A recent report by Global Witness has cast doubt on the value that carbon capture and storage (CCS) can bring to the mitigation of emissions associated with hydrogen manufacture from natural gas. This is based on an analysis of the Quest CCS project in Canada. However, the report fails to discuss the full context in which this project was developed and therefore draws an incorrect conclusion as to the benefits delivered by the project and the prospect for CCS linked to future hydrogen production.

Just over 20 years ago, I attended my first meeting of the Shell Canada Greenhouse Gas Advisory Panel. Shell Canada had established this panel to recommend and oversee measures to manage the carbon footprint of its operations at that time. Led by the then President/CEO, the panel included Shell Canada staff, representatives from Canadian and international NGOs and First Nations, and me representing the broader Shell group.

We met 2-3 times per year up until the mid-2000s and the Shell Canada team took forward a number of the panel’s recommendations to reduce emissions at Shell’s operations in Alberta. One of the earliest discussion points was around the need to develop CCS at Shell’s Scotford Complex in Alberta. These were the early discussions that led to the Quest CCS project.

Shell opened the Scotford Complex in 1984 with a refinery and chemicals plants, then expanded it in the early 2000s to process heavy oil into refined petroleum products. To do this, Scotford incorporated an ‘upgrader’, a unit that transforms bitumen into a light/sweet synthetic crude oil by fractionation and hydrogenation (improving the hydrogen to carbon ratio of the oil).

At the time, some of the hydrogen at the Scotford Complex originated from a nearby industrial facility where it was a by-product. But as Scotford grew with increasing production, Shell built a steam-methane reformer (SMR) to produce its own hydrogen. This is a process where natural gas is converted to hydrogen, with the remaining carbon being emitted as carbon dioxide from the process. A simplified representation of the process is;

CH₄ (natural gas) + 2H₂O (water as steam) –> CO₂ (carbon dioxide emitted) + 4H₂ (hydrogen produced)

In the case of a conventional SMR, which the original unit is, additional CO₂ is also emitted from the process when natural gas is burned to provide energy.

Fast forward to today, Quest CCS has been running since 2015 and captures just over one million tonnes of CO₂ each year – more reliably and at a lower cost than expected – with the CO₂ coming from the reaction outlined above in the steam reformer that produces hydrogen for the upgrader.

Quest was designed as a million-tonne unit to capture one third of the emissions from the Scotford upgrader. Its purpose was to demonstrate not only that CO2 could be captured, but also that it could be stored more than 2 km underground in a geological formation that lies under much of Western Canada called the Basal Cambrian Sands. Quest is part of a knowledge sharing effort with the governments of Alberta and Canada to encourage wider use of CCS technology and bring down future costs. As such, its designs, emissions data and certain intellectual property are publicly available on the Government of Alberta website.

Quest was not, however, designed to capture all of the CO₂ emissions associated with steam reforming of methane to make hydrogen. Nor has Shell claimed in its publicity that Quest is capable of capturing all CO2 emissions from the hydrogen plants or the upgrader. Annual performance reports on the Government of Alberta’s website have been audited and reviewed, and reflect an accurate characterization of what Quest has achieved to date: it has successfully captured and then permanently stored underground more than six million tonnes of CO₂.

And importantly, Quest was not designed to produce blue hydrogen, and as such, it should not be used as an example of blue hydrogen production. Rather, Quest was designed to demonstrate that capture and storage of CO₂ does work; and it has done just that.

Diagrammatic representation of Scotford CCS. Source: Shell Canada

Since Quest began operating, the energy transition has gathered pace and the role of hydrogen as an energy carrier has become a focus of attention. As a result, how hydrogen is produced has also become an important consideration. There are two approaches under consideration for a world that needs to head towards net-zero emissions.

Green hydrogen – this is produced by the electrolysis of water using electricity from renewable energy sources. The basic process dates back over 200 years, but it has remained a relatively small scale process, until very recently. Now electrolysers are growing rapidly in size with Shell amongst a handful of companies installing very large units. In July last year, Europe’s largest PEM hydrogen electrolyser began operations at Shell’s Energy and Chemicals Park Rheinland, producing green hydrogen.
Blue hydrogen – this is produced through the conversion of natural gas to hydrogen, with a very high percentage of the carbon dioxide which would otherwise be emitted by the facility, captured and geologically stored. Although the Quest CCS project captures and stores CO₂ from hydrogen production, this is not a blue hydrogen facility. That is because only a portion of the CO₂ is captured, as per the design criteria discussed above.

The Global Witness report has drawn on the Quest experience and used it to criticise the carbon footprint of blue hydrogen. The report concludes that future blue hydrogen projects should not be considered based on the observation that the existing hydrogen facility on which Quest is attached continues to emit a good portion of total CO₂ produced.

But the analysis fails to contextualize Quest and doesn’t consider that future blue hydrogen projects would be designed very differently to Quest and the associated hydrogen plant, even employing different process technology for the methane conversion itself which in turns makes CO₂ capture much more manageable and cost effective. For example, the proposed Polaris CCS project that Shell is planning for Scoford’s refinery and chemicals plants would include what’s called ‘post-combustion capture’ which has the more than 90% CO2 capture rates needed to produce blue hydrogen.

The route towards the current best process for blue hydrogen is described in a white paper produced by Shell Catalysts and Technologies, with its infographic shown below. The paper indicates the possibility of >99% CO₂ capture in the Shell gas partial oxidation process (SGP).

Hydrogen processes with CCS. Source: Shell Catalysts and Technologies

As the century unfolds and the energy transition takes hold, hydrogen may become an important part of the new energy system. So society needs to be able to produce it at scale and do this quickly. Hydrogen from renewable sources and from natural gas with CCS will be required to meet demand. Both routes are more than capable of delivering hydrogen with a very low carbon footprint and ultimately cost will decide the winner, including the carbon cost associated with managing any ongoing emissions attributable to either process.

Is it time to open up the EU ETS again?

dchone January 20, 2022

As the new year gets going, the EU is facing much higher energy prices than it has had to contend with in the recent past, topped off with an escalating carbon price driven both by the energy price and the ambitious decarbonisation plans of the EU Commission. Starting in late 2020 at a price of around €20, the purchase of an EU allowance (EUA) in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) now costs between €80 and €90 per tonne of CO₂.

The current allowance price in the EU ETS provides a significant incentive to reduce emissions, including investment in substantial mitigation technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS). As such, this is a welcome and critically important change from over a decade of prices below €20 and a low of €3 where the system did little to encourage the energy transition. For much of the 2010s the ETS was awash in allowances, with the surplus brought about by the financial crisis and subsequent EU recession, the influx of units from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol and the overlaying of other policies in the ETS sector, a practice that erodes the need for a specific carbon price and will undermine its impact.

We are now in a world where the EU ETS is driving substantial mitigation action, which is exactly what it is supposed to do. The question that arises is what comes next? One way of answering that question is to look at a scenario analysis of the EU net-zero emissions goal, such as in the Shell EU Sketch released by the Shell Scenario team a bit over a year ago.

A deeper look at the Shell EU Sketch highlights the ambition of the Fit for 55 (FF55) goal. Even in the scenario, the reduction planned under FF55 for the EU ETS sector isn’t fully met in 2030, but instead requires another five years of effort. In addition the energy transformation in the EU is not yet fully matching that of the Sketch. Take for example the build rate of CCS facilities in the Sketch versus the real world. At the rate of change in the Sketch, some 40 major (~ 1 mtpa each) CCS facilities need to be operating by 2030 and over 100 by 2035. The EU has finally started developing CCS clusters, but not yet fast enough to meet these goals. This implies that during the 2020s the EU ETS could see further price escalation if project activity does not fully match the reduction goals of the system.

The Fit for 55 package of measures and targets is extraordinary ambitious, contributing to the global reductions required to avoid passing 1.5°C of warming and setting up the EU for a landing at net-zero emissions in 2050. It does need a meaningful carbon price to usher in the transition, but in the Shell EU Sketch it rises to around €60 by 2030 and €200 by 2050 (but on a much smaller level of emissions than today). The current price of an EU allowance should usher in real change for industry and industrial processes, which is needed, but a continuing steep up-trend may also be a sign of a system that is becoming overly constrained by the rate of reduction required compared to the rate at which projects can be implemented.

When the EU ETS first started the Kyoto Protocol was coming into force and we all imagined a world of interconnected cap-and-trade systems, ambitious clean energy projects in developing countries and a resultant liquid global carbon market. With substantial demand coming from the Kyoto signatory countries with targets and good supply from clean energy projects, the resultant carbon market would be of sufficient size to deliver cost savings to all participants. Importantly, major price spikes could be managed. Almost none of this happened.

In the process, the EU ETS was designed with external hooks to make use of the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM and Joint Implementation or JI) and to connect with other systems. With the prospect of an Australian ETS about a decade ago the EU began early negotiations with the Australian Government to link the systems, but a change of government in Australia put an end to the Australian efforts. With the US leaving Kyoto and other countries making little use of the mechanisms, the EU ETS was left as the only real buyer of emission reduction units (CER) from the CDM. So it was flooded with them, contributing to the 2008 price collapse. The EU rightly closed the doors and it wasn’t until 2020 when they were partly reopened with a link to the Switzerland ETS.

Industry will be feeling the competitive pressure and rising fuel bills for citizens opens the door to voter anger when it comes to elections if the EU ETS price continues to rise without adequate relief valve mechanisms. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) would offer some reprieve as it starts releasing banked allowances, but a longer term solution could also be found through Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The EU ETS could open itself to projects executed under the 6.4 mechanism and transferred into the EU ETS via 6.2, along with the necessary corresponding adjustments to the counterparty country nationally determined contribution (NDC). I discussed the corresponding adjustment mechanism in my last post of 2021. The transfer provision under 6.2 also provides an opportunity to link with other trading systems, such as the recently created UK ETS.

Making use of Article 6 will be a very different experience to that with the CDM. This is a mechanism that operates between two nationally determined contributions (NDC), each with its own plan to reduce emissions, but each plan must be converted to a carbon budget for the period of the NDC in order to use Article 6. The rules for doing this were thrashed out in Glasgow and can be found in III.B of the decision. When the transfer between NDCs is executed, a corresponding adjustment must be made to the respective carbon budgets. This means that the selling country must make up the amount of the sale through additional actions within their NDC, which ensures that the overall reduction goals of the respective NDCs are maintained. Under the CDM, no such provision existed.

With robust Article 6 accounting standards, the EU can have confidence that environmental integrity is preserved and that real reductions are delivered through the ETS. This was always a concern with the CDM. However, there is a fine balance to be achieved when creating a relief valve in that a sharp fall in the carbon price is not helpful for investment. As such, the EU might initially look to trade with a very limited number of countries, such as those with similar ETS structures. The UK, New Zealand and South Korea could all fall into this category.

By opening up the ETS the EU will promote confidence in international carbon trading, which will become an increasingly important part of the mitigation toolkit as the world gets closer to net-zero emissions. This is because remaining emissions and the availability of sinks to balance won’t always be in the same jurisdiction. But most importantly, a larger trading system will lower overall costs for the same reduction goals or alternatively may promote greater ambition, which is certainly needed and was called for in the Glasgow Climate Pact. This will benefit everyone.

A Climate-Neutral EU by 2050

dchone May 5, 2020

As the EU works to reset its emission reduction goals to align more closely with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement, a question arises around the scale and scope of the energy transition required. What will it look like? How fast should it proceed? Which technologies need to be accelerated to achieve the desired outcome? To help answer these and provide a perspective on the transition, my colleagues in the Shell Scenario team have produced a scenario sketch of the journey forward, arriving in 2050 with a net-zero emissions energy system (NB: The pathway was formulated in late 2019 prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and therefore does not include the energy system disruption being seen in 2020).

From a policy perspective, the EU has been addressing the climate issue for at least 15 years, with the EU Emissions Trading System in place since 2005. The 2020 energy situation arises from the 2007 climate and energy package, which included three key targets:

20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels)
20% of EU energy from renewables
20% improvement in energy efficiency

The targets were set by EU leaders in 2007 and enacted in legislation in 2009. They are also headline targets of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Within this, the EU Emissions Trading System is the EU’s key tool for cutting greenhouse gas emissions from large-scale facilities in the power and industry sectors, as well as the aviation sector. The ETS covers around 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. In 2020, the target is for the emissions from these sectors to be 21% lower than in 2005.

The year 2020 represents a halfway point from 1990 to 2050, during which 20% of the hard deployment work has been done, but with a number of key technologies available at scale that hardly existed or didn’t exist around the turn of the century. Solar PV and Electric Vehicles are two examples (although solar PV did exist in 2000, it was expensive and small scale). That leaves just 30 years for the remaining 80% reduction, which must also include bringing to scale several other technologies which are yet to be deployed in the EU. This is a tall order and the scenario sketch illustrates how extraordinarily stretching it will be.

The additional key technologies that must move quickly to scaled deployment are as follows;

Clean hydrogen production via electrolysis of water or removing and storing the carbon from natural gas;
Hydrogen fuel cell road transport for heavy goods (see chart below).
Carbon capture and storage in various industrial settings – e.g. steel, cement, petrochemicals.
Biomass power plants fitted with carbon capture and storage (as a negative emissions technology).
Air transport that utilizes hydrogen as a fuel – in the sketch first flights are imagined in the mid-2030s.
Advanced biofuels for planes, ships and heavy road transport (see chart below).
Grid scale electricity storage.
Electrification of light and heavy industry processes.
Use of hydrogen in homes for heating and cooking.
Some technologies that appear late in the sketch will need intensive development over the medium term. Hydrogen as a fuel for industrial facilities, but particularly iron ore smelting, is a good example.

On the assumption that development and demonstration of all the above proceeds rapidly, deployment kicks in for most during the 2030s. But in the 2020s the energy technologies that have been nurtured over the last twenty years must be accelerated. For example, by 2030 solar must be quadruple current deployment, wind nearly triple current deployment and nuclear must be growing again, not declining.

In the 2030s the really hard work starts, with carbon capture and storage moving from first demonstration in the EU by 2025 to 40 medium sized facilities (one million tonnes CO2 stored per annum) by 2030 and over 100 by 2035. New technologies such as hydrogen fuel cell trucks must become ubiquitous during the 2030s, with at least 600,000 vehicles on the road by the end of that decade.

All of the above will require both technology development incentives and deployment policies. The analysis assumes a rising carbon pricing mechanism – whether explicit or implicit – to more than €200 per tonne of CO2 equivalent by 2050 to deliver and sustain the emission cuts and CO2 management necessary for the EU to reach climate neutrality. But even the EU ETS will need to change, as I discussed in a recent post.

While carbon pricing is an efficient lever for reallocating resources and driving behavioural change, it will not be enough on its own. A sectoral approach to policy which brings clean technologies, fuels and products to market, as well as their deployment and diffusion at scale, must urgently be developed. It is essential that policy should help provide consumers and businesses with low-carbon alternatives to adopt.

In the sketch, 2050 marks a point of climate neutrality for Europe, helped by the development of large scale carbon sinks through reforestation. But this isn’t the end of the transition, merely a point of significance. The hydrogen economy will continue to grow, electrification of industry will expand and efficiency gains will continue to be made. As was illustrated in the Sky Scenario, Europe will likely shift to become a net-negative emission economy during the second half of the century, a necessary requirement to ensure global net zero emissions and a 1.5°C limit on warming.

Download the EU Sketch here.

Getting to net-zero emissions with the EU ETS

dchone February 3, 2020

Perhaps the biggest policy development of 2020 (possibly lasting through to 2023 or so as all the legislative requirements are agreed and put in place) will be the EU laying the foundations for its declared goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. Although the goal of net-zero was always there as an intention, the date of 2050 brings it close enough to require policy makers to give thought and then substance to the mechanisms that will deliver it. One such mechanism is the EU Emissions Trading system, which has now been operating for 15 years (but effectively 20 years from a design perspective) and covers the large emitters across the EU as well as encompassing intra-EU aviation.

The EU ETS functions by progressively reducing the number of allowances available to emitters on a linear trajectory, which means that under current plans the number of allowances issued each year will fall by about 48 million units, with 2020 allocation limited to around 1.8 billion allowances. Subsequent phases of the EU ETS, potentially including the current Phase IV, will need to see an increase in the annual reduction of allowances such that the system reaches zero in 2050. Based on a continuation of the EU ETS under the current trajectory it won’t reach zero until the late 2050s. A revision in the system could operate from the start of Phase IV, i.e. in January 2021, which means that the current 2030 goal would change. If the revision comes in from the start of Phase V, then that implies an even steeper decline for the period 2031 to 2050.

While the mechanics of the cap-and-trade architecture is very simple, the reality of 2050 is not. Under a revised EU ETS, from January 1st 2050 (or perhaps 2051) there will be no further allocation of allowances, either by auction or freely given. Yet this may not be a time in which there are no emissions – thirty years is possibly insufficient time for the complete turnover of everything in the large emitters system. Some industrial facilities, much of the aviation sector and even some power stations in parts of Europe may still be using fossil fuels as their energy source or will be emitting carbon dioxide from a conversion process (e.g. cement manufacture). Any remaining banked allowances and allowances in the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) will be quickly consumed against these ongoing remaining emissions.

The potential for remaining EU emissions can be seen in the Shell Sky Scenario, released in 2018. Even though the scenario represents a period of very rapid energy system and industrial transition, the time from now to 2050 isn’t sufficient to bring heavy industry, aviation and power generation to zero. Even in 2070 significant aviation emissions remain and require balancing with the net negative situation reached in the power sector through the deployment of bioenergy with CCS.

N.B. Sky aviation emissions include international aviation whereas the EU ETS does not.

So how will the EU ETS work once it runs out of allowances?

The key to the future operation of the EU ETS lies within the objective it is trying to deliver, net-zero emissions. Net-zero means that there is a balance between remaining emissions and the removal of the equivalent amount of carbon dioxide form the atmosphere, i.e. a sink. This stems from Article 4 of the Paris Agreement;

Article 4

. . . . . . so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century . . . . . .

However, the EU ETS is currently an allowance issuance and surrender system, which points to a change in its structure at some point in the period leading up to 2050. This would require the introduction of a unit into the EU ETS that represented a ton of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere and permanently sequestered. From 2050, the EU ETS would then become a system without allowances that managed the balance between remaining emissions and sinks, at least until emissions actually reached zero. Policy makers would need to define the parameters of the unit such that it could be relied upon to provide sufficient volume for the required balance. Two considerations would be key;

Whether the units came from within the EU or also from outside the EU under the accounting framework of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (i.e. the use of corresponding adjustments between NDCs to avoid double counting);
The type of sequestration opportunities permitted, which could include geological (e.g. direct air capture with geological storage), natural (e.g. reforestation projects) or product based (e.g. manufacture of products used in society such as plastics).

These units wouldn’t be issued directly by the EU governments in the way allowances are today, but would be made available for sale to emitters from projects that sequestered carbon dioxide. Governments would of course be involved in issuance of units to the sequestration projects against verified permanent storage of carbon dioxide.

A further consideration would be when such a unit is introduced into the EU ETS and how sufficient removal capacity is developed prior to 2050 to ensure there is enough available when net-zero emissions is required. This will be a judgment call arrived at through transition scenario analysis. However, the point in time when the unit will first be needed is not 2050, but when the allowance decline pathway first crosses the actual decline in emissions pathway. The illustration below shows how this might happen as reductions become more challenging over time.

To date, the actual reduction in emissions has typically been faster than the decline in allowance availability, hence the allowance surplus that developed in the 2010s and the creation of the MSR which has acted as an allowance removal mechanism (but it can also return allowances). These lines could potentially cross at some point in the 2030s, so the point of introduction could be at the start of Phase V of the ETS, i.e. 2031.

The EU Commission has developed a similar chart for their own communications, although this is for the transport sector as a whole, much of which is not currently covered by the EU ETS. However, expanding coverage is another option on the table. If such an expansion introduces more activities that may have remaining emissions in 2050, then the need for a sink unit becomes more important.

A provision such as described above might be seen by some as a backstop in EU ETS, but nevertheless an essential one for continuing smooth operation of the system. Without it, the EU ETS could become unstable in the years approaching 2050 as immediate mitigation opportunities for remaining emissions become unavailable and there are insufficient allowances available to cover these emissions.

Getting to net-zero emissions in the UK

dchone May 9, 2019

Last week the Climate Change Committee (CCC) in the UK released its much anticipated report which is recommending that the government revise its emissions goal to net-zero in 2050. The Committee notes that this is an appropriate UK contribution towards the global need of meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. The recommendation also follows in the wake of the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C, which identified 2050 as the year in which the global economy should attempt to reach net-zero emissions in order to limit warming to 1.5°C with a 66% probability.

The recommendation is a shift from the current UK target which would see the country reach an 80% reduction by 2050, in support of which the country is broadly on track to deliver the first 3 interim carbon budgets to 2022. However, as it looks past 2022 the CCC notes there is insufficient early development of some technologies for the heavy lifting ahead. Examples of this include carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen for a variety of uses.

Nevertheless, the state of technology development, deployment and availability has shifted since the time of the first UK target back in 2008. The cost of wind and solar has dropped significantly, offshore wind is now a viable proposition, many electric car models are available and while not in the UK, some 20 CCS facilities are now running in various parts of the world. All of the technologies required to do the job set out by the CCC are in plain sight, although a number still require significant UK development for deployment in this country. The CCC report is also very clear on this issue.

2050 is just over thirty years away and that same time period reflecting backwards marks the time that I first arrived in the UK with Shell. In the next 30 years the whole energy system will need to shift to achieve net-zero emissions, but how does that compare with the changes seen over the last 30 years. While two thirds of that period has not been covered by the Climate Change Act and its carbon budgets, all but three years have been covered by the UK ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The Sankey diagrams below reflect the change over the period, although the most recent from the IEA are 2016, so they won’t show the last two years of renewable energy development.

Overall primary energy consumption has fallen, with the most visible change being the shift away from coal and towards natural gas in power generation. Both bioenergy and renewables have also added to the generation mix. Nuclear plays an important and steady base load function. Natural gas is now the dominant contributor to the current power generation sector and in the past year there have been periods where coal has not played a role at all. Back in 1989 coal made up most of the generating capacity. Oil demand within the UK has hardly changed over thirty years (slightly up) although production has halved.

As noted above, one feature that has surged since 2016 is the proportion of renewable energy in the generation mix. Recent figures from BEIS show that wind and solar have now exceeded nuclear on a quarterly basis.

In the final energy system, the changes are more nuanced. The overall share of electricity has moved from 16.7% of final energy to 20.4%, or a shift of 3.7% points in 27 years. The global rate of change is tracking at 2% points per decade, so the UK is well short of that pace of transition. A net zero emissions economy would likely need electricity to be the major component of final energy, say around 60%, so the UK rate of change will need to shift from 1.37% points per decade to around 11% points in each of the coming decades.

Transport hasn’t shifted at all in the past 30 years, with oil use in transport slightly increasing. Electricity is just starting to creep into this mix, but pure electric vehicles have reached only 0.7% (2018) of new car sales. Worryingly, the total number of petrol and diesel cars registered in the UK in 2018 was unchanged from 2013, a period which has seen the first major push to get consumers to go electric. Reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 will not just mean seeing all new purchases as electric, but seeing all new purchases from about 2035 onwards as electric. It can take up to 15 years to completely turn over the entire on-the-road fleet, although a future government could presumably accelerate this process with a buy-back-and-scrap scheme.

In the industrial sector, energy consumption has dropped by nearly a third, presumably through efficiency improvements as industrial output has hardly changed (see chart below). Importantly, electricity use has stayed largely the same. This means that the sector is gradually electrifying, although again the pace of change is below that required.
UK Industrial Production (1970-2019).

Then there are the tricky bits, where the UK has made only limited progress. The CCC notes that radical change is needed in home heating, including a shift to hydrogen and heat pumps, with support from much better home insulation. But residential natural gas use has marginally increased in 30 years, despite significant improvements in boiler efficiency and the use of electricity instead of gas for new apartment buildings. One highlight in this area is the recent milestone of one million homes now being supplied with biomethane.

The overall change in 30 years has been one of continually falling greenhouse gas emissions, with much of the gain coming from natural gas replacing coal and a fall in industrial energy use. While the impetus for change over the last 30 years was perhaps not as great as it is now, the overall shift is symptomatic of typical energy system dynamics; rapid adjustment has never been a feature, primarily due to the large capital stock involved. Outside the energy sector change over the same period has been dramatic. In 1989 there was no internet, no social media, hardly a mobile phone to be seen and televisions were defined more by their depth than their width. So can the UK reach these sorts of transition rates and achieve the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050?

In the power generation sector, zero emissions should be entirely achievable in that time frame. Renewables are surging and new nuclear capacity is now under construction (although even getting that started took a decade). Similarly, with the models on offer or on their way, passenger vehicles could be entirely electric and various cities across the UK have demonstrated that electric buses are now a viable option. But there is no real sign of change for heavy goods vehicles, shipping or aviation. Perhaps the biggest challenge sits with the use of natural gas in homes and industry. It is easy to use, clean, provides a very high heat load and is backed by extensive infrastructure. Hydrogen and electrification are potential pathways forward, but as noted the electrification rate of change has to shift by nearly an order of magnitude. For hydrogen there are promising signs of change with the government now funding a major programme on supply and conversion of existing facilities away from natural gas.

Finally, there is carbon capture and storage (CCS), which may be a simpler solution in many applications than attempting to dislodge natural gas. CCS in combination with direct air capture (still a nascent technology) may also be needed to balance out emissions in sectors such as aviation. Even the production of hydrogen may be easiest at scale from natural gas, which would then also require CCS. The UK has tried and tried again with CCS, but there is still no operational facility to show for all the efforts made. Yet the UK is both pipeline dense and geologically gifted in terms of storage potential, so deployment could proceed given the right incentives to begin.

The Climate Change Committee have put forward a bold recommendation, but it is not without immense challenge. It ought to be possible to achieve the 2050 goal of net-zero emissions, but it won’t happen without some significant nudging by the government in a number of key areas. Policy decisions over the coming five years may well set the scene for the next twenty, so there is everything to play for.

What next for coal?

dchone December 5, 2018

With COP24 now underway deep in the heart of coal country in Poland, we can’t help but be reminded of the important role that coal still plays in the energy system today.

There is hardly an economy in the world today that hasn’t relied on coal for its industrial development. A few have done so, notably Japan (although even in that country coal mining rose to some 55 million tonnes per annum during the Second World War), but most economies have developed on the back of coal, or oil and gas where these were in abundance domestically. It was the use of coal that supported the rise of industry in Germany, Great Britain, the US and Australia and more recently in China, South Africa and now India.

Coal is a relatively easy resource to tap into and make use of. It requires little technology to get going but offers a great deal, such as electricity, railways (in the early days), heating, industry and very importantly, smelting (e.g., steel making). For both Great Britain and the US, coal provided the impetus for the Industrial Revolution. In the case of the latter, very easy-to-access oil soon followed, and mobility flourished, which added enormously to the development of the continent.

Over a century ago, coal was used widely to produce gas for lighting and heating and in two instances, coal has also been used to supply liquid fuels. In Germany during the Second World War, coal was steam reformed and then catalytically converted to diesel fuels for the military. The same process was developed in South Africa during the apartheid years when oil was partly embargoed and remains today with the legacy of the two largest single point sources of carbon dioxide emissions on the planet. Coal is also used in China to make hydrogen for ammonia plants, a critical part of the fertilizer industry.

But the legacy that this leaves, apart from a wealthier society, is a lock-in of the resource on which the society was built. So much infrastructure is constructed on the back of the resource that it becomes almost impossible to replace or do without, particularly if the resource is still providing value.

As developing economies emerge, they too look at resources such as coal. Although natural gas is cleaner and offers many environmental benefits over coal (including lower carbon dioxide emissions), it also requires a higher level of infrastructure and technology to access and use, so it may not be a natural starting point. It often comes later, but in many instances it has been used as well as the coal rather than instead of it. Even in the US, the recent natural gas boom has not completely displaced its energy equivalent in coal extraction; rather, some of the coal has shifted to the export market.

A stark reality of the 21^st century is that despite great technical prowess, society still cannot offer a developing country a route towards a full industrial economy that does not involve coal. Little wonder then, as the UN published new data on rising carbon dioxide emissions, that the New York Times prominently featured a story titled “The World Needs to Quit Coal. Why Is It So Hard?”. In fact, the article only discussed the easiest of the current uses for coal to dislodge, as a source for electricity. Solar, wind and nuclear all offer zero emission alternatives and natural gas can offer a much lower emissions pathway. But coal is used abundantly in industry, particularly for iron ore smelting where it is fundamental to the conversion process itself.

Yet as the New York Times clearly point out, coal use must start to decline and do so quickly. In the Sky Scenario, released earlier this year by Shell, even an expansion of natural gas use and very aggressive deployment of renewables only sees coal plateau globally, with the real decline not emerging until the 2030s. This may be the best that can be achieved, given the number of new coal fired power stations being built in Asia, many part of China’s Belt and Road initiative.

The future of coal will depend on a variety of developments. Renewable energy deployment will certainly play a role, but it’s effectiveness in displacing coal will depend on how well it can be integrated into the electricity grid. Will we still need base load? South Australia has shown that not to be the case, with a mix of wind, solar, natural gas and interconnectors, glued together with a 100 MW Tesla battery, but has experienced something of a difficult journey to reach that point; the state was an early adopter, so presumably others will fare better.

But coal also needs to be dislodged from industry or married with carbon capture and storage where alternatives don’t present themselves. This means rapid development on several fronts;

Industrial processes need to find alternative sources for heat or even electrify their processes where possible.
A new smelting process needs to emerge for iron ore. Two look promising.
1. In Abu Dhabi, Emirates Steel use natural gas for smelting and have added carbon capture to the process.
2. In Sweden, there are plans for a first demonstration plant using hydrogen for iron ore reduction.
Carbon capture and storage needs to be deployed much more rapidly than is the case today, but there is a dependency on government policy emerging to incentivise its application or ultimately require it.

A recently released report by the Energies Transition Commission looks in depth at a number of sectors where abatement has yet to start, but concludes that there are technologies available to begin the journey to net-zero emissions and to deliver such an outcome.

All the above does happen in the Sky scenario and at an accelerated pace. The likely real world outcome is that coal will be with us for some time yet before we bid it farewell. Even late in this century, coal may well remain the feedstock of choice in some countries for petrochemicals. It could well be a very long goodbye.

Note: Scenarios are not intended to be predictions of likely future events or outcomes and investors should not rely on them when making an investment decision with regard to Royal Dutch Shell plc securities. Please read the full cautionary note in www.shell.com/skyscenario.

After San Francisco . . . .

dchone September 27, 2018

In mid-September the climate change focused world turned its attention to San Francisco to attend, watch, listen and participate in the myriad of events surrounding the Global Climate Action Summit. The Summit was designed to show the extent of action taking place around the world to respond to climate change, but it was also a political statement of intent that the United States remained committed to the goals of the Paris Agreement through the actions of States, cities and the business sector.

There is no doubt that a wide range of actions are underway and that a major energy transition is in its early days of ushering in significant change. But does all this add up to a pathway that meets the goals of the Paris Agreement? Earlier this year Shell published its Sky scenario, which illustrates the depth and breadth of change required in the coming decades. One of the key drivers of the required change in Sky is the widespread use of policy mechanisms, both market based and mandated requirements. Within the mix, carbon pricing looms large, as shown in the chart below.

The exact nature of the carbon pricing mechanism is not specified in Sky, but it would include all the various forms seen around the world today, ranging from taxes, cap-and-trade, baseline-and-credit and so on. What is clear though in Sky, is that even by 2020 some form of carbon pricing is at least getting going in most jurisdictions and that by 2030 it is very well established, both in terms of coverage and impact.

Yet in the days after the San Francisco summit, the OECD released a report which showed just how large the gap is between where the world ought to be with this policy approach and where it actually is. The report looks at the use of carbon taxes, carbon allowance-based systems and specific fossil fuel taxes. The report notes that the latter have distorted the overall picture owing to the prevalence of gasoline taxes in various parts of the world. These taxes have led to greater efficiency in markets where they are imposed, but have not ushered in a transport transition.

Overall the report finds that the aggregate carbon pricing gap is declining at a snail’s pace. Using EUR 30 per tonne of CO2 as a benchmark, the gap for the 42 countries (OECD+G20 cover 80% of global emissions) as a whole dropped from 83% in 2012 to 79.5% in 2015, and is estimated to reach 76.5% in 2018. The authors note that new carbon pricing initiatives have the potential to significantly reduce the carbon pricing gap, with emphasis on the China ETS starting up soon. However, the report doesn’t include recent back-tracking such as in Ontario where the cap-and-trade system was halted. Even more recently, political disagreement has led to another setback in Australian climate policy.

Even as carbon pricing slowly grows in coverage, more companies adopt science-based targets and more cities pledge to use renewable energy and force certain vehicle types out of use, global emissions continue to rise. The sum of the parts is not yet close to adding up to a change of direction for the whole. This may be related to one salient aspect of the OECD report; the lack of carbon pricing coverage of industrial emissions. In the chart below extracted from the OECD report, industrial emissions are hardly touched by carbon pricing, yet as global development proceeds rapidly and GDP rises, it is industrial emissions that rise as cities are constructed, cars built and domestic appliances manufactured in the hundreds of millions of units.

For the most part industrial emissions are not covered by city pledges and looking at the list of companies with science-based targets, large industrial entities are a small subset of the ~500 companies that have adopted this approach. Even at national level, industrial emissions have been difficult to account for. Many OECD countries have moved industrial operations offshore, therefore seeing an apparent fall in domestic emissions even as they import embedded emissions in various goods and services.

San Francisco was a landmark event and a timely celebration of progress to date, but so much more remains to be done. At the heart of the effort must be a more comprehensive and joined up approach across national borders to carbon pricing. Voluntary and locally mandated distributed action is a worthy stopgap measure, but it is unlikely to put the world on a ‘well below 2°C’ pathway.